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Bryan D. Smith, Esq. -ISB #4411
B. J. Drisco", Esq. - ISB # 7010
SMITH, DRISCOLL & ASSOCIATES, PllC

-82011

414 Shoup Ave.
P.O. Box 50731
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405
Telephone: (208) 524-0731

MADISON

Facsimile: (208) 529-4166
Attorneys for Defendant and Counterclaimant
Highway 101 Investments, LLC
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF MADISON
KENTON D. JOHNSON, a married man
dealing with his sole and separate property
and NEPHI H. ALLEN, a married man dealing
with his sole and separate property, and
REXBURG PLUMBING & HEATING LLC, an
Idaho limited liability company,

Case No. CV-I0-115
REPLY TO PLAINTIFFS' OPPOSITION TO
HIGHWAY 101'5 MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Plaintiffs,

v.
HIGHWAY 101 INVESTMENTS, LLC,
Defendant,

HIGHWAY 101 INVESTMENTS, LLC,
Counterclaim ant,

v.
KENTON D. JOHNSON, a married man
dealing with his sole and separate property
and NEPHI H. ALLEN, a married man dealing
with his sole and separate property, and
REXBURG PLUMBING & HEATING LLC, an
Idaho limited liability company,
Counterdefendants.
REPLY TO PLAINTIFFS' OPPOSITION TO HIGHWAY 101'S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
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I.

INTRODUCTION.
Defendant, Highway 101 Investments, LLC ("Highway 101"), files this brief in

reply to Plaintiffs' opposition to Highway 101's motion for summary judgment against
the Plaintiffs and Counterdefendants, Kenton D. Johnson, Nephi H. Allen, and Rexburg
Plumbing & Heating, LLC, (collectively, "Plaintiffs").
II.

IDAHO APPLIES THE REASONABLENESS TEST WHEN ADDRESSING THE ISSUE OF
INTERFERENCE WITH PRIVILEGES A CONVEYANCE GRANTS.
Plaintiffs are correct in pointing out that there is a split of authority in the United

States when addressing the issue of interference with privileges a conveyance grants an
easement holder. In support of the "bright line test," Plaintiffs cite cases from Hawaii,
Maryland, Alabama and Pennsylvania to argue that any interference with their use of
the easement is per se unreasonable.
However, other states, including Missouri, South Dakota and most importantly
Idaho, apply a "reasonableness test./I For example, in Baum v. Glen Park Properties, 660
S.W.2d 723 (Mo.App.1983), a case virtually identical to this one, Baum sold property to
Glen Park Properties "subject to an easement for road purposes over a strip of land forty

(40) feet wide . . ..

/1

The easement provided the only access to the property Baum held.

The land Baum sold was the site of "A Storage Inn", a mini-warehouse operation.
Following the sale, Glen Park Properties erected a sign mounted on two poles at a
height above the rooftop of a one-story building, installed curbing and planted trees and
sod on the easement area. Baum testified that the sign, curbing and trees interfered
with her easement. Baum's position was not that the sign, curbing or trees prevented

's MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - Page 2
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access to Baum's land, but that any obstruction erected anywhere on the 40 foot
easement was unlawful. Baum's position was essentially that her easement amounted
1

to a fee simple interest in the easement tract. The trial court agreed with Baum's
position and granted an injunction against erecting the signs, installing the curbs, or
planting trees on the right of way easement.
In reversing and remanding the case, the Court of Appeals stated that the
injunction the trial court issued was impermissibly broad:
Appellant was entitled to erect any structure on the easement as
long as that structure did not interfere with the reasonable use by
respondent for purposes of ingress and egress to and from her land ....
Respondent has the right to use any part of the easement tract she
chooses for roadway purposes, but subject to her reasonable use,
appellant may also use the land .... But in prohibiting the erection of
any structure on the forty-foot easement, the injunction was too broad.
Upon remand, the trial court should determine a reasonable width
sufficient for road purposes for motor vehicles and farm equipment.
Bourn v. Glen Park Properties, supra, 660 S.W.2d at 726.

In DeHaven v. Hall, 753 N.W.2d 429 (S.D. 2008), the Supreme Court of South
Dakota upheld the trial court's finding that a mature pine tree seventeen feet from the
western boundary of a thirty foot wide express easement did not "interfere with Halls'
reasonable use of the easement," notwithstanding that the granting conveyance
provided that "no person or persons shall interfere with GRANTEES' benefit of the
Ironically, Plaintiff Nephi Allen testified:
"A. In my mind, an easement is for the people that own it. And so just because someone owns
the piece of property doesn't give them the right to not have the other people own their
easement."(Alien Depo., 142:20-23).
"Q. But Highway 101 owns the property, correct?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. Are you saying that Highway 101's use is limited only to ingress and egress.
A. Yes.
Q. Even though they own the property, they can't use it for any other purpose?
A. No." (Allen Depo., 28:6-14).
1
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easement hereinbefore described. ... " In so doing, the Supreme Court stated the
following:
At the point of entry, however, Halls only utilized approximately
fourteen feet of the easement. DeHavens, as the owners of the land
underlying the easement, had the right to use the portion of the
easement not used for ingress and egress ... in any reasonable manner
that does not interfere with [Halls'] ability to travel upon the roadway.
This includes the right to use the ditches of the current roadway, and the
ditches of any future roadway, for parking signange, fences, fence posts,
curbing, planting or removal of trees, sod, or other vegetation. In this
case the trial court found, and the evidence reflects, that the tree did not
interfere with the Halls' reasonable use of the easement .... Because the
trial court found that the tree did not interfere with Halls' reasonable use
ofthe easement, Halls were not entitled to remove the tree.
The court should note that Plaintiffs have not identified these other jurisdictions
that follow the "reasonableness test" but instead chose to identify for the court only
those jurisdictions that follow the "bright line test." Moreover, although Plaintiffs state
that

/IfuJnfortunately, it does not appear that Idaho has addressed the issue of whether

an expressed easement may be diminished based on a 'reasonable interference'
analysis, this statement is patently inaccurate. Idaho cases have applied the
II

"reasonableness test/' and none has applied the lib right line test" Plaintiffs urge this
court to apply.
The first Idaho case ever to apply the "reasonableness test" is Boydstun Beach

Association v. Allen, 111 Idaho 370, 723 P.2d 914 (Ct.App.1986). In Boydstun Beach, a
deed created a beach easement (access was granted along a twenty-five foot strip)
together with boating and bathing privileges, and parking privileges along a 200 foot
length of lakefront property 75 feet wide. The Aliens bought a lakefront lot burdened
by the easement and nearly all of their yard including grass, landscaping and sprinkler
REPLY TO PLAINTIFFS' OPPOSITION TO HIGHWAY 101'S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
PAGE 404
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system were on the lakefront easement. The Association sought an injunction
prohibiting any further interference with the easement and an order directing the Aliens
to remove the obstructions (trees, rocks, bushes, railroad ties, and lawn sprinklers).
The Court of Appeals began its analysis with 5 Restatement of Property,
Servitudes §486 (1944). That section provides:
The possessor land subject to an easement created by
conveyance is privileged to make such uses of the servient tenement as
are not inconsistent with the provisions of the creating conveyance.
Comment:
a. Uses not inconsistent with conveyance. So far as the language
ofthe conveyance creating an easement precisely defines the privileges
of the owner of it, the privileges of use of the owner of the servient
tenement are also precisely defined. As the precision of definition
decreases, the application of the principle that the owner of the
easement and the possessor of the servient tenement must be
reasonable in the exercise of their respective privileges becomes more
pronounced. Under this principle, the privilege of use of the possessor of
the servient tenement may vary as the respective needs of himself and
the owner of the easement vary.

Boydstun Beach Association v. Allen, supra, 111 Idaho at 376. (Emphasis added).
The court noted that "[u]nder §486 it is necessary to determine the precision of
the granting language. To the degree privileges are expressly granted the easement
owner's rights are paramou nt to those of the servient owner. These respective rights
are correlative and where the grant is general in nature the owner of the servient estate
is entitled to use the estate in any manner not inconsistent with, or which does not
materially interfere with, the use of the easement by the owner of the dominant estate.
Thus, we begin by isolating the privileges specifically granted by the easement."

Boydstun Beach Association v. Allen, supra, 111 Idaho at 376-377. (Emphasis added).
------. -----.-.- •. -- ... _ ...•.•••• -.,~ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - Page 5
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"An easement owner is entitled to relief upon a showing that he is obstructed from
exercising privileges granted by an easement." Id.
Within this framework, the court looked first to the written conveyance and
found that "the easement prohibits structures on the beach or parking space, but
otherwise does not limit the allowed privileges in location or time of use." Therefore,
the court precluded a fence erected through the 75 foot easement that obstructed
parking but allowed the fence and even a gate on the easement where they did not
obstruct parking and were not on the beach because these were "sensible," i.e.,
reasonable. Similarly, the court found that the trial court's open fire prohibition was

reasonable because there was no express language in the deed on this privilege:
The rule is that, absent language in the easement to the contrary,
the uses made by the servient and dominant owners may be adjusted
consistent with the normal development of their respective lands ....
Mandating the use of roasting devices is a reasonable balance between
the easement owner's interest in picnicking and the protection and
enjoyment of the servient estate.

Boydstun Beach Association v. Allen, supra, 111 Idaho at 378.
But where the easement granted a privilege in express and specific rather
than general terms, the trial court could not apply the "reasonableness test"
because to do so would bypass the legal rights of the easement owners and go
directly to the equitable resolution ofthe parties' conflicting interests.
Therefore, the trial court could not prohibit parking on the Aliens' lawn even
though it created a nuisance because the easement expressly created a privilege
to park on the entire 200 by 75 foot strip. Similarly, the trial court could not
restrict use of the easement between the hours of 12:00 midnight and 6:00 a.m.
10TION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - Page 6
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Because an easement authorizes limited use of the subject
property, the landowner is entitled to make other uses of the property
that do not unreasonably interfere with enjoyment ofthe easement ....
Whether a particular use by the landowner is an unreasonable
interference with enjoyment of the easement is a question of fact.
Carson v. Elliott, supra, 111 Idaho at 890. (Emphasis added.)
The record contained substantial evidence that "the operation of vehicles had
been hindered by the garden. Carson's cars and a boat occasionally required the extra
room in the circle's center to turn around. These vehicles sometimes struck the raised
garden." Carson v. Elliott, supra, 111 Idaho at 891.
The court in Carson never identified whether the privilege the deed
granted was express or general. Instead, the court simply said that "Carson
enjoys an easement to use the driveway." However, the reason the court found
against allowing the continuation of the raised garden was that it unreasonably
interfered with the plaintiff's use of her easement to use the driveway. The
important point is that the court applied a "reasonableness test/' not a "bright
line test" on whether the raised garden would stay or go.
The Idaho Supreme Court has also applied the "reasonableness test" in Nampa &
Meridian Irrigation District. v. Washington Federal Savings, 135 Idaho 518 (2001).
Interestingly, then district court judge, Daniel T. Eismann, (now Idaho Supreme Court's
Chief Justice), was the trial judge who applied the "reasonableness test" to an express
40 foot easement. At issue in Nampa & Meridian Irrigation District was whether
Washington Federal Savings could erect a fence and sidewalk within an irrigation

REPLY TO PLAINTIFFS' OPPOSITION TO HIGHWAY
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district's lateral maintenance easement. The irrigation district claimed that Washington
Federal Savings could not install the fence and sidewalk within the easement.
The Idaho Supreme Court began its analysis by citing to Carson and Boydstun

Beach as well-settled Idaho law on the issue:
The law is well settled with respect to the correlative rights of
dominant and servient owners of easements. The owner of the servient
estate is entitled to use the estate in any manner not inconsistent with,
or which does not materially interfere with, the use of the easement by
the owner of the dominant estate. In other words, the servient estate
owner is entitled to make uses of the property that do not unreasonably
Interfere with the dominant estate owner's enjoyment ofthe easement.
Thus, an easement owner is entitled to relief upon a showing that he is
obstructed from exercising privileges granted in the easement."

Nampa & Meridian Irrigation District. V. Washington Federal Savings, supra, 135
Idaho at 522-523. (Emphasis added.)
The court then applied the law to the trial court's findings and conclusions
agreeing with the trial court as follows:
Because NMID failed to show that the sidewalk and proposed
fence would unreasonably interfere with its easement, the district court
denied NMID's injunction, holding that Washington Federal was entitled
to construct the sidewalk and fence.

Nampa & Meridian Irrigation District. v. Washington Federal Savings, supra, 135
Idaho at 521. (Emphasis added.)
In short, the court found that "NMID's activity will be so infrequent that its

easement rights will not be unreasonably interfered with" and affirmed the trial court's
order allowing for the installation of the fence and sidewalk. Nampa & Meridian

Irrigation District. V. Washington Federal Savings, supra, 135 Idaho at 522. (Emphasis
added.)
REPLY TO PLAINTIFFS' OPPOSITION TO HIGHWAY 101'S
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Here, this court should first look to the deed itself to determine whether the

privilege granted in the conveying deed is express and specific or general in nature. The
deed by which Plaintiffs acquired their property states:
ALSO, A right-of-way to be used in common with others described
as follows:
Beginning at the Southwest corner of Section 17, township 6
North, Range 40 East, Boise Meridian, Madison County, Idaho;
thence East 140.90 feet; thence North 565.74 feet to the true
point of beginning; and running thence North 89°49' 50" East
378.37 feet; thence South 25.00 feet; thence South 89°49' 50"
West 394.40 feet; thence North 32°37' 44 East 29.74 feet to the
point of beginning."
Although the deed description does not specifically state "over the property"
described as follows, such language is implied because the description is a metes and
bounds legal description of the property over which the easement runs and not a
description of the easement itself. Any other reading would mean that the easement is
the property and give Plaintiffs a fee simple interest in the property rather than a mere
easement. Plaintiffs do not have a fee simple interest.
Significantly, the conveyance does not read a "25 foot wide right-of-way" or
expressly state that Plaintiffs have the right to use the entire width of their easement as
2

a right-of-way or any other restricting language. The deed simply gives Plaintiffs a
general privilege over the described property for a right-of-way. Therefore, although
Plaintiffs have an express easement, it is not an easement of a specific width or length,
and therefore a general privilege for a right-of-way over the described property. When
2 To the extent that Highway 101 has referred to the easement at issue being 25 feet wide, such reference
should be corrected to reflect that "the property over which the easement runs" is 25 feet wide, not that
Plaintiff have a 25 foot wide the easement itself.
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dealing with a general privilege, the law in Idaho requires the court to look at whether
the proposed use unreasonably interferes with the privilege granted in the deed
conveying the easement.
Here, Plaintiffs' undisputed testimony establishes that the sign post and bollards
do not interfere-let alone unreasonably interfere--with Plaintiffs' right-of-way privilege
for ingress and egress to their property. Moreover, Highway 101 chose the location for
the sign because it is the only practical place on Highway 101's property where the sign
can be visible from the road. 3
Plaintiffs try to distinguish the cases Highway 101 relies on by asserting that
"neither case involves an unambiguous private right of way easement.,,4 However,
Boydstun Beach Association and Nampa & Meridian Irrigation District both involve
unambiguous private right of way easements conveyed by express grants. The one in
Boydstun Beach Association was 25 feet wide and the one in Nampa & Meridian
Irrigation District was 40 feet wide. And they are both controlling Idaho cases that
applied the "reasonableness test," not a "bright line test" Plaintiffs urge this court to
apply in the absence of any Idaho authority.
As evidenced by the foregoing, not only does the easement at issue convey a
general right-of-way privilege that invokes application of the "reasonableness test" in
favor of Highway 101, but also a balancing of the equitable interests involved tips in
favor of allowing the sign post and bollards to remain because Highway 101 has no
other place to locate the sign to advertise its business.

3

4

See Affidavit of Barbara Miller dated April 7, 2011.
Plaintiffs' Answering Brief in Opposition to Hill"hw;,v 1 01's Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 4.
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III.

PLAINTIFFS HAD AMPLE TIME TO ASSERT THEIR RIGHTS.
Plaintiffs' assert that Highway 101's position is that Plaintiffs had only three (3)

days to assert their rights (i.e. by August 5,2008). However, this is not Highway 101's
position. Highway 101's position is that the sign post and bollards were not installed
until August 19, 2008; therefore, Plaintiffs had a full two to three weeks to assert their
rights, and they failed to do so. Highway 101 submits this gives rise to a laches defense
in favor of Highway 101.
IV.

THE COURT SHOULD FIND IN FAVOR OF HIGHWAY 101 ON THE QUASI-ESTOPPEL
DEFENSE THAT PLAINTIFFS HAVE NOTICE OF.
Plaintiffs assert that Highway 101 "did not plead quasi-estoppel as an affirmative

defense" and "Plaintiffs were not able to address the doctrine of quasi-estoppel in
discovery - for example quasi-estoppel emphasizes the unconscionable behavior of the
allegedly estopped party."s Thus, Plaintiffs assert Highway 101 should not now be
allowed to rely upon quasi-estoppel in support of its motion for summary judgment.
A.

Highway 101's Estoppel Defense Is Sufficient To Put Plaintiffs On
Notice.

The Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure establish a system of notice pleading. Straley v.

Idaho Nuclear Corp., 94 Idaho 917 (1972). Under Idaho's pleading system, a pleading "which
sets forth a claim for relief ... need only contain fa short and plain statement of the claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,' in addition to alleging jurisdiction of the court
and a demand for judgment .. .. " Cook v. Skyline Corp., 135 Idaho 26,33 (2000) citing Archer

v. Shields Lumber Co., 91 Idaho 861, 866 (1967) (quoting I.R.C.P. 8(a)). Even an "inartful"

5

t'" __

A. __ ' .

.'

......,..

.....
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pleading is sufficient because "[n]otice pleading frees the parties from pleading particular
issues or theories, and allows parties to get through the courthouse door by merely stating
claims upon which relief can be granted." Mortensen v. Stewart Title Guar. Co., 149 Idaho
437 (2010) citing Cook v. Skyline Corp., 135 Idaho 26, 33 (2000).
The Idaho Court of Appeals has succinctly stated the notice pleading rules in Idaho as
follows:
A party's pleadings should be liberally construed to secure a 'just,
speedy and inexpensive' resolution of the case. With the advent of
notice pleading, a party is no longer slavishly bound to stating particular
theories in its pleadings.
Christensen

v. Rice, 114 Idaho 929,931 (Ct.App.1988).

A trial court that fails to apply the liberal and broad notice pleading rules will be
reversed on appeal. See Cook v. Skyline Corp., supra, 135 Idaho at 33 where the district
court was reversed for failing to read the complaint liberally and broadly in support of a
cause of action for both negligent selection and negligent retention.
Here, Highway 101 has pled the affirmative defense of estoppel. There are many
forms of estoppel: collateral estoppel, equitable estoppel, quasi-estoppel, judicial
estoppel, etc. By asserting this defense, Plaintiffs were put on notice that their actions
and/or inactions before the installation of the sign post and bollards would be at issue.
Identifying the specific type of estoppel is no more required under Idaho's liberal notice
pleading rules than is identifying the type of negligence (negligent selection versus

negligent retention). Accordingly, the court should consider Highway 101's estoppel
defense.
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B.

The Court Should Rule In Favor On Highway 101's Substantive Estoppel
Defense.

"The doctrine of quasi-estoppel requires that the offending party must have
gained some advantage or caused a disadvantage to the party seeking estoppel . ..
quasi-estoppel is essentially a last-gasp theory under which a defendant who can point
to no specific detrimental reliance due to plaintiffs' conduct may still assert that
plaintiffs are estopped from asserting allegedly contrary positions where it would be
unconscionable for them to do so." Thomas v. Arkoosh Produce, Inc., 137 Idaho 352,
357 (2002) (Emphasis added).
Plaintiffs Nephi Allen and Kenton Johnson acknowledge that Dean Moon of
Rexburg Plumbing & Heating, LLC told Danny Miller of Highway 101 that Highway 101
could put the sign at its present location provided Highway 101 owned the property and
the City of Rexburg permitted the sign. These predicates turned out to be true because
Highway 101 does own the property, and the City of Rexburg permitted the sign.
Allen and Johnson further argue that to the extent estoppel applies here,
estoppel applies only against Dean Moon (a nonparty) and Rexburg Plumbing and
Heating, LLC because neither Allen nor Johnson made similar statements to Danny
Miller. Although the general rule is "Silence generally cannot be relied on to support
estoppel," silence can be relied upon to support quasi-estoppel"when a party who has
a duty to speak fails to do so and thereby produces an advantage for himself, or a
disadvantage for someone else, which is unconscionable." Thomas v. Arkoosh Produce,
Inc., supra, 137 Idaho at 358 (Emphasis added). Allen and Johnson both had duties to

speak because they admit that Dean Moon told them what he had told Danny Miller. If
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Allen or Johnson felt differently as they now claim, they should have told Danny Miller
to avoid Highway 101's reliance and an unconscionable result.
Finally, Allen and Johnson argue that the conversation between Moon and
Danny Miller happened on August 6, 2008 and Highway 101 was committed to installing
the sign on August 5, 2008; therefore, Highway 101 could not have relied on Moon's
statement. However, the facts are undisputed that the installation ofthe sign post and
bollards did not occur until August 19, 2008--well after the August 6, 2008 conversation.

v.

CONCLUSION.
For all the reasons set forth above and in Highway 101's pleadings, this court

should grant Highway 101' motion for summary judgment.
DATED this

~~pril'

2011.
SMITH, DRISCOLL & ASSOCIATES, PLLC

Bryan D.
Attorneys for Defendant
Highway 101 Investments, LLC

REPLY TO PLAINTIFFS' OPPOSITION TO HIGHWAY 101'5
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
PAGE 414

VlOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - Page 15
on to Highway 101's brief in support of motion for summary

CERTIFIC~RVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this ~ day of April, 2011, I caused a true and correct
copy ofthe foregoing REPLY TO PLAINTIFFS' OPPOSITION TO HIGHWAY 101'S MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT to be served, by placing the same in a sealed envelope and
depositing in the United States Mail, postage prepaid, or hand delivery, facsimile
transmission or overnight delivery, addressed to the following:

Hyrum D. Erickson, Esq.
RIGBY, ANDRUS & RIGBY,
Chartered
Attorneys at Law
25 North Second East
Rexburg, Idaho 8340

REPLY TO PLAINTIFFS' OPPOSITION TO HIGHWAY 101'5
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
PAGE 415

[~S.Mail
[ ] Fax
[ ] Overnight Delivery
[ 1 Hand Delivery

IN FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - Page 16
ghway 101'5 brief in support of motion for summary

04

2011 14 : 35 FAX 12085294166

P. O. Box 50731, Idaho

Smith Driscoll & ASsoc's

I4J 001

Falls, Idaho e3405-0731

Telephone: (208) 524-0731
Telefax: (208) 529-4166

To:

Madison County Clerk

Fax:

356-5425

From:

Debbie Hamilton

Phone: 356-6880
Re:

Johnson v, Highway 101 Inv

o Urgent

o For Revi

o Please Reply

D Please Rec;ycle

• Comments:

Cris:
Pursuant to our telephone discussion a few minutes ago, attached please find page 7 to our Reply to
Plaintiffs' Opposition to Highway 101 '5 Motion for Summary Judgment which was inadvertently
omitted in the original sent to you on April 7, 2011 for filing with the court.
Please insert page 7 in our Reply Brief. Thank you for your assistance.
I apologize for his oversight.
Debbie Hamilton
Legal Assistant

The information contained In this facsimile message Is attorney privileged and confidential
infonnation intended only for the use of the individual or entity named above. If you have
)edlately notify us by telephone to arrange for
REPLYTO PLAINTIFFS' OPPOSITION TO HIGHWAY 101'5
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
PAGE 416

J.

04

011 14:36 FAX 12085294166

Smith Driscoll & ASSOC'S

141 00 2

because the easement expressly granted a privilege for ingress and egress
without such limitations.
Finally, the court reversed and remanded the case with respect to the retaining
wall for "(flurther findings. " to determine i/the wall obstructs the parking, boating or

bathing privifeges granted by the easement" with specific instructions that the trial
court was to "indicate whether these findings are based on the specific language of the
easement [in which case the "reasonableness test" would not apply)

or on the principles

applicable to easement granted in general terms" in which case the "reasonableness
test" would apply. Boydstun Beach Association v. Allen, supra, 111 Idaho at 379.
The rules announced in Boydstun Beach Association are simple and
straightforward. The court looks first to the written instrument itself to identify the
privilege granted in the deed. If the deed grants the privilege in express and specific
terms, the court cannot apply "equitable principles" or what is reasonable under the
circumstances. But ifthe deed grants a privilege in general terms, the court allows the
proposed use ofthe servient estate as long as the proposed use is reasonable in view of
the privilege granted in the deed. Finally, none ofthese rules involves a "bright line
test" like the one Plaintiffs urge this court to apply.
The next Idaho case to apply the "reasonableness test" was Carson v. Elliott, 111
Idaho 889 (Ct.App.1986). Carson involved an obstruction placed in a right-of-way
easement. The court upheld the trial court's removal of a raised garden placed in the
"eye" of the circular end ofthe single driveway providing access to two homes. In so
dOiM. the court noted the following:
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF
IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF MADISON.

KENTON D. JOHNSON, a married man
dealing with his sole and separate property
and NEPHI I-I. ALLEN, a married man
dealing with his sole and separate property,
and REXBURG PLUMBING & HEATING,
LLC, an Idaho limited liability company,

)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV-2010-115
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND
ORDER RE: MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

)

Plaintiffs,

)
)

vs.

)
)

HIGHWAY 101 INVESTMENTS, LLC,

)
)

Defendant.

I.

)

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs Nephi Allen and Kenton Johnson are the managing partners of Rexburg
Plumbing and Heating LLC (hereafter collectively referred to as "Plaintiffs"). On October 23,
2000, Plaintiffs acquired real property in Rexburg together with a "right-of-way" easement
(hereafter, "Easement") over a strip of property abutting the property they purchased. Plaintiffs'
deed describes the Easement as follows:
ALSO, a right-of-way to be used in common with others described as follows:
Beginning at the Southwest comer of Section 17, township 6 North, Range 40
East, Boise Meridian, Madison County, Idaho; thence East 140.90 feet; thence
North 565.74 feet to the true point of beginning; and running thence North 89°49'
50" East 378.37 feet; thence South 25.00 feet; thence South 89°49' 50" West
394.40 feet; thence North 32°37' 44 East 29.74 feet to the point of beginning.
On February 20,2007, Highway 101 Investments, LLC (hereafter, "Highway 101")
acquired real property in Rexburg, which lies to the east of Plaintiffs' property, and also included
a right-of-way easement, identical in all material respects, to Plaintiffs' Easement. The strip of
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land over which both easements run is commonly known as "American Street," but will
hereinafter be referred to as the "Subject Property." On July 29,2009, Highway 101 acquired
fee simple title to the Subject Property from Leishman Electric. Leishman Electric now has an
easement that allows them to use the Subject Property for egress and ingress.
Plaintiffs and Highway 101, as well as their predecessors in interest, have used the
Subject Property for years to access their respective businesses.
In May and June 2008, Highway 101 sought and obtained a permit from the City of
Rexburg to have a sign erected on the northwest comer of the Subject Property. On August 6,
2008, Young Electric Sign Company (hereafter "YESCO") began digging the hole in preparation
to install the sign. After a delay that resulted from YESCO damaging the sewer line while
digging the hole, the sign-post and two bollards were installed on August 19,2008. YESCO
placed the sign atop the sign-post on August 26,2010.
The sign post is approximately five feet from the north border of the Subject Property,
leaving approximately nineteen feet between the sign-post and the south border. There is
approximately forty feet of additional space between the south border of the Subject Property
and Plaintiffs' building. On the north side of the sign, Highway 101 's building is approximately
fifty feet from the border of the Subject Property. The sign is approximately twenty feet wide
and ten feet tall. The bottom of the sign is fourteen feet above ground, and the sign-post is
approximately sixteen inches in diameter. The two bollards are each approximately five inches
in diameter. Highway 101 paid YESCO $27,234.00 for construction and installation of the sign.
On February 19,2010, Plaintiffs filed this action seeking removal of the sign. On April
1, 2010, Highway 101 filed an answer and counterclaim.
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On November 17,2010, Plaintiffs filed a motion for summary judgment asking this Court
to rule in their favor on the following affirmative defenses and counterclaims raised by Highway
101: latches, estoppel, equitable estoppel/recoupment, unclean hands, merger, forfeiture, rightof-way forfeiture, no unreasonable restriction, set off, unjust enrichment, and trespass.
On March 9, 2011, Highway 101 filed a motion for summary judgment asking this court
to determine that the sign does not unreasonably interfere with Plaintiffs' use of the Easement
and that the doctrines of latches and equitable estoppel bar Plaintiffs' claims.
On March 31, 2011, Plaintiffs filed a brief in opposition to Highway 101' s motion for
summary judgment.
On April 1, 2011, Highway 101 filed a brief in opposition to Plaintiffs' motion for
summary judgment.
On April 7,2011, Plaintiffs filed a reply brief in support of their motion for summary
judgment.
On April 11, 2011, Highway 101 filed a reply brief in support of its motion for summary
judgment.
This Court heard oral argument regarding the motions for summary judgment on April
14,2011.
II.

STANDARD OF ADJUDICATION

A motion for summary judgment "shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings,
depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter
oflaw." I.R.C.P. 56(c). See Grover v. Smith, 137 Idaho 247, 46 P.3d 1105; Rockefeller v.

Grabow, 136 Idaho 637, 39 P.3d 577 (2002). The burden is, at all times, on the moving party to
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demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Jordan v. Beeks, 135 Idaho 586, 21
P.3d 908 (2001).
The United States Supreme Court, in Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,106 S.Ct.
2548 (1986), stated:
Of course, a party seeking summary judgment always bears the initial
responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and
identifying those portions of "the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any," which
it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. But unlike
the Court of Appeals, we find no express or implied requirement in Rule 56 that
the moving party support its motion with affidavits or other similar materials
negating the opponent's claim. On the contrary, Rule 56(c), which refers to "the
affidavits, if any" (emphasis added), suggests the absence of such a requirement.
And if there were any doubt about the meaning of Rule 56(c) in this regard, such
doubt is clearly removed by Rules 56(a) and (b), which provide the claimants and
defendants, respectively, may move for summary judgment "with or without
supporting affidavits" (emphasis added). The import of these subsections is that,
regardless of whether the moving party accompanies its summary judgment
motion with affidavits, the motion may, and should, be granted so long as
whatever is before the district court demonstrates that the standard for the entry of
summary judgment, as set forth in Rule 56( c), is satisfied. One of the principal
purposes of the summary judgment rule is to isolate and dispose of factually
unsupported claims or defenses, and we think it should be interpreted in a way
that allows it to accomplish this purpose.
!d. at 323, 106 S.Ct. at 2553 (alterations in original).

When assessing a motion for summary judgment, all controverted facts are to be liberally
construed in favor ofthe non-moving party. Dodge-Farrar v. American Cleaning Services, Co.,
137 Idaho 838, 54 P.3d 954 (Ct. App. 2002). In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, a
court is not permitted to weigh the evidence to resolve controverted factual issues. Meyers v.
Lott, 133 Idaho 846, 993 P.2d 609 (2000). Liberal construction of the facts in favor of the non-

moving party requires the court to draw all reasonable factual inferences in favor of the nonmoving party . Farnworth v. Ratlti!, 134 Idaho 237, 999 P .2d 892 (2000); Madrid v. Roth, 134
Idaho 802, 10 P.3d 751 (Ct. App. 2000).
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The Idaho appellate courts have followed the United States Supreme Court's decision in
Celotex, which stated:
Summary judgment procedure is properly regarded not as a disfavored procedural
shortcut, but rather as an integral part of the Federal Rules as a whole, which are
designed "to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every
action." ... Rule 56 must be construed with due regard not only for the rights of
persons asserting claims and defenses that are adequately based in fact to have
those claims and defenses tried to a jury, but also for the rights of persons
opposing such claims and defenses to demonstrate in the manner provided by the
Rule, prior to trial, that the claims and defenses have no factual basis.
Id. at 327, 106 S.Ct. at 2555 (citations omitted); see Win

0/ Michigan, Inc. v. Yreka United, Inc.,

137 Idaho 747, 53 PJd 330 (2002); Thomson v. City o/Lewiston, 137 Idaho 473, 50 P.3d 488
(2002).
A party against whom a summary judgment is sought cannot merely rest on his pleadings
but, when faced with affidavits or depositions supporting the motion, must come forward by way
of affidavit, deposition, admissions or other documentation to establish the existence of material
issues of fact, which preclude the issuance of summary judgment. Anderson v. Hollingsworth,
136 Idaho 800, 41 PJd 228 (2001); Baxter v. Craney, 135 Idaho 166, 16 P.3d 263 (2000). The
non-moving party's case, however, must be anchored in something more than speculation, and a
mere scintilla of evidence is not enough to create a genuine issue of fact. Wait v. Leavell Cattle,
Inc., 136 Idaho 792, 41 P.3d 220 (2001).
The moving party is entitled to judgment when the non-moving party fails to make a
sufficient showing as to the essential elements to which that party will bear the burden of proof
at trial. Primary Health Network, Inc. v. State, Dept.

0/Admin., 137 Idaho 663, 52 P.3d 307

(2002). Facts in dispute cease to be "material" facts when the plaintiff fails to establish a prima
facie case. Post Falls Trailer Park v. Fredekind, 131 Idaho 634, 962 Pold 1018, (1998). In such
a situation, there can be no genuine issue of material fact, since a complete failure of proof
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concerning an essential element of the non-moving party's case necessarily renders all other
facts immaterial. Id.
III.

DISCUSSION

A. Rights of Dominant and Servient Estate Owners
Highway 101 believes it can use the Subject Property in any way that does not
unreasonably interfere with Plaintiffs' Easement. Highway 101 asks this Court to grant
summary judgment in its favor because Plaintiffs admit there is adequate space on the Subject
Property for them to access their business without unreasonable difficulty.
Plaintiffs appear to admit that the sign-post and bollards are an inconvenience rather than
an unreasonable interference with their use of the Easement. However, Plaintiffs argue the
Easement is "express," and as a result, permanent structures such as the sign and bollards are per
se unreasonable.

Neither party asserts the Easement is ambiguous, and this Court concludes it is not. Thus,
the legal effect of the Easement will be decided as a matter oflaw. See Latham v. Garner, 105
Idaho 854, 673 P.2d 1048 (1983). Both parties have cited to cases outside this jurisdiction to aid
this Court in making that determination. Plaintiffs believe the issue presents a question of first
impression in Idaho. After reading the parties' briefs and conducting additional research, this
Court finds it unnecessary to consult the laws of foreign jurisdictions.
In Boydstun Beach Ass 'n v. Allen, 111 Idaho 370, 723 P.2d 914 (Ct. App. 1986) the Idaho
Court of Appeals determined the permissible use of an easement described as follows:
[ingress, egress privileges], together with parking space extending along
the beach in a southeasterly direction 200 feet from north line of said drive, and
extending 75 feet in width from the meander line, and boating and bathing
privileges along said 200 ft [sic] strip, and these presents provide, that, no
structures or tents shall be erected along said 200 feet of beach, or parking space;
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and that said second parties may, at their option, assist in the improvement and
maintenance of said drive and parking space.
In deciding the legal effect of that language, the court began its analysis by quoting the following
from the Restatement of Property:
The possessor of land subject to an easement created by conveyance is
privileged to make such uses of the servient tenement as are not
inconsistent with the provisions of the creating conveyance.
Comment:
a. Uses not inconsistent with conveyance. So far as the language of the
conveyance creating an easement precisely defines the privileges of the
owner of it, the privileges of use of the owner of the servient tenement are
also precisely defined. As the precision of definition decreases, the
application of the principle that the owner of the easement and the
possessor of the servient tenement must be reasonable in the exercise of
their respective privileges becomes more pronounced. Under this
principle, the privilege of use of the possessor of the servient tenement
may vary as the respective needs of himself and the owner of the easement
vary.
5 RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY, SERVITUDES § 486 (1944) (emphasis added).
The court then stated,
Under § 486 [of the restatement] it is necessary to determine the precision
of the granting language. To the degree privileges are expressly granted the
easement owner's rights are paramount to those of the servient owner. These
respective rights are correlative and where the grant is general in nature the owner
of the servient estate is entitled to use the estate in any manner not inconsistent
with, or which does not materially interfere with, the use of the easement by the
owner of the dominant estate. City of Los Angeles v. Ingersoll-Rand Company, 57
Cal.App.3d 889, 129 Cal.Rptr. 485 (1976); Western Massachusetts Electric Co. v.
Sambo's of Massachusetts, Inc., 8 Mass.App. 815, 398 N.E.2d 729 (1979). Thus
we begin by isolating the privileges specifically granted by the easement.
Boydstun Beach, at 376-77, 723 P.2d at 920-21.
On numerous occasions subsequent to Boydstun Beach, the appellate courts of Idaho
have addressed the rights and privileges of servient estate owners. This Court, however, is not
aware of any Idaho case that has applied something other than the reasonableness test.
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The rights of landowners concerning easements are well settled. Because
an easement authorizes limited use of the subject property, the landowner is
entitled to make other uses of the property that do not unreasonably interfere with
enjoyment of the easement. R. CUNNINGHAM, W. STOEBUCK & D.
WHITMAN, THE LAW OF PROPERTY § 8.9 (1984). As noted by the
RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 486 (1944): "The possessor of land subject
to an easement created by conveyance is privileged to make such uses of the
servient tenement as are not inconsistent with the provisions of the creating
conveyance." Accord Reynolds Irrigation District v. Sproat, 69 Idaho 315, 333,
206 P.2d 774, 785 (1949). Conversely, the easement owner is entitled to full
enjoyment of the easement. In the case of an access easement to a dwelling, such
enjoyment includes not only a right of ingress and egress but also an implied right
to tum vehicles around. Annotation, Right of Way-Width, 28 A.L.R.2d 253
(1953).

Carson v. Elliott, 111 Idaho 889, 890-91, 728 P.2d 778, 779-80 (Ct. App. 1986).
The law is well settled with respect to the correlative rights of dominant
and servient owners of easements. The owner of the servient estate is entitled to
use the estate in any manner not inconsistent with, or which does not materially
interfere with, the use of the easement by the owner of the dominant estate. See
Boydstun Beach Ass 'n, 111 Idaho at 377, 723 P.2d at 921. In other words, the
servient estate owner is entitled to make uses of the property that do not
unreasonably interfere with the dominant estate owner's enjoyment of the
easement. See Carson v. Elliott, 111 Idaho 889, 890, 728 P.2d 778, 779 (Ct. App.
1986). Thus, an easement owner is entitled to relief upon a showing that he is
obstructed from exercising privileges granted in the easement. See Boydstun
Beach, 111 Idaho at 377, 723 P.2d at 921 (citations omitted).

Nampa & Meridian Irr. Dist. v. Washington Federal Sav., 135 Idaho 518, 522,20 PJd 702, 706
(2001).
In Idaho, "an easement is the right to use the land of another for a specific
purpose that is not inconsistent with the general use of the property by the
owner." Abbott, 119 Idaho at 548, 808 P.2d at 1293 (emphasis added); see also
Carson v. Elliott, 111 Idaho 889, 890, 728 P.2d 778, 779 (1986) (summarizing the
rights of landowners concerning easements). As long as Sorensen is able to use
the easement for access to his land for the specific purpose for which the
easement was granted, without unreasonable interference, he has received
everything to which he is legally entitled.

Drew v. Sorensen, 133 Idaho 534, 540, 989 P.2d 276, 282 (1999).
It is well established in this jurisdiction that an easement is the right to use
the land of another for a specific purpose. Abbott v. Nampa School Dist. No. 131,
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119 Idaho 544, 548, 808 P.2d 1289, 1293 (1991). The easement owner is entitled
to full enjoyment of the easement. Carson v. Elliott, 111 Idaho 889, 890, 728 P.2d
778, 779 (Ct. App. 1986). To the degree privileges are expressly granted, the
easement owner's rights are paramount to those of the servient owner. Boydstun
Beach Assoc. v. Allen, 111 Idaho 370, 376-77, 723 P.2d 914, 920-21 (Ct. App.
1986). Every easement is a particular easement, privileging the owner thereof to
make particular uses of a servient estate. The more precise the express language
of the easement, the more certainty there is regarding the specific privileges
granted. Id.
McKay v. Boise Project Bd. o/Control, 141 Idaho 463, 471, 111 P.3d 148, 156 (2005).

Based on the cases cited above, this Court concludes the law of Idaho gives servient
estate owners the right to use their land, but forbids them from unreasonably burdening the
privileges of the dominant estate owner. Moreover, the precision with which a dominant estate
owner's privileges are defined is important in determining whether a particular use by a
dominant estate owner is permissible.
Thus, this Court begins by looking at the granting language in Plaintiffs' deed, which
describes the Easement as follows:
ALSO, a right-of-way to be used in common with others described as follows:
Beginning at the Southwest comer of Section 17, township 6 North, Range 40
East, Boise Meridian, Madison County, Idaho; thence East 140.90 feet; thence
North 565.74 feet to the true point of beginning; and running thence North 89°49'
50" East 378.37 feet; thence South 25.00 feet; thence South 89°49' 50" West
394.40 feet; thence North 32°37' 44 East 29.74 feet to the point of beginning.
Plaintiffs' are entitled to full enjoyment of the privilege granted to them by their
Easement, and Plaintiffs are entitled to relief upon showing they are obstructed from exercising
that privilege.
The privilege created by the Easement is "a right-of-way," or a right to use the Subject
Property for ingress and egress. The legal description contained in the granting language
precisely describes the location of the land upon which Plaintiffs can exercise that privilege.
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Thus, while the location ofthe Easement is precisely defined, the privilege is stated generally as
a "right-of-way." This Court concludes Highway 101 has the right to use its servient estate (the
Subject Property) in a manner that does not unreasonably interfere with Plaintiffs' right to use
the Subject Property as a "right-of-way."
B. Highway 101 's Use of the Subject Property
Plaintiffs' only argument in opposition to Highway 101 's placement of the sign on the
Subject Property is that such use by a servient estate owner is per se unreasonable. In the
discussion above, this Court concluded Highway 101' s placement of the sign and bollards is not

per se unreasonable.
Typically, "[w]hether a particular use by the landowner is an unreasonable interference
with enjoyment of the easement is a question of fact." Carson v. Elliott, 111 Idaho 889, 890-91,
728 P.2d 778, 779-80 (Ct. App. 1986). Plaintiffs, however, have never argued that the sign and
bollards constitute an unreasonable interference with their use of the Easement. Furthermore,
Plaintiffs have never argued there is a material question of fact regarding the reasonableness of
the sign and bollards on the Easement.
While being deposed, Nephi Allen and Kenton Johnson admitted they and their
customers and suppliers are able to the Easement despite the presence of the sign and bollards on
the Subject Property. Based on those concessions, Highway 101 asserts there is no dispute that
the sign and bollards are reasonable.
Nephi Allen testified as follows:
Q.
A.
Q.
A.

And you are saying that you cannot use the exact area where the pole and
bollards are located?
Correct.
But you acknowledge that you can go around them, correct?
Yes.
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Q.
A.
Q.
A.
Q.

A.

Q.
A.
Q.

A.
Q.
A.
Q.

A.
Q.

A.

The poles or those bollards, do they prevent you from accessing your
property?
No.
SO you can still access the property where the Rexburg Plumbing and
Heating is located?
Yes.
Let's just talk generally about that. In terms of accessing your property,
what kind of vehicles do you use to access your property? In other words,
I'm assuming that you've got plumbing trucks, and HVAC trucks, and
maybe a boom truck-I don't know what you've got. So just tell me what
do you use to access the property?
We have service trucks, we have a forklift, we have delivery trucks,
various UPS, Federal Express.
What was that last one?
Federal Express. Just normal everyday usage.
And is there anything about the location of the pole and these bollards that
prevent any of these service trucks, delivery trucks, forklifts, or any UPS
or Federal Express vehicles from accessing your property?
No.
Over the easement?
No.
Okay. Would you then agree that notwithstanding the fact that there's a
pole and two bollards, your equipment, your service vehicles can still
access your property on the easement?
Yeah.
All right. But as you sit here today, is it your testimony that the pole and
the two bollards, do they unreasonably interfere with your ability to use
the easement to access the property?
Not to access the property.

Allen Deposition at 31-34.
Kenton Johnson testified as follows:

Q.

A.
Q.
A.
Q.
A.
Q.
A.
Q.

Let's talk about how this placement the pole and the two bollards interfere
with your ability to use the easement to access your property. Can we do
that?
It doesn't interfere with it.
It doesn't interfere, does it?
Huh-uh.
Is that aNo, Sir.
No interference, does it?
No interference.
The fact is that-
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A.

It doesn't interfere with the ability to get in and out of there. It doesn't
interfere with the professional truck driver's ability to get in and out of
there. But for some reason, some of our customers it seems to interfere
with them. I had one hit it yesterday ....

Q.

A.
Q.
A.
Q.
A.
Q.
A.
Q.
A.
Q.

A.

And notwithstanding the placement the pole and bollards, your customers,
and you, and your employees still have plenty of room to drive on the
easement to access your property?
I wouldn't say 25 feet is plenty of room in today's world, I guess.
Okay. How about - we actually have it's 19.34 feet, correct.
Yeah.
Instead of saying plenty of room, would you agree that that is sufficient
room to access your property on the easement?
We're making it work, let's put it that way.
And so it is sufficient?
It is sufficient.
And so you could actually have two trucks passing in the 19.34 foot space
and still be totally on the easement, correct?
Correct.
And so there is sufficient room for you, and your service people, and
delivery people, and your customers to use the easement to access your
property?
Yes, Sir. There is today.

Johnson Deposition at 19-26.
This Court acknowledges evidence in the record indicating Plaintiffs and some of their
customers have backed into the bollards while leaving Plaintiffs' property. However, even if
presumed true, that fact would not render the placement of the sign and bollards unreasonable
when there is ample evidence that delivery trucks, service vehicles, and customers have all be
able to access Plaintiffs' property without unreasonable difficulty.

This Court concludes Highway 101 's use of its servient estate, by placing the sign and
bollards on the northwest comer of the Subject Property, does not unreasonably interfere with
Plaintiffs right to use the Subject Property as a "right-of-way." Highway 101 's motion for
summary judgment should be granted on that issue.
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C. Highway 101's other Defenses and Counterclaims
Having concluded Highway 101 should prevail on its claim of reasonable use, this Court
need not address Highway 101 's defensive claims oflatches, estoppel, unclean hands, set-off,
recoupment, and merger. This Court will, however, address Plaintiffs' request for summary
judgment on Highway 101 's counterclaims of forfeiture, unjust enrichment, and trespass.

1. Forfeiture
Count I of Highway 101' s counterclaim asserts Plaintiffs have "overburdened" the
Easement by allowing their customers and others to use it. Highway 101, therefore, believes
Plaintiffs' use of the Easement constitutes a forfeiture of their rights therein.
Plaintiffs argue there is no basis in law or fact to conclude they have forfeited their rights
in the Easement.
"[C]ourts have held that forfeiture of an easement was available in certain limited
circumstances, but most courts have recognized that forfeiture is not available." A.L.R. 5th 313 §
2(a).
The Idaho Supreme Court has stated, "As a matter of Idaho history, most forfeiture
provisions, even those incorporated in written agreements, signed and acknowledged by all of
the involved parties, will not be honored in order to avoid unconscionable results." Graves v.

Gore, 119 Idaho 425, 807 P.2d 643 (1991).
[T]he general rule concerning easements is that the right of an easement holder
may not be enlarged and may not encompass more than is necessary to fulfill the
easement. Id In Merrill v. Penrod, 109 Idaho 46, 704 P.2d 950 (Ct. App. 1985),
the Idaho Court of Appeals observed that an easement does not include the right
to enlarge the use to the injury of the servient land.

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER RE: MOTIONS FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
PAGE 430

'IONS FOR SUMMARY

The use of an easement claimed under a grant or reservation must
be confined strictly to the purposes for which it was granted or reserved,
and in compliance with any restrictions imposed by the terms of the
instrument. Where the grant or reservation of an easement is general in its
terms, use of the easement includes those uses which are incidental or
necessary to the reasonable and proper enjoyment of the easement, but is
limited to those that burden the servient estate as little as possible. In other
words, an easement granted or reserved in general terms, without any
limitations as to its use, is one of unlimited reasonable use. It is not
restricted to use merely for such purposes of the dominant estate as are
reasonably required at the time of the grant or reservation, but the right
may be exercised by the dominant owner for those purposes to which that
estate may be subsequently devoted. Thus, there may be an increase in the
volume and kind of use of such an easement during the course of its
enjoyment.
25 Am.Jur.2d Easements and Licenses § 74, pp. 479-80 (1966).

In Boydstun Beach Ass'n v. Allen, 111 Idaho 370, 723 P.2d 914 (Ct. App.
1986), the Idaho Court of Appeals applied the following rule to an easement:
"The rule is that, absent language in the easement to the contrary, the uses made
by the servient and dominant owners may be adjusted consistent with the normal
development of their respective lands." 111 Idaho at 378, 723 P.2d at 922.
Abbott v. Nampa School Dist. No. 131, 119 Idaho 544, 548-49, 808 P.2d 1289, 1293-94 (1991).

The record in this case indicates Plaintiffs use of the Easement is consistent with
historical use of the Easement. There is no evidence that Plaintiffs' use of the Easement has
overburdened the Subject Property or harmed Highway 101 in any manner. There is no evidence
that Plaintiffs' use of the Easement interferes with Highway 101 's or Leishman Electric's use of
the Subject Property. Furthermore, Plaintiff's deed describes the Easement as a "right-of-way to
be used in common with others .... " Thus, there is no restrictive language that would limit use
of the Easement exclusively to the easement holders.
This Court concludes Plaintiffs have not overburdened the Easement and forfeiture is not
an appropriate remedy. Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment should be granted on this
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2. Unjust Enrichment
Count II of Highway 101 's counterclaim asserts Plaintiffs have been unjustly enriched by
Highway 101' s efforts to improve the Easement.
Plaintiffs concede Highway 101 spent considerable time and money paving the Subject
Property. However, Plaintiffs argue they had no part in Highway 101's decision to improve the
Subject Property, and Highway 101 's work has harmed rather than benefitted them.
The doctrine of unjust enrichment sounds in quasi-contract or implied-inlaw contract. Beco Constr. Co., Inc. v. Bannock Paving Co., Inc., 118 Idaho 463,
466, 797 P.2d 863, 866 (1990). The theory is based upon the defendant having
received a benefit which would be inequitable to retain at least without
compensating the plaintiff to the extent that retention of the benefit is unjust. Id.
In order to establish the prima facie case for unjust enrichment, the plaintiff must
show that there was: (1) a benefit conferred upon the defendant by the plaintiff;
(2) appreciation by the defendant of such benefit; and (3) acceptance of the
benefit under circumstances that would be inequitable for the defendant to retain
the benefit without payment to the plaintiff of the value thereof. Idaho Lumber,
Inc. v. Buck, 109 Idaho 737, 745, 710 P.2d 647,655 (Ct. App. 1985).
The principle of unjust enrichment, however, is applicable only if the
person conferring the benefit is not an "officious intermeddler." The officious
intermeddler rule essentially provides that a mere volunteer who, without request
therefor, confers a benefit upon another is not entitled to restitution. This rule
exists to protect persons who have had unsolicited "benefits" thrust upon them.
Chinchurreta v. Evergreen Management, Inc., 117 Idaho 591, 593, 790 P.2d 372,
374 (Ct. App. 1989) (adopting RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF RESTITUTION §
2 (1937)). A person is not an intermeddler if such person has a valid reason for
conferring the benefit, such as protecting an interest. See comments to § 2 of
RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF RESTITUTION, supra. Cf Western Coach Corp.
v. Roscoe, 133 Ariz. 147,650 P.2d 449,456 (1982).

Curtis v. Becker, 130 Idaho 378, 382, 941 P.2d 350, 354 (Ct. App. 1997).
Regardless of whether the work done by Highway 101 actually "improved" the Subject
Property, there is no evidence that Plaintiffs were involved at all with Highway 101's decision to
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undertake the "improvements." There is no evidence that Plaintiffs requested or desired that
Highway 101 do the work. There is no evidence that the improvements were necessary to
protect Highway 101 's interest in the Subject Property.
Because there is no evidence that Highway 101 had any valid reason for thrusting the
unsolicited "improvements" upon Plaintiffs, it would be improper to allow Highway 101 to
thrust a portion of the expenses upon Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment
should be granted regarding the issue of unjust enrichment.

3. Trespass
Counts III and IV of Highway 101' s motion for summary judgment assert Plaintiffs have
trespassed on land owned by Highway 101. 1
Plaintiffs assert there are no facts to support Highway 101 's trespass claims. Plaintiffs
believe the following interrogatory, and Highway 101's response, show that Highway 101 's
trespass claims were based on an incorrect plat, and therefore not supported by the undisputed
facts:

INTERROGATORY NO.9: Please list each fact that supports Count III of the
Counterclaim (Trespass) as well as who has knowledge of that fact and who will
testifY to that fact at trial.
RESPONSE: Hwy 101 had a plat that showed a small strip of land between
plaintiffs' property and property belonging to Hwy 101 situated on nearly the
same "footprint" as the right of way. This strip appeared on the plat to belong to
Hwy 101 and not plaintiffs. Hwy 101 has since obtained an updated plat that
shows this strip as a "deed overlap." See attached plat. Hwy 101 is continuing to
conduct discovery on this issues and will supplement its discovery as discovery
progresses ....

1 Count

Tn asserts tre~na",,,, hv Rf'vhnra Plllrnhin" ~"rI uO'1.ting. Count IV asserts trespass by Nephi Allen and
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Insofar as this Court is aware, the Subject Property, which is owned by Highway 101,
directly abuts Plaintiffs' property. It is undisputed that Plaintiffs have a right-of-way easement
over the Subject Property.
As the moving party, it is Plaintiffs obligation to prove the absence of a material fact
regarding Highway 101's trespass action. Other than the interrogatory and response quoted
above, Plaintiffs have not directed this Court to any evidence that disproves Highway 101's
trespass causes of action. Highway 101' s response to Interrogatory No.9 references two plats.
If those plats are in the record, Plaintiffs have not directed this Court to them and have not
provided any explanation or discussion regarding them. Thus, this Court is unable to reach any
conclusion regarding a possible "deed overlap" or other discrepancy in the deeds that mayor
may not create a factual basis for the alleged trespass. Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment
must therefore be denied on that issue.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Highway 101's motion for summary judgment is granted on the issue of reasonable use
of the Subject Property. Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment is granted on the issues of
forfeiture and unjust enrichment. The parties' motions for summary judgment are otherwise
denied.
IT IS SO ORDERED

DATED this

~day of May 2011.
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Hyrum D. Erickson, ISBN 7688
RIGBY, ANDRUS & RIGBY, Chartered
Attorneys at Law
25 North Second East
Rexburg, Idaho 83440
Telephone: 208-356-3633
Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF MADISON

KENTON D. JOHNSON, a married man
dealing with his sole and separate
property and NEPHI H. ALLEN, a
married man dealing with his sole and
separate property, and REXBURG
PLUMBING & HEATING LLC, an
Idaho limited liability company,
Plaintiffs,
v.
HIGHWAY lO 1 INVESTMENTS, LLC,
Defendant.

HIGHWAY 101 INVESTMENTS,LLC,
Counterclaimant,
v.
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Case No. CV-10-115

MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

KENTON D. JOHNSON, a married man
dealing with his sole and separate
property and NEPHI H. ALLEN, a
married man dealing with his sole and
separate property, and REXBURG
PLUMBING & HEATING LLC, an
Idaho limited liability company,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Counterdefendants.

)
)

Plaintiffs above named, through their attorney of record, Hyrum Erickson, of Rigby,
Andrus & Rigby, Chtd. hereby move the Court, pursuant to LR.C.P. 11(a)(2)(B), to reconsider
that portion of its Memorandum Decision and Order Re: Motions for Summary Judgment
determining that the sign does not unreasonably interfere with Plaintiffs' use of the right-of-way
and granting summary judgment to Highway 101 on that issue. This motion is supported by the
attached Brief in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Reconsideration.
DATED this 20 th day of May, 2011.

Hyrum
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE BY MAIL, HAND DELIVERY
OR FACSIMILE TRANSMISSION
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document was on this date
served upon the persons named below, at the addresses set out below their name, either by mailing, hand delivery or by telecopying to them a true and correct copy of said document in a
properly addressed envelope in the United States mail, postage prepaid; by hand delivery to
them; or by facsimile transmission.
DATED this 20 th day of May, 2011.

Bryan D. Smith, Esq.
B. J. Driscoll, Esq.
SMITH, DRISCOLL & ASSOCIATES, PLLC
P. O. Box 50731
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405

[X] Mail
[ JHand Delivery
[ ] Facsimile

Honorable Dane H. Watkins, Jr.
Bonneville County Courthouse
605 North Capital
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83402

[X J Mail
[ ] Band Delivery
[ ] Facsimile
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RlGBY, ANDRUS & RlGBY, Chartered
Attorneys at Law
25 North Second East
Rexburg, Idaho 83440
Telephone: 208-356-3633
Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE DISTRlCT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRlCT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF MADISON

KENTON D. JOHNSON, a married man
dealing with his sole and separate
property and NEPHI H. ALLEN, a
married man dealing with his sole and
separate property, and REXBURG
PLUMBING & HEATING LLC, an
Idaho limited liability company,
Plaintiffs,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV-10-115

BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS'
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

)

v.

)

HIGHWAY 101 INVESTMENTS, LLC,

)
)

)
Defendant.

)
)

)
HIGHWAY 101 INVESTMENTS, LLC,
Counterc1aimant,

)
)
)
)

v.
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KENTON D. JOHNSON, a married man
dealing with his sole and separate
property and NEPHI H. ALLEN, a
married man dealing with his sole and
separate property, and REXBURG
PLUMBING & HEATING LLC, an
Idaho limited liability company,
Counterdefendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

COME NOW Plaintiffs, through their attorney of record, Hyrum Erickson of
Rigby, Andrus, & Rigby, Chtd. and submit the following brief in support of Plaintiffs' motion for
reconsideration.
BACKGROUND
At summary judgment Highway 101 raised for the first time the argument that the term
"A right-of-way to be used in common with others" was a "general" grant and as such Highway
101 could place a permanent obstruction within the right -of-way. The Court accepted this
argument and issued a Memorandum Decision and Order Re: Motions for Summary Judgment
(hereinafter Decision) on May 6, 2011. Plaintiffs now bring this Motion to Reconsider.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
A motion to reconsider a grant or denial of summary judgment is reviewed by the trial
court using the same standard as the original summary judgment motions. When a motion for
summary judgment has been properly supported with evidence indicating the absence of material
factual issues, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to make a showing of the existence of a
genuine issue of material fact that would preclude summary judgment. Treasure Valley

Gastroenterology Specialists, P.A. v. Woods, 135 Idaho 485, 20 P.3d 21 (Ct. App. 2001); State v.
Shama Resources Ltd. P'ship, 127 Idaho 267, 270,899 P.2d 977, 980 (1995). A party against
whom summary judgment is sought may not merely rest on allegations contained in his
pleadings, but must come forward and produce admissible evidence to contradict the assertions
of the moving party and establish a genuine issue of material fact. McCoy v. Lyons, 120 Idaho
765,820 P.2d 360 (1991); Olsen v. JA. Freeman Co., 117 Idaho 706, 791 P.2d 1285 (1990). See
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Rhodehouse v. Stutts, 125 Idaho 208, 211,868 P.2d 1224, 1227 (1994).
ARGUMENT
1.

The Court's decision purports to affect the "type" of easement, but in actuality,
addresses only the location of the easement.

The Court rejected Highway 101's argument that the language in Plaintiffs deed
described the entirety of the servient property rather than the right-of-way itself. The Court
specifically found that ''the legal description contained in the granting language precisely
describes the location of the easement[.]" Decision at 8. However, the Court then ruled that
"Highway 10 1's use of its servient estate, by placing the sign and bollards on the northwest
corner of the Subject Property, does not unreasonably interfere with Plaintiffs right to use the
Subject Property as a "right-of-way." Decision at 12.
However, the Court does not address or explain why, if the right-of-way is precisely
described, Plaintiffs are not entitled to the use of the described property as a right-of-way. The
Court identifies the meaning of the term right-of-way as a "right to use the Subject Property for
ingress and egress." Decision at 9. The subject property in this case is a precisely described strip
ofland at least 25 feet wide. However, it is clear that under the Court's Decision, the Plaintiffs
do not have the right to use the "subject property" - they have a right to use only a portion of the
subject propcrty since they cannot possibly use that portion of the subject property upon which
the sign has been placed.
The Court appears to recognize that Plaintiffs have the right to use the full 25 feet, but as
they do not currently need it to access their property, it finds that the placement of permanent
obstruction in the easement is not an unreasonable interference with their rights. Presumably, if
Rexburg Plumbing and Heating did need thc full 25 feet it could return to court and ask that the
sign be removed. Counsel for Highway 101 recognized as much at oral argument. However,
asking Plaintiffs to return to Court to enforce an easement right they already have is extremely
inefficient and ignores the realities of people's everyday lives. If Rexburg Plumbing and Heating
needs the use of the full 25 feet, because they will need it when they need it, not 6 months or a
year down the line when a court decides that their use is "reasonable." As a practical matter, the
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Court's Decision says nothing about the "privilege" granted, but addresses only the location by
shrinking the size of Rexburg Plumbing and Heating's right-of-way from 25 feet wide, as set out
in their deed, to 19 feet.
2.

The placement of a permanent obstruction within a right-of-way diminishes the
ability of the easement holder to use the right-of-way.
The Court has identified the privilege granted by the right-of-way as follows: "to use the

Subject Property for ingress and egress." However, the terms "ingress" and "egress" do not
appear in the deed. The "right-of-way" is not limited to a specific purpose, but is a general right
to pass through or over the described property. This is consistent with the historical use of the
subject property as well as the deeds relating to it. For example, in 1986 Leishman Electric
received a deed to the property that conveyed only the right-of-way and no other property and as
such, could not have been for ingress and egress to a particular parcel. Affidavit of Counsel in

Support ofPlaintiff's Motion for Summary JUdgment, Exhibit E, bate 5. A right-of-way is
defined by Black's as follows:
right-of-way. 1. The right to pass through property owned by another. • A
right-of-way may be established by contract, by longstanding usage, or by public
authority (as with a highway). Cf. easement. [Cases: Easements 1.] 2. The right to
build and operate a railway line or a highway on land belonging to another, or the
land so used. [Cases: Railroads 69.] 3. The right to take precedence in traffic.
[Cases: Automobiles 154, 171(4); Highways 99;] 3. The strip ofland subject to a
nonowner's right to pass through. - Also written right ofway. PI. rights-of-way.
private right-of-way. See easement.
public right-of-way. The right of passage held by the public in general to travel on
roads, freeways, and other thoroughfares.

Black's Law Dictionary (9th ed. 2009), right-of-way. The Court erred when it ruled that
Plaintiffs' right-of-way was solely for the purpose of ingress and egress to their property. Rather,
the Plaintiffs have the right to pass over the right-of-way regardless of purpose. Their ability to
access their property is not relevant to the an analysis of whether their easement rights have been
infringed upon. Unambiguous deeds, including deeds granting easements, must be interpreted
based on the language of the deeds. Phillips Industries, Inc. v. Firkins, 121 Idaho 693,697, 827
P.2d 706, 710 (Ct. App. 1992); Coward v. Hadley, 246 P.3d 391,396 (ldaho,2010). The Court
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has correctly determined that the conveying document is unambiguous. The Court must look to
the conveying document and determine if Plaintiff's are able to use the property described in the
conveying document as a right-of-way. As the sign makes it impossible for Plaintiffs to pass
through property subject to the right-of-way, they are entitled to its removal.

3.

Boydston Beach does not support Highway lOlls position, but supports Plaintifrs
contention that they are entitled to the use of their entire right-of-way.
Highway 101 has relied heavily on the Boydstun Beach Ass In v. Allen, 111 Idaho 370, 723

P.2d 914 (Ct. App. 1986). However, the decision in Boydstun supports the Plaintiffs' position.
In Boydston, a recorded deed granted an easement for ingress, egress privileges and parking
space on a specifically defined strip ofland 200 feet long and 75 feet wide along the shore of Big
Payette Lake. Id. 111 Idaho at 377, 723 P .2d at 921. Subsequent owners of the servient property
had developed the area subject to the easement. Id. 111 Idaho at 373, 723 P.2d at 917. Nearly
their entire yard was on the easement, including grass, landscaping, and a sprinkler system. Id.
In addition, they had built mounts of dirt and rocks and planted shrubs and trees. Id. There was
a 25 foot strip of the easement area that was not developed. Id. The district judge found that the
mounds of dirt and rocks interfered with the ability to park and drive on the easement. Id. 111
Idaho at 374, 723 P.2d at 918. The district judge also found that the full area of the easement
was not necessary for its use and that there was sufficient room to park and tum around on the
twenty-five foot wide undeveloped area. Id. He found that building fires and parking cars on the
lawn of the owners of the servient property would be a nuisance. Id. The district court ruled that
the holders of the easement were not entitled to park on the lawn and to the removal of the
obstacles in the easement. The district court's decision was a reasonable attempt to resolve a
difficult situation in a manner that was equitable to all involved that the Court of Appeals
described as "commendable". Id. 111 Idaho at 377-378, 723 P.2d at 921-922. In overturning the
district court the Court of Appeals recognized the good intentions of the district court but
determined that in attempting to reach a reasonable workable solution, it had failed to take into
account the legal effect of the easement. The Court stated as follows:
The district court apparently sought to preserve the existing improvements to the
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easement area while allowing those with easement rights the fullest use available
consistent with the changed use of the servient estate. The district court's efforts to
accommodate the interests involved and arrive at a realistic solution to the
problem are commendable. However, since the plan adopted by the court does not
take into account the full legal rights of the dominant estate owners, we are
constrained to reverse and remand for the formulation of a new plan of use.
Id. III Idaho at 377-378, 723 P.2d at 921-922. In reaching its decision the Court of Appeals
stated a number of generally accepted rules of law regarding easements - and given the dearth of
Idaho cases on point, referenced numerous out of state cases for support. The Court stated the
following rules:

•

Where a servient landowner takes the land subject to the easement, as did the AlIens, he
must refrain from interfering with the use of the easement, and the court has the authority
to order removal of obstructions. Id. III Idaho at 377, 723 P.2d at 921 (Citing Brown v.
Alabama Power Company, 275 Ala. 467, 156 So.2d 153 (1963); Warsaw v. Chicago
Metallic Ceilings, Inc., 35 Ca1.3d 564, 199 Cal.Rptr. 773,676 P.2d 584 (1984).

•

An easement owner is entitled to relief upon a showing that he is obstructed from
exercising privileges granted by an easement. Id. III Idaho at 377-378, 723 P.2d at 921922. (Citing Connecticut Light and Power Co. v. Holson Co., 185 Conn. 436, 440 A.2d
935 (1981).

•

All privileges expressed in a written easement and those necessarily incident to
enjoyment of the express rights pass with the easement. Id. III Idaho at 377-378, 723
P.2d at 921-922. (Citing Smith v. Wright, 161 Colo. 576, 424 P.2d 384 (1967); City of
Pasadena v. California-Michigan Land and Water Co., 17 Ca1.2d 576, 110 P.2d 983
(1941).1

IAn additional inference can be drawn from the Boydstun Court's heavy reliance on out
of state authority - Idaho courts have interpreted the law of easements consistent with the courts
of its sister states. While the out of state cases cited by Plaintiffs in earlier briefing are not
binding on this Court, they are directly on point and the reasoning in them is persuasive. The
consistency of the decisions across state lines is remarkable. Absent an Idaho case directly on
point, the Court errs by not following, or at least addressing, the well thought out decisions of
other states.
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The Court of Appeals engaged in a reasonableness analysis regarding only two issues - open
fires and toilets/sanitation. In doing so the Court specifically stated that these issues were subject
to a reasonableness analysis because they were not part of the easement. "The right to have fires
is not granted by the easement and hence is subject to reasonable adjustment." Id. 111 Idaho at
379, 723 P.2d at 922. Regarding the sanitation services the Court stated "This [the requirement
for toilet and sanitation facilities] does not interfere with the granted privileges and is proper in
light of the normal development of the servient and dominant estates." Id. 111 Idaho at 378-379,
723 P.2d at 922-923. At no time did the Court of Appeals use a "reasonableness" test to
determine a right granted in the easement. It simply applied the language of the easement. And
it did so in spite of the factual findings by the trial court that the entire area subject to the
easement was not necessary for its use and that it would be a nuisance to the owner of the
servient property.
F or support of its position, Highway 101 points not the substance of the Boydston
decision, but to the language of the Restatement of Property cited in the decision. The Court of
Appeals cited the Restatement as follows:

Our analysis is guided by principles stated at 5 RESTATEMENT OF
PROPERTY, SERVITUDES § 486 (1944):
The possessor ofland subject to an easement created by
conveyance is privileged to make such uses of the servient
tenement as are not inconsistent with the provisions of the creating
conveyance.
Comment:
a. Uses not inconsistent with conveyance. So far as the language of
the conveyance creating an easement precisely defines the
privileges of the owner of it, the privileges of use of the owner of
the servient tenement are also precisely defined. As the precision of
definition decreases, the application ofthe principle that the owner
of the easement and the possessor of the servient tenement must be
reasonable in the exercise of their respective privileges becomes
more pronounced. Under this principle, the privilege of use of the
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possessor of the servient tenement may vary as the respective needs
of himself and the owner of the easement vary.

Id. 111 Idaho at 376, 723 P.2d at 920. However, that language provides no support for Highway
10 l's position. The key phrase in the restatement is "not inconsistent with the provisions of the
creating easement." As applied by the Court of Appeals in Boydston, the rights expressed by the
creating document are enforced specifically - regardless of whether the amount of property set
out in the easement is more than is necessary for the enjoyment of the easement.
In this case, the creating conveyance provides for a "right-of-way to be used in common
with others" and specifically describes the location of the right-of-way with a metes and bounds
description. The right conveyed by the conveying document is the right to pass over the subject
property and the Court has properly ruled that the subject property is precisely defined by the
creating conveyance. However, like the trial court in Boydstun, the Court has found that the
location of the right is more than is necessary - the Plaintiffs do not need the full 25 feet set out
in their deeds. However, the location of the right was determined decades ago when the deeds
for the properties involved were created and the easement was granted. Affidavit o/Counsel in

c)'upport 0/Plaintiff's Motion/or Summary Judgment, Exhibit E, bates 5, 6, 9. The Plaintiffs, and
numerous prior owners of the parcels, purchased their property in reliance on the existence of the
25 foot right-of-way that appeared in their deeds. As in Boydstun, this Court does not have the
authority to shrink the size of the easement granted because it is inconvenient to the current
property owner.

4.

Carson v. Elliott does not support Highway 101 IS position, rather it shows that the
holder of a right-of-way is entitled to remove obstructions from the right-of-way.
The sole question in Carson was "whether an easement owner was entitled to remove a

physical obstruction placed in a right-of-way by the owners of the land." Carson v. Elliott, 111
Idaho 889, 890, 728 P.2d 778, 779 (Ct. App. 1986). The Court of Appeals found that the
easement owner was entitled to the removal of an obstruction. Id. The Court described the
easement as an "access easement to a dwelling" and the location or size of the easement was not
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addressed by the Court. Id It appears that the dimensions of the easement were not set out in the
creating document. The Court cited to a ALR annotation that addresses the width of a right-ofway created by an express grant, reservation, or exception that does not specifY the width of the
easement. Id A copy of that ALR article is attached. Given that the location of the easement
was not described in the deed, the Court had no choice but to consider the facts surrounding the
use of the easement. The Court approved the easement holders removal of a garden although the
easement holders vehicles only "occasionally" required the space occupied by the garden to turn
around and "sometimes" struck the raised garden and in spite of evidence that these occasions
were rare. Id 111 Idaho at 891, 728 P.2d at 780. Carson provides no support for Highway lOl's
position.
The raised garden in Carson is quite similar to the sign in the present case. The easement
holders are able to access their property and the obstruction is an inconvenience rather than an
absolute bar to the properties. Unlike Carson, the evidence indicates that sign is hit regularly,
and particularly when drivers are attempting to turn around or back out of Rexburg Plumbing and
Heating. Plaintiffs have affirmed as follows:
[C]lients or persons visiting plaintiffs have hit the sign. Nephi Allen and Kenton
Johnson have both seen people hit the sign. For example, they saw a driver from
Clair and Dee's Tire Factory hit the sign. They also had a client come back into
thcir building to apologize for hitting the sign.

Affidavit of Counsel in Support ofPlaintiff's Motionfor Summary Judgment, Exhibit C, pg. 4-5.
Nephi Allen has testifIed as follows:
Well, that's one of our major complaints about that sign is that many of our
costumers, as you can see by the pictures of the pipe bollards, have hit that sign.
And I believe that our costumers are the only ones that are in that unique situation
because how they pull in using the easement, and then when they back out, that's
where the sign is, so.

Affidavit of Bryan D. Smith in Support of Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, Exhibit
"A", Depo. Of Nephi Allen, pg. 33, L. 15-21. Nephi Allen himself has hit the sign while using
the right-of-way. Id pg. 34, L. 4-10.

BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION
PAGE 447

leration- Page 9

In its Decision, the Court states that Plaintiffs' only argument to the placement of the sign
was that it was per se unreasonable and that they have never (emphasis in original) argued that
the sign constitutes an unreasonable interference with their use of the easement. Decision 10.
This statement is not supported in the record. Plaintiffs maintain that the placement of a
permanent obstacle in a right-of-way must, as a matter of law, interfere with the ability of the
easement holder to use the right-of-way since, due to the permanent obstacle, they cannot pass
over that portion of the right-of-way. Due to the clarity in case law and efficacy of resolving the
matter on that basis, much of Plaintiffs' briefing has been in support of that position. However,
they have always maintained that the sign unreasonably interferes with their right to use the
easement based on the fact that they and their clients have hit the sign.
The Court, in finding that there is no dispute that the sign is reasonable confuses
Plaintiffs ability to access their property with their right to use the right-of-way. Decision 10-12.
The question is not whether Plaintiffs and their customers can access Plaintiffs' property - the
question before the Court is whether the sign prevents the Plaintiff from using the property
subject to the right-of-way as a right-of-way.
As in Carson the sign does not prevent the Plaintiffs from accessing their property, but it
does interfere with their right of way, both as a matter of law, and as shown by the fact that both
Nephi Allen and various customers have hit it. As in Carson, Plaintiffs are entitled to its
removal.

5.

If the Court determines Plaintiffs are not entitled to pass over the entirety of the
right-of-way described in their deeds, the Court should described the area of the
right-of-way over which they are entitled to pass over.
If the Court determines on reconsideration that Plaintiffs' are not entitled to travel over

the entirety of the described right-of-way, the Court ought to determine the portion of the rightof-way over which they are entitled to unobstructed access. "[I]t is well settled under Idaho law
that any judgment determining the existence of an easement must also specify the character,
width, length and location of the easement." Bratton v. Scott, 150 Idaho 530, _ , 248 P.3d
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1265, 1277 (2011). In this case it is important that the parties understand precisely what they
mayor may not due so as to avoid future disagreements and litigation. If the Court determines
that Plaintiffs' are not entitled to pass over the entirety of their described right-of-way, the Court
should determine what portion they are entitled to pass over. Such a ruling would also benefit
Highway 101 by making clear what portion of the described right-of-way it may place permanent
structures on. For example, if Highway 101 installs a sign that is one foot larger and reduces the
useable portion of the right-of-way from 19 feet to 18 feet and Plaintiffs' object to the expansion
of the sign, are the parties required to engage in costly and lengthy litigation to determine if this
additional encroachment is "reasonable?" To avoid the need for additional litigation, Plaintiffs
request that the Court determine what portion of the right-of-way they are entitled to pass over.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons the Court should grant PlaintifTs' Motion to Reconsider and
Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment as it relates to the signs' unreasonable interference
with Plaintiffs' use of the right-of-way. Additionally, for the reasons set out in Plaintiffs' prior
briefing, the Court should grant Plaintiffs summary judgment on all counts and Plaintiffs their
costs and fees pursuant to I.C. § 12-121 and I.R.c.P. 54(e)(l).

DATED this 20 th day of May, 2011.
Hyrum . rickson
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE BY MAIL, HAND DELIVERY
OR FACSIMILE TRANSMISSION
I hereby certifY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document was on this date
served upon the persons named below, at the addresses set out below their name, either by mailing, hand delivery or by telecopying to them a true and correct copy of said document in a
properly addressed envelope in the United States mail, postage prepaid; by hand delivery to
them; or by facsimile transmission.
DATED this 20 th day of May, 2011.
RIGBY ANDRUS & RIGBY, Chartered

Bryan D. Smith, Esq.
B. J. Driscoll, Esq.
SMITH, DRISCOLL & ASSOCIATES, PLLC
P. O. Box 50731
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405

[X] Mail
[ ] Hand Delivery
[ ] Facsimile

Honorable Dane H. Watkins, Jr.
Bonneville County Courthouse
605 North Capital
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83402

[X] Mail
[ ] Hand Delivery
[ ] Facsimile
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tor thetieed) ; Grliwfqrdv. ,Tennessee
Gas Transmii;lsiori' 0.0.(1952, TexCiy
App) ' 25?, SW2.,d 237 , ("s1,l,~~ab,i.ei, a~4
corivenient"""';'''r~aliol1,l;l,bly suffiCIent ),
, '. Ver~ont.~W~lker~. ' P:ievce' (186,5 )
38 Vt ' 94 .' C'r,ea,so!)~bly , go~~el}iElnt:',);
Ad~ison ,Co,unt,y v.)~la~kmer , (19~~)
191 , y:t ?~4, .' l43 A 700', ("of al':eas:OIlab1~'iwt4thi',;~onsideXing .i ts purpOSEl),.
Virginia.-;-:-Buckles v. 'Kennedy Coal
Corp. (1922) 134:Ya 1; 114SE233; (the
width is,to be suc.h as is "reasonably
sufficient" for the accomplishment of
the ,object) •
'"
'
Washington; - Van ' De VahteJ"V.
Flaherty (1905) 3'7 Wash 2i8;79 P 794
(when notliinited :by the grant itself,
the : wayrt,~isi bounded by the line oJ reasonable enjoyment").
"
.
West . VitginHI. +'-' WHey : v•. ,Ball
(1913) 72 W: ,Va 6:85, 79 SE ' 6'59, >ceueh
width as is "reasonabIY i u'eGes:l\ary")i
Palmer v.New:ma:n: el922»:91 ;W Va
13, 112 SE 194 (width is to be .st.icha,/l
is .'~reasonably necessary'.' .fO.I: the purpOil'e's; and isto.i~e ,i'as'u it.abieandcon,.
venient way'); . state ~o.ac;l Corp., v.
Chesflpeake & O·ll· Go. , q,9~4} 1~5 ~ :W
v:~ 647, 117 SE 5:39(the~,aseme!1ii' is

"pounded by the ,line(lof
eIljOYIflent',' ) ; ' ll1l9desCe)l1et~ry
v. Miller (1940) 122 W Va 139,
2d 659 ("reasonabl~ width'.') • .'
, The dominant idea seems tQbe '
the way allowed fo\.; i(> one of ...',., "07....
able width, h iking intQ~onsi.<:l
the '. charaCter and: situation
p:r:opel~ty, the cir~4mstanGes .'
tne us~; ·lJ.pd the purposes to
',: The , widtll being Un
tlie deed, the laws"ys
ment shan be . QfareasQlla
~on§'ideriI1g t4ePlln~Ose 'for
wa(intenileg. ,· In ,deaJirig
qilesti6nthe ' deed is to be
liherally toward the gn].ntee . ..
~ati9'n aridchataCter. of the rniiA'"li:«
fbr the be~efit of which the
Il1a:deal1d'it~~,; ~ther ' cir<; .
~,sting', a,t tile Wrie !iteto
c6risidetatiopa~ W!llI as .
nec(lss:ary :to thebepefieial
all
the_ ~nd tl1<lt the purp "
intehtibns of the parties may
J;ied out,., ; AM,i sgn ,Copn.t )'. v,

tu

lIl~r; (1928), )q~:Vt ?~4,)43

A

'. In. Wiley, :v,BIiLIH19J3) 72 W
7,9S£6,59., :a" suitto,.obtajna "UH 'O' "',U'
in cQJJfoxmitywith a .will
part,of 'the-land ·tQ ;a .daughter
oth,e rto 't,hechildren :Qf a
testatQra.n d p.~·ovidingfor a
Uneand d(l(:laring that "a right
,is ,res:Elrved tlirough the; front itr
the>pQ:bIic 'road.," , whe:reinr,the
j.\;ldge fixed' the: ,location ' of ;
'W.a~ ' held that the d.e cree
,o us· in fixi)J.g ,the width ' at
sjnce for .' .all that .appeared
record that :w.idthmight .be
was necessarY, to provide g". "V U il l '"''
ingress and egress. According~
was. hel;d tJl;:J;t, the" decl'ee · shop,"!1t
rt1(tjQine4by .s,tJ;iki.ng out the, "p,t"I,;:! 1!''''
tion'9f wldthand providiing·sIlfllNIY)l!t
f\:uch, U!'le of. a WaY.oG ,thel
"as",js: J,'e:il,s9n:ably , n.eCElss:arv
ordinary purposes of:
going to anlj, frOIfl t,he land q
them.. .

•

As already noted; some of the
define the way..!lSi one of con
or su'i table width;,'or the. lik~. '
! ',

,

'

_,

' J

;,

,

•

•

~

•
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' tf}#,w~Tl&~tthf~th~t w1t~l! t~~; ~r~~t
Heile ~~ ' tQ" th~ ~la~h the "Wl!'1 ~~1~

h~tlftb 'M; dfs'ticW }\'i:d~h ~~S; I'S)il:llt'"

~ean9, c,onverti,llnt 'fb:r th.~(jrd.i:~~ry
~B!NbiH.'. free pa. s~ag,e;' an.',.d., Jf ,the, p,.:a..f~~llr6-bjk'6,( of the ,grai1.rofthe WI}-'J
"d: th~ ' width
f :r'tat~"
'" " 'hhtst
, "," bEi
',"" suitablE!
"" ,, ",'
, ijl(~6hvifni'elllWitli :~enfr.etice, ,to that
o j~ay Th1,sis 'in(~r'e!~, td\driitt~e ~M
J.r8fit, ih ' , ac,(!bl'd.a,rtCe, ·' :-vith', ;t;heJ:jfe~
IS ,fi\eH"ihtentiort 'oftlHlpartie$. , ~h~at
I~Jit~bi ~,J,art~, ' i:9hVel1~efrt ,mUst If;~C"
l!alatiIy' depe,nd ~Bon~he ClrC?'IYlstan~
LOf,eacli C}tiH:l",'" The., prt!surrt,ed
tp 'erit~6n; is:;" df _ ~dllrse;to , be , fb~~d
irl.!li'E\:insfl'llrnent ItSelf, but ~h~ l~~~~U~
ment is to be re~d In the ligfit of:the
ie~it£t conditiOn.}; 'a-nddlrci:IiilWmees
IIldS't'itig at :Hsdate" ,trh( iri~etp:retaL
t b, irrcl:!s,e' tifd'ou'bt mar be 'itidlld ,by
~r p't'h~H'ca,1 ct)rtBtl'il~tibjiwhtch t~e
))l1l'tleS placed upon the ' l~hgtl!¥¢e, " by

Ii " <lotte by bf1E3aticl acqmesMtt il'lby
the other, espl1MAlly' when': ddtllitnllEia
{Is' a;t)ong; time:: DrUrrlffiond 'vfi F~ster
(l~nO) 107 Me 401, 78 A 470 . . :.,~, ,:; ,
The validity of an easement of way
~'i'jtM i IMid i o'i,"·l1MtIHlt' Is !fitiffim.
" Jte'd altli.lJUgl1 it is. ltbt defiIHlilffi tl'ib
, r by : rfleteS aitId b(jtii'ids~' 1;he : tlifmi~
n t i tenetMIlt il:i 'Such ' it cltSe" lJeiiig
II

itled tti'!il; G6rtVefil\:intand :,gtii'taM~
a , ;'depe:htli'ng: Oit- th-e conditi'o ns ;cif

h,6Hp1-M~'

ft

tin d ' the

flU rp'o-sea ,1flft 'w hlth

' a:a l hit~ntl{;li:t:':

Kotiak

".' Durrant

;(9'40) 143' Flii ~86j , 196S(jg02i"
'
.~ 'GeBri~ v.frot (fS~4l f'f4Mag~
2/\V'hete :; th~:CoiIveyail'cti Was of A
~ ~aVor ' 1a:h'd ' abi:Jtlt :t47 feel d~~p 'and
1tr~ J ~~~tWid~ . ~yip.g to th~ no~thof a
~

bUrt, Me'th6distmMtihghditse, ' Uto_

ge lfer witIt'll rtght 'of a: fr.~ll pitSs~ge
~ fi01n ' Medfbrd road by ,thtl ea.-st·
e tY'"side': of th~;nf~ati,ng.house , toliAid
10 ,i i land/'ttffdlt:\*as clairiIM'thin
ati the time of the- :gtatlb the gr'a ntee
fl)atle c:a 'practical lOcation of the way
by;ve/ltablishiIiga f'ence · so as to ,give
8. Wi,dth of eighteen feet and that the
Irt'aintors then ; and for a long time
acqfiJescedthEirein, the court conceded
-t t ,this; if done with intent to fix the
VtitltlfOl the passageway, would operat~\viththEf' Same legal effect as fixin'g
·th~e:vJ-id'tli by"oee'd; but said that if the

"f j'28ALR2dJ-17
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jIlt'y ,Ilhollid find, ',ag-ninst i that daim
then the instl'uctioh ' which ,i 'h e ',c/)uH
l-nid given thattnede-ed 'gaYe,tlie-tgr'iintee "1\ , way of ' ci6nv e,n ient width, -fOJ;
all the 'ordilial'Y u ~e fl of fre~ passage
td aHd :fi:on1 hisland/' Would b'e appro'
pl'iatealYd correct, '
, In: ~Ht1ith v.Wiggiri(1812) 52 Nil
11tii\tft~fe tMconv/)yailcei by deed 6f
1833, included a ."ri&,ht. of a passa~e"
Wayfr'oht 'Chapel ' sti'eettd lYl:e teat, of
theiltdi.'e" ' on the ' gra:fited: rprefrlistls~
and it :tppearedthatfoi' alDhg tii!!\!
'P~rsbns ' daimTilg under the tleed had
used, Withteam~iihd bthel.'wise)a pM·
i;iigeWiiY< )about thh'ty feeti:i1 ' WidtH
m\.t11sh6ftly iJef~~e the· suit; 'W lt~n ,'the
tlW-nerbfthesei-'vi/)ntteneIfie'titere<lt·
~t1 . sttucfUi'es which atbn'epoiht 1'~J.
dUted the ' i.vldth t(j ' about twMvea:fHi
6'M·hlrlf feet;H Was held th at slti~l?
plaintiff ' Was only el1tltieu fda pM~'!l.g~Way "colivehletit a.ndliUi't;~ble\'fbt
~:iie pu'f'P,bses f'ot whi'chgi"a'h'H!d, : antl
tHe j'QrYfilid fdtiHd ithtit tl'\~ fE(J;Y1l:ti1ifig
~ptite w¥t'shiffl.cie'li:Hoi' tho~-e PUi"pos'es,
)~dg!TIeht :mus1; 'be, giyefi lor ' th,e o.~.

Ientlal1t. '

,' InRiipde's, Cemetery, Asso,v:

..
M'jiiit

'(194b) 'i 22W Va 139, 7 S'E2a 615Q,a
conv@yance for cemetery purposGll' of

a,one.half acre lying in the midsl· of

'a ' farm; 'and the further, gr~nt, of " i~
convenient right ' of wayfi, o.vera~,d
through ~he landS to the (lOunty road·,
were held by the trial chancellor to
entitle the,grantee to a way ~ixteen
,and one-haIl fe:et in wJdtb. i 1:his holding was sustained on the appefLl as
within the chanceHor's "sound discreti()rt.'~ the court saying that' in determining the question of , width, 'it : is
'prbperto consider thewholescO'pe and
putpose:bfthe deed and the ' mal1ifest
intentbf the patties,
, : IiI' Lipsky v; HelIer (190'8) 199 Mass
310, 85 NE 453, the court approved the
dEiclsloh of thehiaste'r that silicethe
deed did not define the litnits •Of 'the
, way, and they were not established by
user; the plaintiffs -were entitled tot'a
convenient way. whose width ,throu'g hout should be determined by jtsSllfficiency' to afford ample ingrel)S, a:nd
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egress, for the owners, and occupants
of the dominant estates.."
Seemingly there is. in ordinary cIrcumstances no real difference between
a passageway of "suitable and convenient" width, and one of "reasonable" width, since a way inconveniently or un suitably restricted would not
in most circumstances be a reasonable
one.
In Palmer v. Ne....>mnn (1922) 91 W
Va 13, 112 SE 194, where the court
stated that it was well settled that
when the in trument creating or reo
serving a right of way does not staLe
ita width, "a s uit ble and convenient
way is mean t," to be determined by
its sufficiency to afford Ingres and
egress and by the purposes of . he
grant or reservation and he circumstances of each cllse, the opinion goes
on to say that the servient estate cannot be burdened hy the occupancy of
a greater width "than is reasonably
necessary for the purposes for which
the right of way wa intended," thu
seeming to tre t a way of "suitable
and convenient" width as the same IlS
way of such width as is "reasonably
necessary for the purposes" for which
the way WIlS intended.
In AtkIns v. Bordman (18 1, Ma )
2 Met 457, 87 Am Dec 100, infra, § 10,
it was said that the width was to be
"reasonably sufficient" nd also lIaid
that the right was to a "suitable and
convenient" passway.
And see Willband v. Knox County
Gr in Co. (1929) 128 Me 62, 145 A 405,
infra.

+

A mention in the instrument of the
particular purpose to be lIerved is
doubtless of aid in determining the
width of the way, though the effect
may be the same as ~ here the purpose
appears other than by mention in the
in trument.
Alab ma.-Ellard v. Goodall (1919)
203 Ala 76, 83 So 56 .
Dlinois.-Barber v. Allen (1904) 212
III 125, 72 NE 3S; Perry v. Wiley
(1918) 285 III 25, 120 NE 455.
Indiana. - Vanatta V. Waterhouse
(1904) S3 Ind App 516, 71 NE 159.

l ain e. Drummond v.
(1910) 107 Me 401, 78 A 470;
v. Knox County Grain Co. (1929)
Me 62, 145 A 405.
Ma
u tt - Atkin v . .DU.I~ UII1Rn'
(1841) 2 Met 457, 37 Am Dec
O'Brien v. Murphy (1905) 189
853, 75 NE 700; McKenney v..... "nL"l.ney (1913) 216 Mass 248, 103
New York.-Grafton v. Moir (
130 NY 465, 29 NE 974, 27 Am St
533; ndrews v. Cohen (19H) 163
Diy 580, 148 NY 1028, reb den
App Diy 918, 160 NYS 1074, mod
other grounds 221 NY 148, 116
862; York v. Briggs (1887, Su
NYSR 124Penn yl ania.- Roberta v.
(184) 8 Watts & S 464;
Woodruff (1902) 8 Lack Leg News
T a.-Elias v. Horak (1927,
Civ App) 292 SW 28 • error ref;
Star Gas Co. v. Childress (194.5,
Civ App) 187 SW2d 93G.
Vermont-Walker v. Pierce
38 Vt 94.
When an easement of way is
by express grant, reservation, or
ception, and the purpose or pu
for which it is to be used nrc set
but it is not otherwise limited
fined, and no way is exislent w
nite limitations or boundar
within the contemplation of
ties that the limit of the way
be "such 8S might from time to
be r asonable, suitable, and
ient for the p rticular objects
gr nt." Willband v. Knox
Grain Co. (1929) 128 fe 62, 146 A
When the particular object ot
way Is stated the width must be
able and convenient with .....·...... n"
thnt object. Drummond Y.
(1910) 107 !Ie 401, 78 A 470.
In Barber v. Allen (1904)
125, 72 NE 83, where the ,.n,'VPVAI
reserved and excepted the right
.. good and umcient pri ate
way over and across the west
the lot hereby conveyed, for
and accommodation of the sto~~
lying on the north side thereof,"
w
shown that the property
(28ALR2dJ
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Drummond ,v ..
OiMe 4tH, 78 A 470; . ,
County Grain Co.(i .
45 A 405.
,
chusetts._Atkins v. DV,L,U JJI"l"
l Met 457, 37 Am
v. Murphy (190.5.) 1 ..
fit JOQ;McKenney v. lVJ.,<e:n.e.a.'
3)j~~ Mass 248, 103
· ork.~Grafton v.
t65 29 NE974, 27 '
re~s v.Cohen(1914) .~,,,.,.., ~.,,, ..
148 NYS 1028, reh
918, 150 NYS 1074,
ounds 221 NY: 148"
:k v. Briggs (1887,
4.

.

'Ivania.~Roberts V"

Watts & S 464;
' .'
(1902) SLack Leg NeW.il
-Elias v. , Horak .(
,
292 SW 288, error r!lf"
Co. v. Childress (19{q,
187 SW2d 936.
:t .
It.'--'Walker v. Pierce l"ii;r.\""" ·~"

[§4]

• bU'siness center of an important
' and that the store lots for whose
, the way was reserved fronted
dllP::1Public stre~t, the court concludedrthat the partIes contemplated that
a mercantile business would be conducted (in the lots and had had in mind
no.t 'an alleyway to give :t:atrons access
but a 'passage for the delIvery of goods
at the : rear of the lots by drays and
·'g.ons, and hence, no witness testifying that a width of less than sixteen
iept r would be sufficient for that purpose and most of them fixing the )leCli ~ry . width at fifteen to twenty-two
Ie J, .. it was held that at the least a
!Jth of eighteen feet was necessary,
';~cpnsequentlY that the decree of
e, court below fixing the width at
l'ye,feet should be reversed.
-Iri !Roberts v. Wilcock (1844, Pa) 8
aUs & . S 464, a deed including the
rJgbi1,andprivilege of "a car tway and
pa ~ age of eight feet wide at least,"
~eably to a "plan and draft" indo ~ d on . the deed and further de,lIailled as ' given for passage "with
an Lwithdut hOrses, cattle,ca.rts and
carriages" was held to entitle the
8r4 tt;!~ to more than eight feet · at a
o ntof turning where t he fact was
~~i ,th~t. poin t eight feet was insufllelent. ,·The court was of opinion that
tb;il~h:guage ,u sed,,"eigbt feet wide at
I, str. had t.he meaning of "fully, or
.nof .Iess than" and indicated that the
gralt~ee should have eight feet certain
anJIhnore if more should be indispena Hi, ,regardless , of the fact that the
~1 "~~ttached to the deed did not so
8h ,~,c
' ,', . :
'-'i>e~~y :v; Wiley (1918) 285 III 25,
2O~, 455, wh!lre the conveyance of
~!!51 : quesJiop. prqvJc!ed for a "right
ot :ay fora carriageway" northerly
f¥ Pi;~~e west. end of the lot "to Emero .rEoad, together with the right to
s,~,~<J. right of way for the passage
of ea-iUs ' to and from said Emerson
q to said 'land/; and a strip of hind
n . tin width had accordingly been
"".'.. m 'T fw thephrposeand moreover the
":.I\~lllDt(il' · had later conveyed: to the
a lot to the north in which
of wa,y. in question was recas being ten feet in width,

an

I
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the court was of the opinion that th~t
certainly was as narrow a passage as
could be construed as intended for
the purpose; and 'held that the decree
allowing that width should be affirmed.
In Elias v. Horak (1927, Tex Civ
App) 292 SW 288,error ref, where the
deed stated that the grantee was to
"have an outlet to the public road over
our land," the court observed thatthe
grantee became entitled to use only
so much as was reasonably necessary
for an outlet and noted that the' court
below had awarded a strip four feet
,wide on each side of a line designated
and that no complaint had: been made
as to that.
A grant of a right of way and ,e asement to construct, maintain, and OPElrate pipelin es and appurtenances thereto, and to construct, maintain, and
operate telegraph and telephone lines
' in connection therewith, together with
the necessary poles, guy wIres, and
anchors, over and through the lari.ds
described, was h'eld, in Lone Star ~as
Co. v. Childress (1945, Tex CivApp)
187SW2d 93~, to en:title the defendant to Use in the future as much . of
the land "as ' each occasion may reasonably demand." The court said that
the amount of space reasonably needed in any partIcular operation was, a
questIon of fact and held thatlirider
the testimony, the ''trial judge erred in
tendering judgment confining the defendant to a strip thirty feet wid,e for
its future use. '
'
In Andrews v. Cohen (1914) 163 App
Div 580, 148 NYS 1028, rehden 165
App Div 918, 150 NYS i074, mod on
other grounds 221 NY 148, 116 NE862,
where the grant stated that the way
began at a certain point "running
thence always of sufficient width an:d
with 'room to turn with'reasonable care
' into the northern end of" a certain aileyway, and that it sho~ld give a right
"to pass and repass on, foot or with
horses or vehicles of whatsoever description but was "not to be so interpreted that there "i~ to be room along
. it for ' a wagon to be turned entIreiy
' about," the court pointed out that
however ample the :space then existing

)

)
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' the specifications limited the width, , ty,"the court was Of the
' and 'that the iater removal of certain ,the parties must have c
: buildings giving more open space ;did ' that the"way should be sui
"not ' increa~e the .!1im.ensions of ,the patticular locality, andac
way.,.,
,upheld the finding of the court '
In Day v. Atlantic & G. W. R Co. that to be, of ,any,bEmefit to the'
,(1884)41 Ohio St. 392, a Gase riot on its 'tiff's property 'the way would
facts within the scope of this annota- be thirty feet wide. ' rhe """'rt" 'ai'"
tionbut involving th.e width of a rail- that "nothing less could have been
ro:;td, right of way whic:h ;at ,the time of templatedby the parties than ,aF
the grant thereof was"definedbya plat sufficient for the purpo'ses for :
subsequently mislaid but showing a it was manifestly opened/'
width of jJfty feet, .w.herein the issue
In McKenney-v. McKenney (
pres,e nted, was the width of the way as 216 , Mass 248, 103 NE 631; whe
' against a subsequent purchaser of the will gave one-half of a dOltble:'
farm who had never seen the plat and to one son :hImied ' and the Otfl' €':r" ,Il'AlfJ
,wail not informed as tl) ,the width to another son; and ' to ' the l"rr""" "h.'. claimed by the railroad company" the heirs and assigns" aright of waY
court"re)1larked thtne~essari1ya rail- thep'remises given to the'flrst'sorr '
' roaqriis,ht ofw~yinchides mOre space all purposes as': if the sarire were
' tnf,l,ii.i's' co,vered bYJhe cross ties; since Jic . highway,'~: the court :said :
' cars r'e qiiire more than that for ,their wouJdbe ian unwarranted i'n fA """;,,,,,
p~ssihll~!ithe track nee,ds, draillage ' I:wnclude that by, the words ,ab
an~ .ties ' apd rails must 'be ,repiacededthe testatrix meanttogiv.e
. and pending such w()rk materia, must · thewidth usually prescribed f",,,,,,,,,'hliltl
lif:!: . a,r6ligi/ige~he tr~\!k an.d , l:ieyo~d , the "ways" the. words bein.g rather rlt>'g ....,,1Ptl
ql'\ltn,s, 'an~ that, con~eq!1entlythe PO$tiveof' ,the character of the
';~j:!,;isibh9:f"ihe raiIr9adin sijCh ~. eas,e : n()t ()f,the breadth of the
riO',N , ,",8""
iri,<;lgdeS:not' ,only , the ' grouiid ' c9v~red sagewa:y.;~
byth~ .crossties ' and ,wl£hinth~ 'walls
In :Bu'rnham v. MahOney "
of 't he cuts but' ~'lsoso, nluchof the va- Mass 524, I'll NE:396; where '
c~i).t"gtouiidohbothsidesasis 'r ea~~n- ' of three c6ntig'tioiis lots; in
ablynecdssary 'roroperating and main- one of them>referred to '
.taiI\ipg ~hp r~ilway , in 'the customa,ry 'these premises'! 'lind, to a ,"e .. r"" l ""'~'
:m~qT' '
,',
"
ed street running ,
., ' 1:1':,';f,'r"T" ~"Jo'
"'j',' , . ,
. '
, ;+";,,
,::'"
lot, to which the' name
Cnrtam mstrumentshave ,see,med ,to is given on the>Plan.' af6r A'Q'" j71".f.Il'iII1'I
"pro,y,ide 'faraway" comparable to a , stated 'that the ' sidd 'streElt .'
'roador public highway:: '
"
' laid but within 'oneyear frbrti
,IT) Yanattav" Wat~rh9use (190~) 33 Of ,:t hedeeci;btlt'in.'factthere '
Irid App 516; 71 ,NE159,wherethere- such street ever laid out and
speqtlveowners, of irr,egula;r :pieces of across the 'lbf! conv'eyed',' '
adjoining : l:;tnds, in arder .' to obtai:n defined,byuser,: itwa:~heid:
)nor~ , ,desirapre . 'pol,ln9.ariesj , 1lgJ:'eed
complaining of, obst:i:tfctiori's '
"upqn an 'exch~nge or certain ,portions, Cla:inredto' 'exisfihd 8'1~e~jIi,g
Md" a~ong o,t'her,)hings;, agreed,' that -its p~ecise limits;)I' tlfat, a :"l'.."'"''''''
, One ~o(Hiem (tIiedefenciaiit~('!graptor) . fhelitnitshavlng become
would open, establish; and maintain acolii'tof equityfnight locate
hig~\vay, 'flout4 ,o f and along and a:dj,a- ' ''in a reasonable iTIaimer."
cent ' to .the south of the ' plriintnb
'. " f , ; "
premist\s, and the deed to plajntiff ac- Width to pass; turn; OJdurn
cordingly specified that the grantor '" ' ' 'rhepurposefor which
' WQtjld ' provide , ;i~, p!1ssa.bl~ highw~ai" granted ,o r reserved when ,
sou.thof and aii'joining pla,intIWs , ia'pd gether ;withthe: l : H ",Ulm,
, to)nt~r~e(!t'a ':ceFtqinavenue an9. that
thll ~am~ ~l:tQtlJd" bll "for puMic utili-

of'
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. eh11.bl'e' vehicles to' pass or' to
to torn; around;:
v.Woodruff (1902, Pa) 8
News 194, the deed under
claimed, which gave .
. a ;' tight of. ' way along railroad
e'i'ty "wide enough for wagons and
uses," was regarded byth'e court,
a · fair' construction of. ' the : lahed, as entitling the defendants
rtgl1tof way ofa reasonable width
fori}'a r Wagon road, wide enough for
wagons to pass · or hU'n around . . The
ooiHt found under the evidence that a
'Ii tlthmf thirty feet' was reasonable for
tb G;tptupose. .
,
.
~ridsee Barber v. Allen (1904) 212
JU 125, ,7 2 NE 3S, supra; Bina v.Bina
(19$1)'213.' Iowa 4~2{ . 239 < NW; 68; 78
ALR 1216, mfra, § 6; and Rhodes Ceme c: y Asso. v. Miller (1940) 122 W Va
18,91'7 SE2d 659, supra~
COFnpare Burroughs v. Milligan
'9 &2)-- Md - , 85 A2d775, 28ALR
i243, and Good y.: Petti crew, (1936)
1 Va 526, 183 SE 2t7; bothjnfra~ §9; ,
arldoa:lsoElias v. Horak (1927, Tex Civ
App ~l 292SW 288, errOr ref, supra.
LIi ' Long v. Gill , (1885) 80 Ala 408,
I~ra,§ 7; a width sufficient to .' give
ro prfor turnin g was contemplated.
:And see l)unham v.Dodge (1920) .
235.:1'11ass367,126, NK.663, infra, § 6,
a ck Robe:rts v. Wilcock (1844,. Pa) 8
& , S . 4G4, ·slipra~

. ,{

\

)

~

,,

-.

, ',

'l{Jilder particular circumstances a
;X"',_~,.r., l. ;sufficient to 'allow for turning or
P . sing only at certainpraces may be
'jmded:
'
:,'
" , York v. Brigg's '(1887; Sup)' 7 .NY
S , L124, where .a conveyance of wareH~.d se' premises' incltideda' privilege of
6 A'C'e ' north : of: the north line "for
:ins to' go to, and from," the 'w are, es, and the '1t1atter complained of
, illloth'e act of one: of ' the grantor's
, rg; in con's tructirig the foundation
,#~ lS'. for a building ' on the north lot
8 -'as ' to leave a passageway of:, only
l eV,e nteen feet on that lot and adjacent
. ~hepurchased 'premises, ' and in all
1>11 It; twenty"one feet between such
fo "ndation and the warehouses, and
it .a's insisted that theeffed ·was not
.. leave enoug h room for teams to
P , as' at that point, ' taking into account
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the~ width Of vehicles used to de!{ver
goods' to the warehouses, and moreQver
that there was interference with teams
and wagons turning al'ound so as. to go
out atthepoint .of entry, the court, in
holding that there was no interfeJ:enGe ;
with ' the plaintiff's right s; said . t.h at
the . question was . whether , the space '
stilL available amounted to a reasonably suitable width, or such width as
was within the contemplation of the
parties at the time of the grant. The
court concluded that the remaining
space was sufficient notwithstanding'
the proof of the great width of vehicles
coming to the warehouses, and said
that it could not be concluded' as a
matteroflaw that the passage of such
vehicles abl'east came within the contemplation of the grant, or that a width
sufficient at all points for such pur- '
pose was actually or reasonably 'necessary to the enjoyment of the way as
contemplated at the time it Was made.
The court further noted that necessarily incident to the way for ingress
and. egress were the means to , turn
around, but observed that this did. not
necessarily require sufficient width for
the whole length of the way for teams
and wagons to turn about,. "n or the
mos~convenient means of doing so at
any place."
In Smith v. Sponable (1900)54 App
Div' 615, 66NYS177, where the d~ed
included "the right to pass and rep a~s"
from ,the .roaq t ,h erein designated,
"thence across the f actory bridge as
it now lies; said right of travel nbt to
extend , over, a strip of ground above
three rods wide/ i the cOllrtpointed out
that the deed did not in terms, grant
a way three rods wide, rather . that
three rods was the extreme timit
which could be deinanded, and . the
court said that within that limit the'
width ' must be. regulated by J;~asona
ble necessity; and concluded that, ;considering the right as being one to pass
and repass only,and .that by thewor.ding of the grant it could not exceed
three rods, a reasonable interpretaJion
did not require a width of three rods at
the bridge, nor a way any wider there
than the bridge itself. The cQurt
pointed out that north of the bridge
and a certahl barn there appeared to .
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be all the space necessary for turning
around, and al;;o abundant room for
teams to pass west of the barn.
In Walker v. Pierce (1865) 38 Vt 94,
the conveyince which included the
right to 'use the common passway at the
west end of the building i'n question
and which also gave a right to a passway 'from the first passway mentioned
"to the rear of the portion of the building hereby conveyed" in such manner
as to give to the grantee his heirs and
assigns "room to .pass of the width of
a common cartway for all necessary
and ordinary household purposes· to
the rear of the building," was held not
to limit the plaintiff to a width of
twelve feet at the corner of the passage so indicated, even though the
proof disclosed that an ordinary cartway was of the width of only twelve
feet, since what would be sufficient for
a common cartway on a straight line
might not be such in the case of a
way with sharp angles and curves, and
the true construction of the grant was
that the grantee was entitled to a
space "reasonably convenient" for the
purpose indicated.
The instrument may, of course,
specify whethei or not room is given
for turning or turning around. Andrewsv. Cohen (1914) ' 163 App Div
580, 148 NYS 1028, reh den 165 App
Div 918, 150 NYS 1074, mod on other
grounds 221 NY 148, 116 NE 862,
supra.

+

There is no right to a use of space to
turn teams around where turning was
neither needed nor contemplated at
the time of the conveyance. Drummond v. Foster (1910) 107 Me 401, 78
A 470, infra, § 5.
.
§ 5. -

As limited to the width required at the time of the conveyance.
Since ' the determination of the
width of the way, when granted or reserved without specification of width,
is a matter of the construction of the
instrument with the object of arriving
at the intention of the parties, there
seems to be no possibility of concluding that the width is greater than was
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reasonable, convenient; or
the purposes and uses cOlltemrllaj~'e
when the instrument was exec
The instrument is to be read in '..
light of ·the relevant conditions
circumstances existing at its
Drummond v. Foster (1910)
401, 78 A 470.
It is the thep circumstances
necessary uses which are to be
into consideration in dot" ......";,,
width. . Addison County v. Bl'HOJ""IU "Clo
(1928) 101 Vt 384, 143 A 700,
§ 4.
The way is limited to the nature '
condition of the subject matter at , '
time of the grant and to the
purposes which the parties
mind; Dunham v. Dodge (1920)
Mass 367, 126 NE 663, infra, § 6..
.In Drummond v. Foster (1910)
Me 401, 78 A 470, where, in con
a strip of land lying at the rear
grantee's store, there was also
"a free right of way with teams, ·
riages, etc:," and the effect of the
guage at the time of the grant
provide for a through passage
one street to the grantee's ~~.n~;:.'"
and thence to an undi
point, but subsequent to the
successors in interest of the
blocked the eidtas a eorisequen
extension of .the buildings on
nant tenement, thus forming a
sac, the court rioted that the
the way was to be determined
deed and the circumstances
at ,the time of conveyance and eon
ed ' that there was no intent to
a way of such a width as would
point enable teams and wagons
around; In rejecting the claim
width of fifteen feet should be
behind the store on the servient
me nt, at a point where an open
had existed for a long time, the
noted that even the width
for at that place would s
sufficient to permit teams and
to turn around.
And see Lipsky v. Heller (1908)
Mass 310; 85 NE 453, supra, § 3;
rett v. Duchaine (1925) 254
149 NE 632, infra, § 7; York v.
(1887; Sup) 7 NYSR 124, supra, .§
and Palmer v. Newm:an (1922) . 91 '

rATED
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ited to the ilaturea '
subject matter at :t hll
It and to the obvio~
the parties had' ( ilt
v. Dodge (1920) . 2:S
8.; 663, infra, § 6. ::;
v. Foster (1910) :107
,; where, in conveyin
'ing at the rear ofilic
here was also granted
way with teams,car.
the, effect of theIan.
e of the grant was:,to
lrough passage from
e grantee's premises
an undisclosed exit
uent to the grant t he
;erest ' of the grantee
Ii a consequence of an
,uildings on thedotjll.
IUS forming 'a cul"d •
ted that the width o!
, determined frotnthe
~ct1mstances existing
veyance and cone '
s no intent to grant
ridth as would at lltly
s and wagons to tti
ting the claim that po
!et should be allowed
on the servient teRe
where an open sp a~c
long time, thecou t
the width contendtlcl
! would scarcelY ;,ibe
it teams and wagons

IS, 112 SE 19 , Infra, § 10. Noro proximately 8 hundred feet long and
about thirty-three feet wide, no questhe casea Inft , § 9.
evertheless it may have been wilh- tion seems to have arisen as to the
the contemplation of the parties width of the way to which the grantee
t the limits of the way shall be became entitled the principal question
s.
as may. "from time to time be r ea- being the one as to the right to usc
,so,\\able, suitable and convenient for the way fo r hauUng gravel and loam,
tbe particular objects." Willband v. which hauling had occurred very exox County Grain Co. (1929) 128 Mc tensively and to the inconvenience and
annoyance ,nd damage of the servient
62 145 A 05, supra, § 4.
);0 Lone Star Gas Co. v. Childress owner by reason of the du st creat d
(194.6, T
Civ App) 187 W2d 936, and the failure of workmen to shut
supr , § 4, a grant of a rigbt of way gates. 'lhere the court inted that aland easement to on truct, maintain, though be deed was given in the year
and operntc pipeline!! and appurte- 1820. the grant uf the g neral right of
(lces was held to entitlc the grnntee way for vehicles therein 'did not retrict Ita u e to horse-drswn v hicles
. a future use of so much of the land
each occa ion may reasonably de- or limit the way to the wid h of vehicles then in common use,' and the
mand."
!Dd in Crawford v. Tennessee Gas court quoted with approval langu ge
to the effect that a court should be
Tr~ll!mi s ion Co. (1!l52, Te Civ App)
25 SW2d 237, a grant of a right ot cry slow to hold that even ancient
rights of way not expres Iy r tricted
W 'Y to I y, construct, maintain, operIj,te, alter, repl ce, and remove pipe- a to type of vehicle could not be mJines for the transportation of oil, gas, ployed at all for the means of transpetroleum products, or any liquids, portation in common use by a succeedg ses. or subst~J.nce which can be ing generation.
And see Dunham v. Dodge (1920)
~an sported through a pipeline, and to
367, 126 NE 663, infra, § 6.
e ect, maintain, and remove a line of 235 1\1
poles and appurtenances thereto for
§ 6. Width D S fn dieat d by ay in fact
the operation thereon of telephone and
e isUng.
egraph wires, the grantee to have
In ca e of the indefinite grant of a
right to eelect the route, and the
i
ument further spec\fying that the r~ght of way it sometimes bapp ns thnt
there existed at the place in Question
~ nlee should have the right to lay,
e'Ollstruct, ma,intain, etc., " one or more a way that had been used for the pur,a ~!tional lines o! pipe" adjacent to poses mentioned or can emplate.d. "In
such ci rcumstances the limits of the
~Ild para lie) with the first one, for
way then existing are frequently
'~ich it, its successors or &asign ,
a ould pya s-pccified amount per rod adopted aB the limits of the way thus
granted." Kotick v. Durt nt (1940)
Q additional line, was bcld not limited
to ,n way of "any specinc width of 143 Fla 3S6, 196 So 802.
An d in Willband v. Knox County
J d," the court referring to the Lone
t(tr Gas Co. Case (Tex) supra, as in- Grain Co. (1929) 128 Me 62, 145 A 405,
olving a very similar agreement and the court used very similar language.
So in Salisbury v. Andrews (1837,
e entitling the grantee to use 8S
if
) 19 Pick 250, a grant of the
,m)lch of the land as each occasion
"right to pass and repass on foot and
)ht reasonably demand.
In Hodgkins v. Bianchini (1948) 323 with horse and carriage to said
if
169, 80 NE2d 464, where the con- house and land" was held not one of a
suitable nd convenient way subse~Jance included a "privilege of a cart
. oad to pass to and from main street quently to be deflned but one of a way
. to ,the said premlses at all seasons of limitcd and defined by the passageway
existing at the time.
~ ye r," and the property over whicb
In Kotlck v. Durrant (1940) 143 F la
t he right to pass and repass was thus
lP'.anted wa.s a parcel of land called the 386, 196 So 802, where a church, being
• ne," described by the court 8S ap.- the Owner of three tracts of land one
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of which 'wi's entirely surrounded'by
the other 'p't operty and did 'Dot , ab'ut
on any street or th6rolighfal'e, 'conveyed the iinier tract by deed 'which
provided' for ' an easement "bh' north
and ' southlines of above propettyfor
.use, as Ii. road, connecting with CO\lnty
Road;" which amounted to a provision
'for two ways acrosil'the gran tor's land,
anCl it appeal'edthat the practical interpretatioh. placed upon the gbiht had
belm that th~ parties intended to' use
·generally the same roads that had
beehin use by members of the church
prior to the deed, it was held that the
width of erg'ht feet allowed by the ttHH
court Was not excessive, there being
,e\ddencethat' that was about 't he'w'idth
which had been used and accepted un' del" the :grant;
In Bina v. Bina (1931) 213 Iowa 432,
239 NW 68, 78ALR i216, where. the
parentsCif the parties, ()wning 230
. actes of Iarid. cOnveyed aninnei' 70
acres there'of to the defe'ndant, grant'ing to him by the same instrument 'a
right of way over the 160 acres ret idned by' the grantors, and later! on
the same day, they conveyed toanotherson, the plaintiff, the 160 acres subjeCt to the right of way, all without
specifying ,the width, but it appeared
that ruri~inp'. Jr?mthe farm. building,s
up6ri ,whcp the grantors resldedto}he
hig}1~.ay . ~,hereexis~eda lane eigqt~en
feet in width . and .:marked by, fenpes
~hiIe the r~st oUhe 'c6ritemp~atI'4way
* .a s ' tirifencedarid siriipJy hty, :9ver hBIyand .rocky fields, It was hel,dthat
in view of the testimony. that the ,unfenced portion of the way as used since
those conveyarices was also appr,oximit'tilly eighteen feet in ,wip.th a.n dthat
w~i·l it less there would.be difficulty in
v'ehiCIes passing e'ilth i other,tile' c()rt~t'{ conclusion was that the defendant
'\VasentitIed to awciyeighteen f~et in
wiqth throughout. ' .
... .,
In Eastham v. Ch1,lrch (1949) 310
Ky 93, 219 SW2d 406, where ' ~he servierit lotwas only thirty-three feet in
width 'and the house thereon 8.0 stood
as to leave room for a driveway on the
west leading to a lot at the rear, and
Hie driveway existing was paved with
concrete for about one-half or the
depth· of the lot to serve' a garage on
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' those preh1ises, it 'V:'as
reservation in 'tlie deed of "a s
passway": ~'throu ghsaid lot';:·
lofhacki6f itwas ' of the width
driVeWiiy 'a ctually in' use; it app
thatforyeius the ' occupapti and '
'ersofthe back lot had driven
such aHveway.
.
' ...'
And lzl ' L{psky -v, Heller (190gY~'1 9
Mass 310, 85 NFl 453, supra, § 4, ,c ~
Width of the ' intended way was. 'fi
to coi-respond with the covered "p ._
sageway thr6ugh which communI. ~
tionwith the street hid been obtai9red.
In Dunham v . . Dodge (1920) '2S5
'Mass367, 126NE 663; where thdee ,
'given in the year 1887, p
"aright 'of way to pass " .
from said granted premis~s .-....''''. ,._ ..
.ownlarid onth~weste:rly side
and the pa:!js'aie on "
'was by a lane ."",.",'ta~"lY
' in width; hit atihe point of
'it froIn · thegranfe'e's '. , ." .
·fences were so 'loCated ' ast6
,'iVidth' iof' iinly twelve feet; al ' .
'that point and in turning in ' .
of the lane· and passing to or '
granted' premises ' it was ne,~' 4~ssaT:'f:'IQr
. the .teams , to turn at righ
'was held' that whetherasll
c'oriveniEiht 'use of the 'w ay .'
th:enarrowness of ' the laile'
th"ebarway ·td thecgi'lihted
q ufretiaii'operiing' ill' ,t he'
'IEjs'S" than fifteen fe'i,jtiri
question of filet' and t[iaf '
tHe trial jlidgetha't'stich
was required ' coul.d 'not 'be
prainlywr'ong'~' There plidti
tended and offered eviderice '
~ that -the n'ari.'OWness of: tHe
'cbn1plained of'a:.iid which ,
ailt had coilstr(lcted' in the '
'the fencea'f plairitiff's bouri
it impossiblef6r large coal '
pass to' and from her Ii
the lane and th'a t an v>-'v ...... '"
leastfif'teen feet ' at that
necessary to a reasonable u,se
,vay. . The court, though cori'c~~qing
that what \-vas a reasonable width fer
the use of the plaintiff at the' bafw r
would ne'ed to be determined' byre l'ence to' what was presumed Jo'oh_a e
been in the minds' of the parties a'Hhe
time of the grantand that plaintiff ,ail

.!lQt, e~titledd~~
,WIdth than ,waS;l
§yen : d;hoMB"h ;~
, chang€)d;. sta:t~~~
inferreq frat r1ihfi
the paBsageQ{;t~
of hay ; 01' :othilii
, j.~g a , ~pacir'i~~
jighter a~d : SniiiJ
COllrt noted' t1i~t:
~i~nt for ah~a~l1
~Hng aiol1g ~ ,A.~
,De su ffi~ient ~~~i
glcs.. ComPar~:

(1865 ). .38
Yt9~~
- ."' - .

..

'~!JJ

,: ,!

:A,~NQ;: ~~G~1l ) <tIf;;W4X-;-WJP;rJI

~~~
[§§ , ~I.'!~

e~titI~4to
thth~nWilS

a :i>assagei ot.,,8Te!!<tllr
rea,s onable ,at ~pat ,t,ime
t~en :(, tho)J.:g.h .cond;i.;.F~m.s.,; :h. l}g '!'iP,c.:.e
I}tange~. sta.t ed th~t 'itmigh,t ;\ye)I lie
. ~" 'rred tj:Jatthe paJ:',tie~contemp.lat~4
:f1I;¥sa!5~of teamswHh; lW~YY , lQa~1>

.P
ter(190S ~

lupra, §4~,
way was
! 'covered .
h

i~a::v

: 01'

:pt.l1~r faJ;m; prod\1§!'~ il'e,q;u!,r~

g,:a!lpacewl<le,t; "th,a.n nec"s~a ry ,fpr
l .hter an.d : sl1lallelj ;x~h~cl,es, ~ndthe
~I't note(i that: what, yvo)lld, pe . su!lir
c.i9nHora heaviIylQa 4e:d, wagon; tray"
, Uhg along a . straight . Ii,ne, might tnQt
~:~j,ufficient for turning at righ~, an."
i4~?..; , Compare Walker . v.Plerce
1~p!5) i38 yt 94; supra,§4.
,;

+

h ,·

.

:'": yray unrea1lonablf

br()a~~~~:n~t

~ :i:2ily be" t;on~~dere~ ,~o:h~veJN?f~ !jl1~
ten~~1

bl ~he !nst,rument~YeJ1 tllO,Ugh
! ':llast us e ,'Yaspfmorespa~ th ~n
rll1.!iil'f!~·; , ' ..; . ,'.: . ; ... . ,\:1'
'lil£tetson v;Curf;i1l.,(1876) 119,M,a ss
2 6,('>}V~er5l ;th~~rf1l1to!" , ~:ho ~wn!l.9: , a
J gjil ' tractqf iand .i:lfontip.g on: ~acfi).r'
from which,extendin.g back
tract,
}~~~ f<.n i ;Qi?~n:
egular width, varyingfr,om
NLl

.J -..:

I. • , :

_

.

'"

.,.

"

J

,,'

', , "

.

•

,..

•

tj:le,r,ei

to

.feef; an'd

fif~y-three
IIUI~JI~I,'m onthesi~s~>p'y tiet$.',. f.en:c~,

1.1,..........-"""'. ..

. "'" and whleh' hadbeen

s . tp~h~ , g!~};,tbr'8 Q.ther
iiii: £l~~~. c,o~parativalY
tion; "the eonvey;that '" . ' , . J!
'l',

'wa"

.

"c·'"

., •.

i,Up." ....... i

Jo.r~

iinob-

;if, the ,wholew.l}s

then , 4,se~ fl,S , away

f,9ra~Ces,s\t() ;1ii~ , pth~'r l~nd." " . "
-i' ,4nd .s ee9!Bri~Ii ,
Mf)l!:ph~ ;9 995;

r-\

189 Mass, 858,75 ,NE700; infra,§ ,7•. '. '
." IILFarringtO,n
Bundi:;(1875;NY)
5 HJIiM7;aconveyr\llce of store pi.:~m~
ises which'incltid'ed "thk ' rightand
?r.fvi,leg,e t () ):llty:e,an()ut~i~,e : s~a}rs l,eiadlUg t.o, the 'upper , rooP1:s:6f, the store,'~
;w,as, held t,o entitI~ , th~i'ra:ntee to a
.Ilt~Xrs ofreasonabl,e , width"
also
t9; aJanding a t. t~.e top of .r~ aso~~ble
Wl,d th,and that .Slllce the. tnal Judge
had JUstifiiib.1Yi ' found , that .astairway
pij'our' fee.f vi.ils of rea:ro.u'ilble width
thy",isXJlntee )eCameell~itle!l ,thereto
al,lq., a,S weU to)m tlpper landing orthat
wJdtn, Pl1fnorto a landing p{thiiwidth
prs~ 'arici.Q~i?h~H, feit, ~¥eI1 'tho~gh at
tJ~Hltn~ q;ftli'e con'vcyanC,e thc ,e xist,i ng
litndiifg yvaso:f th at wi ~th. , 1'he result
was, that" t.h.e grantOl: hayipg .sold the
&4joiiling 'lot to the east, the. purchas¥~ in 'cbnst,ru<:\ing a building thereon
~M j.n pro.,Vi4f~g~ .new stajrway 4nd
hV~alI1~ }yil-.1l notpbhge,d to .al~qw ip-,: a
lailding 'w ider ' than the stairs.
.
':;~¢Q#ik'#'e; 'W~tl)th~ last ' three deci~
s~6,!;fs,; ,the .\!.a ses infi'a, § 7. ,
,,',:]'( tne ' grMft was by express refer~npe : to . an existing way the case is
d~~Jt ..W~th,in ,§§ 9 and 10, infra.

v.

and '

§:7. WJtHh as coextensIVe with par~el
:(it' area over whiCh granted or re~

, ,~

-!,,' , }

setviti ::

.,

" toth~ , ·:A grant hi-reservatIon: of

a right of
a particular area, striP, or
p'arcd: or ground is n.o t · ordinarily to
be cdnstiued .as prov'fding for .a way
AS broad ,as the ' ground : referred ' ~().
, Alabama.-'- Lbng v.GilI(lS8'5 ) so
')\1&408. '
. . ' ". ..
'. ' Ma'i1ie. ~'j:;leayeil'y,: Bratttan;; (l~67)
1og'M ' lMl§s A '857' "
' " , . ,. , .
.
\1. 'Willil),i~i,iJt (1848) ,2 Cush 158 ,; . Sh9rtv.
Devine , {1E88) 146 Mass 119, : 15 NE
.14~';;' {)~.Bt{enV:'MutphY ' (i1l05) 18'9
Ma1ls8S8, 7,5 NE700; Barrett v. Du:.c;h~i~e (1'925) :~51 '1\1:,a~fl' ?7)49NE'632.
'Y,!Y'.~Qver"

{:h;tji~:a~h~l!le~ts:'·. ~ 'j~h.r,1?on

r
1

·that
lable
bugh '
)nable
ff at the,O l-·-';"·...,1'I'
rrriined' bY'
'esUmed' to
;he parties a
thafplaintiff
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, ': ;NEtW ,n,~k.~,qr~ft.9,n", :Moir (1~92)

~3!):N:Y465, 2~ N:!p ,97 ~;. 2T,Am ,S,tRep
.583 ; DaJton ' v ... Lev.y (1982) 258 NY
J~1, 1,79' N~; ,3,n :) (~,9. C,6,hsid~i~d~. eV¢fl
though thegxarltOi'IOr a. tiihif all()wed
a greater ~Hith'~Qt M used); ·SIllit1).~.
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Sponable (1900) 54 App Div615, 66
NYS . ~77;Re Buffalo (1910) 65 Misc
636, 120 NYS 611;' Lattimer v. Sokolowski (194i,Sup) 31 NYS2d 880.
Rhode Island. ~ Abney v.Twombly
(1916) 39 Ri 304,97 A 806:
.
The leading case touching this point
is Johnson v~Kinnihtt(1848, Mass) 2
Cush 153. There; thecohveyance to
plaintiff was of certain lands "together with the right of passing and repassing over the space of twenty feet
between the west wall ' of the' store
aforesaid and the eastern :line" of the
granted pi'emfses, and the matter complaimid' of was the defendants' use of
Ii part of the fwenty~foot space for
the piling .of boxes and barrei.s against
the rear of their store. The question
being whether plaintiff was entitled to
a right of passing and repassing over
the whole area of twenty feet, or, on
the contrary, to a mere passwiy Kt
re'asonable and convehient . width
through that area, it was held thatthe
latter ,vas the correct construction and
that a jury sljould be ailowed to det~r
mine under all the facts and circumstances whether or not the acts of the
defendant had impeded plaintiff in his
use of a convenient way for any useful and, prOPer purpoSe for which the
iand. might oe used, considering its
position in relation to streets and other parts of the' town "and .other like
circum~tance~."
.
'.
'.
So in O'Brien v.. Murphy (1905)18,9
Mass 353, 75 N,E 700, where .it appeared that in the year 1874, the owner
of the two tracts, whereon there stood
two dwelling houses so located as to
leave a space between them .thirteen
feet in width, affordillgtheonly feasible means by whiCh the land ' in the
rear of either house could be reached,
conveyed to the defendant's predecessor in title the easterly tract t,ogether
with the dwell~ng house thereon and
also a dght of ' passage "over a strip
.of land sufficjeI1tly' wide for . ali' pdtposes of travel, withte,~ m ' or 'onfo,o t."
lying "along the .,\:\;esterly side' of the
hind above descriqed;;' and to be used
,ill ' ~ommonw'ith th¢gb.n~or and thos~
claIming underhin(~or the purpose of
.enferingupon the rear part of the lot
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de'scribed, the court stated ; H' la];" .. nr.fI!\~
withstanding the narrowness '
space of thirteen feet betwe'
houses the boundaries of the n'~," '·~"<
not described "but only
within which a way con
be laid out," and concluded
way lay entirely upon the
unconveyed premises and
western boundary of the p
veyed; and that since the hOljn"' ;,;I·; ....
of the way were left un
were to be "determined by
0
the purposefor whichit was gri;l:n M
and the acts of those having the right
of user."
, And in Barrett ' v.Duchaine (J~25)
254 Mass 37, 149 NE 63~, the l:inguage
of a deed of theY-ear 1905, giving "a
right Of way over a strip of lan:'d ly_
ing ~etween two houses," was .h~rd not
to grant a way over the whole ,of that
land but to h.ave "referg'Ilceorily"to be
area in 'which: the , '\Vay Was to:"
I
cated." In , that 'case; ' . rmrou"'"
question was rrot specifically '
the width of t4e way but url1'.,tln·.. .
was confined loa footway, or ._"'-_'L.'L..":
as the defenda,nt clainYed,$t H " ; ! UU",U
the right of pass'age by'
In coricluding th~t the '
sage byatitomoJ)'i1e was '
court· noted that an au"'l'lUl'Ull
not have passed thtough ' the oPeJlj:rlj~
in the boundary ' 'fence ' as' ()' 1"0',"",
constru,cted atthe. Hme of
ance ;md as it remained
time. . There the order of '.
judge givingth"e plaintifft~e'
10,c ate the f90twiyand hi
. lCn.' r,,[Il'_.
providing that the way
the pIa(:e arid of the width
in the Mcree was ' upheld
's tanti,aLcompljance with,' a
gested " inprevidus Mas"',0'''''],;,.,,,,,.:
cases a,s appropriate. ' .
And In Short v. Devine ' (i
Mass 1i9, i5 NE 148, a: res"1'""r''''"
the right to pa;;s and repass
upon a strip orland ten(iO
'width ,on the , sou ' " ,', lirie
granted prenlises '
.
'
C6i:t street with t~arbs "
washeld,iipp:ti. the •au
J o'h nson Case (1848, Mass)
supra, not to' describe the
way but the close over which

tee should have a conv
able way, although th
called upon to determi
way was • . The quest:
, obstruction by gates . .'
i Arid see Stetson v. G
Mass 266, ' and Far'riI
· (1875; NY). 5 Hun 6
§ 6; 'and Atkins v. ' ]
Mass) 2 ME£457, 37 }
ira:, § 10".
':;;
~. In Long :v.GiIl (18
· wliere the grant of 1
". over the following
'. llind;" was followed wl
by metes and distaRi
· space immediately infJ
· store of thegrantee;;"i
the opinion thatthe -tl
was not intended to ':~
6rthe;"'ay ,j'Jiit rmi n;;l~
rilaceoveiwhich th~ l~
. and con~equently thli1
· came entitled niereIy~"
~'se ofs1!~h ,area '~~'~
sary to thepurposes:lI
thepremis~s to he ~~r
it was coricluded ill t
(time entitled to a W
a
vehient ror' convefah
and
\I

a
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tee shou ld have a convenient and suitble way, Ilbougb the court w
not
called upon to determine how wide the
VI. y wa. The question wa one of
obstruction by gatea.
I And aee Stetson v. Curtis (1876) 119
266, and F rrington v. Bundy
(1 75, Y) 5 Hun 617,. both supra,
§ 6; and Atkins v. Bordman (1841,
La ) 2 Met 457, 37 Am Dec 100, inirf, 10.
In Long v. Gill (1885) 80 Ala 4.08,
where the grant of
"right of way
cfver the {ollowing lot or parcel of
lAnd," wa followed with a d scription
6y metes and distances of an open
space immediatel), in the rear ot the
store of the grantee, the court was of
the opinion that the descriptIon giv n
not intended to de.fine the limits
ci~ the way but merely to designate the
place over which the way wa t.o exist,
and consequently that the grantee became entitled merely to the convenient
e of such rea a ,shQ'uld be nec saTY to the purposes in tended. There,
the premises to be ser ed being a store,
i · WIlS concluded that the grantee became entitled to a way reasonably CODehient for conveyances 8uch as are
lIually and generally employed in
transporting goods to nd from stor s.
1'.he court said that the case reduced
ft8elf to • question of fact whether
~he
obstruct!on
complained
of
• ~dged or impeded the reasonable
a ~ convenient use' ot the way for the
~os'es inte~ded. , The decision a~
lit ed at: by 'the court below that the
o struction was not of that cbaracte.r
's, however, upheld nofuithstandlng
b Supreme Court lntima,t d its opinton to be that the spa~e left aIter
e',~ation of the obstruction was "to
(ojD'e extent IJ.t~onveni~t1y restricted
the tu rning of vehicles."
H.' D Re Buffalo (1910) 66. Mlsc 636,
,l:.i::Q
S 611, a grant of prem[selS "to&'~the r with a J'ight ot way over a strip
of land 621 links wide bounding on
lie 'easterly line at said lot No. 11,"
Was held to constitute 'not the grant of
• ay 6U links wide but merely of •
y over a strip of land of tbat width.
'!Ilie court said In effect that in uch.
e tbe question whether the fliurea

wu

to

aUT n r,rlT·v

"Mass ) .

e the iimits ·
l r which the ··

, ' .',
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given measure the way will depend
upon the circum tances of the cue.
In Cleaves v. Braman (1907) 103 fe
154, 68 A 857, where plaintiff's hotel
premises were bounded on the south by
the county road and on the ea t by a
strip of land forty feet in width, called
the "avenue," which extended north
and south along the whole fran t of
such premise for a di Lance of 160
feet, and the gnnt to him was of
right of way "for all purposes of a
way over a piece of land 40 feet wide
In every part, lying easterly," etc.,
(being the "venue" above m ntioned ), it wa beld that while ordinarily a grant of a w y over a de 19nated trip of land is not of a w y
a wide as the whole strip, in this instance the Intention was to allow for
passage onto and over the so-called
avenue from every feasible point on
plaintiff's eastern border Dd thence
south to the county r oad.

..

The idea that a grant of a way
"over" a particular piece of ground
does not give IS way as wide as the area
r ef rred to has in aome instances produced tr nge results, wher the reference was to an existing passageway.
See Atkins v. Bordman (1841, M .) 2
Met 457, 37 Am Dec 100, and Grafton
v. Moir (1892) 130 NY 465, 29 NE 974,
27 Am St Rep 533, both infra, § 10.
IlL Grant or r ervation by reference
to an ex!. ting BY
§ 8. Generally.

Ordinarily a grant or reservation of
right of way by in strument r eferring
to an exIsting way at the place ' contempI" led, and not otherwise indicating the WIdth of the passage, operate
to limit the width to that of the existIng way (aee cases infra, § 9); although contrary results have beeD
reached in certain instances (see cases
infra, § 10).
•
A

§ 9. Width defined by the existing way.

With the cases set out herein compare those supra, § 6.
Usually If the instrumeDt granting
or reserving a right of way makes
reference to a way existing at the place
contemplated, and especially if the

AMERICANLAWiREPORTS; i ANNOTATED

268,~
[§9)

::.,

r.ight I:lxpressly given is ,to; use ~ tha;t
way ,' and ,.it is welL defined. , there is,
little ground, fOLthe , ~ontention that
t4e iJ1t ~ ndedwidthwas o,ther than' that
of the existing way.
':,' , ,' ;, ' " ,~'-,"
' In Di,ckinsQn v. Whiting. (1886) 141:
Mass 4H, 6 NE 92iwhere th'e ;convey,
ance inclUded a privilege' in, tbe , gl'an~:
tee, his heh'sandassigns,"tb; ,use the,
lane onth,eso,uth ~ side of said, p r:eJn~
i.8es , to ,ddvehjs,cattle ;to 'P<1<stPl'e, ,a nd:,
4is t eams, fQrc,tb.e ; convenient Occup\ttion ,o f said p l;~mi:ses,'? , and at the time;
of theconveyancetbere was a"defined:
way; about twentYcfiYefeet:in widt h,
bounded ,bn each sjde ;bya' stOlle : wall.,
with qarwaysaUntetva1.sopenjng into:
adjace,nt, field's. exten'9,ing , frQI:U , :tl1e,
hjghW,ay ;to ,a:, point back ,;to "Jhe:,dveJZ,
which):lO,1;lnqeci,the: w:holetra<lt; it was,
held that the right ' granted, was nqtl
a general rightof, w~y ,overthe graut1:
or's preni!sg s :convenient for thegxan~f
tee, of such "a , width, " dh,ectiQn, ,(andgeneral character a,s might thereafter
l:!.e ; , ;dete nwir1~cl , ,_,bYi, ' Vf}1l10US.. l ;c ir c~m
stances, but was: of the lane, so ex:istiug on ;the, S9}\th', side ',Q( t]IElPreplfses
and :s,o, defi,ne,q ,by ,tli~, iWqlIs,):ani!' Jh;a t:
to cons,trlle j ,t 'q,s , an¥th,ing-, ;el,Sf),; wqqld,
be to ,do jnju sti.c~ ,to ,the , gr1>nt~ei , A-~ ",
cording,~y the ;fin,d~iig ;9Hh,~tr,iaJ;itidge
th~:t a. fep' ,c~ E)reft~(t a,cp~s\l (:tP;e: Jll:ne;,
aIthoug,h ~ 1?rovided," wHh ,a , g~te 'iwpi:cp"

the"eart,h;and:now;jn, use'}... ,
s:eeJ;l1s thaHnfact there. were no
to, ind;icatedhe width , of the "
~sed, :and , neither: plaintiff inor',
ant had ever discu ssed ,the
under;,sueh ,deed defendant. can
hl:;; ; qq~in~~~' an d atJeng~h cO,ll(ltr
a ; stjpstantial garage · bui,lding' orr,
granted premises aAd 9ger<tt,ed!~, g~' •
ly increasedb1,lsiness" dnvolving",
sei.;viciii g ' of lal'ge ' t~aile'r tr~lcks, Wi h
the ,res;ult ,t ha,t, ~, .y~n~rpyer.sy" ,~~\~qs~ ~
t9, the ,ixt~nt , Qfth~ ; dei e:ridan'VsFF
of' u,!ei"', it' W~s plai,n th ~t d ur f!1,g ;; (!
later y'~a.rs d;~ ~ypda~t h:a,d In ,f~Ct '~f e
a. mutll larger . PortJQ;n
,the h yen rslx,foot st f$'P .in 'qu'e stion tharif6dhr: ly;' Y?t.th.¢A~~~W,oljJeft)o ,th~i'j~lrJ

or

~r}~rmi!iff;rQm'th~ : eyi~e:riF~,~\Ta~(:'91at

'Y.JVi tj1 ~>tlcl t,~~ . of We .W',a~;,.~ranM .·· n

t?e;qe~\i ...,;rJ:l.e, ver,dlst, .w1},~cp.!;~'1a,(!.j

p~

h.~..W.'~.~.'.;suP.'..,Il Q,rt..,.ed. , by 'i a.,m., ~. 1 e. ,c.,W ~lq,
e'ylden c~'" w~~ tPll.t th? ,'YH1Eh 'lBt t,ll .
'Y~y, a,.~ It)a:;v, ,f,r,9F\ tJ:H~f'1tr~~t ,t<;> ,fI,}£.cr·
t,I1:HLP Ol~ t W,a~ , t,e,n ;.::feeta,nq ,tP,§!t. frp
t4itpoiri t oii't'o' ,t nereai'o:f H\:kpl tlintijf;s, ia n ~i:h'e .wi'dHi
;twe1v~:,fee ,

wa's:

TtC~ , q,J~~i,ipri;, iefrt<,; ' th~.: j\lr~; )~#P. "
" w.a" , wl:a~ . )~udth : qt. •.\Y:~~ 9 Ii
use" vVlthmthe ,Ia,Il,l~U~~Jt I)f

coulfiea1i1~; ;bi: , ,~p:~rie,d;; ,, ~:n ,d , ~4iC;Q:

when open

l~ft

sufficient ipa,c.e

f~r:

the

paifsag~M tea':Iri's )rtti'd"~ca ttlte; ' eoli'stittitJ

ed an unjusti,fiahh!; "obsti-u'ction and
materially interfered wit,hethe conven.,
i~~t ,ij$e , giy~,p. , :»,a,~ ,\l-phelcC ' ,':: ,. <'
T# Wn,h ~¢ :y.Q~rgg(1991) ~, ~~,
-77
A2d 595
"he'N~
"
' " ,,,,
, , '" vf.
" "'laifltHl"
p ,.. " ", " l'laviA
,,, g,
be,eh iJ:l thE!' Ye,# ' , 199~ ,W~ ' 6~h ¢t " ot
lll'pan ' " i:d erfd bii ~ wiii'cy{)Ohe :'c6n~

~ ~iit~,d~ ,fifHhl~t:~i9I{:4f t~~N~r:r9f

tIu·ee~c.ar: :Wi?'69.en:g'!lri
aig~, ,' in th1it YMrI~a:s~4'tM Jht:~e ~c;~lf
g~rag~ J(ftp/' 4efehd ?;nt! ,l:t,~~~yi,rl~; ~ha~
defefid'lfnt iiltended' to "c6ird,uct; th~\"¢~

whicll., ) tbo'9. "t

with a general garage bll s'iriMs, 'iind;
after :' ahou:t ;; a 'i YE(,~r(1 1,1>te,li:-~n d ; after.
deJ~nd,!,LUt <h.a;d ,:,been , eOJ:lClue~ing , ,sl1ch
business. plaintiff:)c:ony~y~4to : hiP'\} the
1e.a:sedpre;lJ:l~ses,; : ,t .ogether with; ,l}right
of,; ,w?y ,;descdbed/l;.s "pei:llg ,' :';on ; tln~
:n9Xt~er}y ~ sigeot . loy,~ qf ,s?.id ,gr:8:n t91?
iW.h ich, is,C'~~&x:l~ de~ll~_d g!1t4:~JiJ.~(!f), ,9if
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. .th"t
' fl . '.

'

the "Wl\-Y ,
could not'::l'l'e
deedsilithe reaso'ria ble '
location;,fol" ,iuch: tight ,of i
strip of,land ten 'feet wid:e", ,etC;),WI18
' ' ' ' ; .< i '
,"
uphe}d.:. ,," i
" In ,Bu:rgas Y . •Stbub , (:1902) '
586•.,141 S6, 67,. where "the, sale '
lol! , A- together with tM ' :prJyil
!lsi~g, tlwJ Paveq. dri;v,~Wlty "op.' .
a~C1 the, "eport i?t.?-t~J:! t.~aJ, ~.'in,
j,t :\V,~I'! !l~ip\!l~J.E!,Q; ",thl!-t .
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I!hould "have the privilege of using
the 'Paved drivewAy in the rear of ~he
proll fLy," lying on lot H," the "ruhng
mnd~ was that defendant' atta.ck upp 'the languan providing for h~ way
118 being InsufficienttQt; failure to state
the length or width of he passage w.ss
\ ithout merit, the paved runway De11f t' a phy'ical objec on the surface
'Of the grouhd' and its lehgth aI1d width
bejng easily ascertainable.
In Bricault v. Cavanaugh (1982) 261
1lch 70, 245 NW 573, where plaintiffs
ere he owners 1:11 the south half and
the def ndant the bwner Of h north
holf of Ii certain urban Jot, and the
de d to the plaintiffs, from the cOmmon grantor of th parti s, sta ed that
the conveyance was "subject to 0 joint
driveway b~tween s id
bove decribed premises and the north onchalf of aid lot three," ODd specified
tbat the driveway was to be kept and
maintained a
joint driveway by the
respective owners, ond it was shown
that the grantor knew from prior re'cord d conveyances. that e emenLs ior
joint dl'iveway over the south five
f eet of the north parcel and the north
five f et of the south parcel had been
cr.eated by conveyances under which
ahe obtained titlo to both parcels, the
court said i was right'to. assl1me that
she intended to re-e tabli h the easements in the lIame location, and the
cou rt concluded that comjdering the
~anguage and circumstances the deed
b the plaintiffs created a joint driveway over the Bouth five feet of the
north hal:£ oi lot 3 and the north five
:teet of the soutb balf. Such was the
ruling notwithstanding . the eJtisting
driveway did not lie over and along thCl
bounduy line but Int entirely llPon
ihe north half of the lot, seemingly (1
.tact which bad not been realized until
~hortly before the jnstant suit was
·commenced.
-I In Jackson v. Richl1rds (1941, To:
lOiv App) 157 SW2d' 982, error ref, a
eservation to the grantors of an easeintent "for a roadway aa at present 10ated approximately twenty feet in
Idlh" along a certain line desighated
,was held to confine he road to a
idth of four een and on -half fee,
tince it was clear from the record that
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the road used at the time the deed and
contract were made and at the time of
the trial was not more than that width.
In Decatur v. Walker (188 ) 137
!tin
141, where the in strumen t referrl!d to onl) boundary line as r unning "to a passage ay to be made,"
but there was some evid nce that the
way was then id entified and ran over
the grantor's land, the court said th t
if it "was identified" by mutual agreement at the time, or ven aft rw rd,
"it stood on the same footing as ii
it had been described in the deed."
In Colting v. Murray (1911) 209
oM
133, 95 NE 212, where the deed
included a right of pa ing "over said
asugeway not less than five f t
wide leadIng to Carv r street," the
court noted that if the grantors intended to limit the passo,ge\ ay to five
feet lind no more it was difficult to
understand why lh y did not do so,
whi/e on the other hand the indefinitene~s of the grant was accounted lor
by the fact hnt although a portion of
the way"wa already indi cated on the
urCac8 of the earth as twelve feet
wide, the grantors had not finished
laying out and wsposing of the rest
f their land and might well have pref erred to leave the final wid th of the
way undetormined while gunranteeing
that in any event it should not be less
han five teet wid. Hence it WIlS
concluded that the plaintHTs had the
r ight of pauing and repassing over
tbe , ay "as finally locnted by the
grantors whatever the width might
be," whether five feet or in excess
ther of.
The right given may cover simply
the ulle of a one-way road, where such
was .t he existing road reterred to in
the deed.
In Good v. P etticrew (1936) 165 Va
526,183 BE 217, where a t the time the
contract was entered into between the
adjoining landowners tbe roadway was
in existence and amounted merely to a
one-way road on which cars could pa 8
only by putting a wheel in the ditch on
either ide, but it w 8 not necessary to
have anything more to have acce 8 to
the dwellings in Question, and the
written contract ran to the effect tb t

210
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the party of the second part should
have "the right and pl'ivilege Of using
the toad and bridge on the lands of the
firSt party" and paralleling their division line, and it was agreed that the
future maintenance and expense of the
i:oad should be paid jointly. the i'uling
made was thai the dominant tenement
was not entitled to a sixteen-foot road
without gates or other obstructions
but was ent itled only to the one-way
road as it exist ed at the time of the
grant.
In Btitroughs v. Milligan (1952)":':'
:M:d ..:....:. 85 A2d 775, 28 ALR2d243,
where the lands lay on a wooded peninsula 3,000 feet in length but 300 feet
in width, throu gh which at the date of
the deed there ran an ordinary farm
or woods road of a width not established by either r ecord or findings, and
which the chancellor r egarded as possibly amouriting to "little more than
two wheel tracks,";it was held that the
' language reserving to the grantors "a
tight of way over the property hereby
conveyed by the existing road" did not
entitle them to a twen t y-foot road nor
to a two-way toad nor to a road reasonably 'sufficient for convenient passage
nor one necessarily adequate for later
requirements. Consequently ' it was
held that the suit brought by one
claiming under the grantors and seeking the establishm'e nt of a way twenty
feet in width and ,the removal of obstructions reducing the cleara'n ce substantially below that figure should
have been dismissed. The dissenting
juage was of the opinion. that the language should not be given a construction so restricted as to allow a road
narrower than a way of necessity,imd
he pointed out that no case had' been
cited in which a way of necessity had
been restricted to a one-way road,

+

In: Lattimerv. Sokolowski (1941,
Sup) 31 NYS2d 880, a reservation of a
"right of way across 'the above described property from the highway"
to a certain lot, "as the ' same is now
used," was held . riot to entitle the
grantor to the unobstructed use of a
strip thirty feet in width then marked
by fences; rather, as indicated by the
testimony, the way intended was sim-
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ply of a right of passagedo'r' g'eneh!
farm purposes; so that away. si~te
and a:half feet iIi width, whichaccprd.
ed with the us er, was, under the t .' i.
mony, sufficient. ' Compare, generally,
thecases' stipra, §7;
1Cj. " .
§ 10. Width not so defined.

tween the old ga
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In Atkins v. Bordman (1841, I I . )
2 Met 457, 37 Am Dec 100, where.,the
deed, after reCiting that there laY' ion
the southerly side of the premises conveyed "a gate and passageway of about
five foot wide, leading from the s aid
street," reserved to the grantor free
liberty of ingress a'nd egress "through
and upon thes~dd gate or passageway,
for carrying and recarrying woo'd~ or
any' other thing; through the same,"
and into and ' from the '~hotising' Ulnd
land" 'of the· grantor for , the use 'and
accommodation thereof, the court wa
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not fix the width of ' the ; passageway
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.were bound to maintain a pa::;l>a~r l:-':''''l
equal in breadth to the distanc.e.

ATED

;'.; ..r;

, passage"for general
o that· a way sixteert
width, which .accprcb
was, under the testii<
Compare, generally,
7.
' ."
';(

D defined.

,
gr:a,n t- or reservation
r "over" a parti~ul ar
does not give a ~~y
are' coextensive with
f the ground soj.. e-es supra, § 7)hal1in
produced surprisillg
"

rdman (1841, Mas )
Dec 100, where t he
19 that there lay ~n
of the premises conpassageway of about
tding from the said
to thegrimtot fi'ee
and egress "through
gate or passageway,
recartying wood, ~'6r
through the same,'}
IT the "housing aii'd
tor .for the' use 'a nti
~reof, the court wltS
t that language :di d
of the ' passagewBY
what 'was :reser,ved
right of ' a suitabl
assage , for the ' pur.
le court .' stated. tnat,
ning house being a
i way was limited .tb
rried td land from~a
ts ordinaty,
.
llit the ,presumption
the way was to: f e
rriage Of merchnns, boxes, or cas .
right ' reserved was
; footway of di
he carrying of
md necessaries ' ,f
the use of ·wheel·
Is, and such ' sm' II
mmonly, used , in ,j/l
closely buiIt .' ~na
le Court was of
Ige had inc
;hat the

\.,1- .

ANNO: RIGHT OF WAY-WIDTH
~

tween the old gate posts, but conceded
that "supposing that width and 11 rea,sonable width to be practically the
' q ame thing, this mode of laying down
' the rule would lead to no pz:actical
error in the result" since a passage of
the distance between the old gate posts
l and one of reasonable width "might
i' not practically \Uffer."
.
,
"
:' In Grafton v, Moir (1892) 130 NY
; 465, 29 NE 974, 27 Am St Rep 533, the
, court stated that the conveyance, in its
(; incIu~iol1 .of a"righ,t,of way through
,. and 'oy'er the: carriage or alley-way in
i: the rear of the said above-granted
l.' pi-emises to the three stables" ,so long
as. stlch ' stables should, be occupied as
fC,privatestables,' ,did Il,Qt entitle the
' grantee . to a . passag.eway over tl~e
whole of such alleyway, .r ather 'that all
thatwas .reqiiired' of the grantor was
that he should not so reduce the alleyn ~iy a§ to deprive theplaintiff ot a
"reasonable and conveni'ent use in pass~
>' i'U 'g.J toa'nd ff-o: The language of the
,6pihion ' concedes that the grantee
t:would , ha.vebeen en,titledto passage
Qve'rthe whole of the aIley ifthe whole
:}vjdthW.erenecessaryJ,o the enjoyment
uiof wlsonable right of passag~,
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",LIn' ,P aIiner v. Newm'a n (HI22) 91
'W:Va f3, 112 SE 194; \vl1ere the owner
.' 'O'fittactof 114 acres, in selling there",fl'o'ni a "baclLlot of 41 'acres, granted
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sometime prior to the conveyance the
road , in, litigation had been used to
reach the back lot from the public road
and that an oil and gas well had been
sunk on .that lot and that a width of
twenty feet had been left through the
. fence at ;tnepublic r,()~d for the purpose ()~ affording convenient passage
, for wagons' hiiu'ling the: iJong pipe and
timbers used in building the well, and
that there had been erected at the road
two gates hinged on posts twenty feet
apart, but it was further shown that
at some places in the road the used
portion was wider than at others, the
narrowest part beingortlyabout seven
feet and the widest aboqt fifteen feet,
alld it was further plain tl:iat at ,the
date of, the deed the necessity for . a'
twenty-foot gate ,at the high~ay'; foi'
the purpose 'of haUling of the ' long
timbers and well piping ha'd loiig sihce
ceased, the ruling ' made was -that the
decree of thetriai judge providing 'for
an unobstructed passage tV\:'entyfeet
in width at the entrance to tj1e highway and for a right of way .of aupi, form width of sixteen feet, eight feet
. on ' each side of a lirie to' ,be ' run by a
surveyor in. the center of the' old road,
was not justified, especially' in view of
the practical interpretati On which the
parties ,had placed upon the language
granting the road. In fact, in view of
the' circumstance that plaintiff com• phiined not of tl)e·wid.th of the passage
being re~tricted but of the ereCtion of
gates, it was concluded that the bill
shollld siInply be dismissed. ;
.
.
W. W. Allen.

Bryan D. Smith, Esq. - ISB #4411
B. J. Driscoll, Esq. -ISB # 7010
SMITH, DRISCOLL & ASSOCIATES, PLLC
414 Shoup Ave.
P.O. Box 50731
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405
Telephone: (208) 524-0731
Facsimile: (208) 529-4166
Attorneys for Defendant and Counterclaimant
Highway 101 Investments, LLC
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF MADISON
KENTON D. JOHNSON, a married man
dealing with his sole and separate property
and NEPHI H. ALLEN, a married man dealing
with his sole and separate property, and
REXBURG PLUMBING & HEATING LLC, an
Idaho limited liability company,
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MOTION FOR AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S
FEES AND COSTS

Plaintiffs,

v.
HIGHWAY 101 INVESTMENTS, LLC,
Defendant,

HIGHWAY 101 INVESTMENTS, LLC,
Counterclaim ant,

v.
KENTON D. JOHNSON, a married man
dealing with his sole and separate property
and NEPHI H. ALLEN, a married man dealing
with his sole and separate property, and
REXBURG PLUMBING & HEATING LLC, an
Idaho limited liability company,
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COMES NOW Defendant and Counterclaimant, Highway 101 Investments, LLC, by
and through its attorney, Bryan D. Smith, Esq., of the firm Smith, Driscoll & Associates,
PLL(, and moves pursuant to Idaho Code Sections 12-121, 12-123, and I. R.C.P.
54{d)(l)and 54{e}{l1) for an award of attorney's fees against plaintiffs and
counterdefendants, Kenton D. Johnson, Nephi H. Allen, and Rexburg Plumbing &
Heating, LLC .
This motion is made upon the grounds and for the reasons that Highway 101 is
the prevailing party and therefore entitled to an award of attorney's fees and costs.
This motion is based upon this Motion For Award Of Attorney's Fees, the Affidavit
of Bryan D. Smith, the Memorandum of Costs filed hereWith, the Brief In Support Of Award
Of Attorney's Fees and Costs, and upon the Court's files and records herein.
Highway 101 requests oral argument.
DATED this

I ~y of June, 2011.

-E3~
Bryan D%tth
Attorneys for Defendant
Highway 101 Investments, LLC
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I~ne,

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this
2011, I caused a true and correct
copy ofthe foregoing MOTION FOR AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS to be
served, by placing the same in a sealed envelope and depositing in the United States
Mail, postage prepaid, or hand delivery, facsimile transmission or overnight delivery,
addressed to the following:

Hyrum D. Erickson, Esq.
RIGBY, ANDRUS & RIGBY,
Chartered
Attorneys at Law
25 North Second East
Rexburg, Idaho 8340
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[ ....}-1:f.S. Mail
[
[
[

] Fax
] Overnight Delivery
] Hand Delivery
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Bryan D. Smith, Esq. -ISB #4411
B. J. Driscoll, Esq. - ISB # 7010
SMITH, DRISCOLL & ASSOCIATES, PLLC
414 Shoup Ave.
P.O. Box 50731
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405
Telephone: (208) 524-0731
Facsimile: (208) 529-4166
Attorneys for Defendant and Counterclaimant
Highway 101 Investments, LLC
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF MADISON
KENTON D. JOHNSON, a married man
dealing with his sole and separate property
and NEPHI H. ALLEN, a married man dealing
with his sole and separate property, and
REXBURG PLUMBING & HEATING LLC, an
Idaho limited liability company,

Case No. CV-10-115
MEMORANDUM OF ATTORNEY'S FEES
AND COSTS

Plaintiffs,

v.
HIGHWAY 101 INVESTMENTS, LLC,
Defendant,

HIGHWAY 101 INVESTMENTS, LLC,
Counterclaimant,

v.
KENTON D. JOHNSON, a married man
dealing with his sole and separate property
and NEPHI H. ALLEN, a married man dealing
with his sole and separate property, and
REXBURG PLUMBING & HEATING LLC, an
Idaho limited liability company,
Counterdefendants.
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COMES NOW, defendant and counterclaimant, Highway 101 Investments, LLC,
by and through its counsel of record, Bryan D. Smith, Esq., of the firm of Smith, Driscoll

& Associates, PLLC, and moves the court pursuant to Idaho Code Sections 12-121 and
12-123, and Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure 54{d)(1) and 54{e)(1) for an award of costs
and attorney's fees.
I. COSTS AS A MATTER OF RIGHT.

(1)

Filing Fees:
a. Notice of Appearance

(2)

(4)

58.00

$

45.00

Service Fees:
a. Unfound Service Fees - Dean Moon Subpoena

(3)

$

Deposition Fees:

a.

Nephi H. Allen taken 1/28/11

$

679.50

b.

Kenton D. Johnson taken 1/28/11

$

328.50

$

34.28

Exhibits:

a.

Color copies of exhibits

TOTAL COSTS CLAIMED.

$ 1,145.28

Defendant Highway 101 hereby claims as total costs

$ 1,145.28

II. ATTORNEY'S FEES.
Defendant hereby claims as total attorney's fees

$16,083.00

TOTAL FEES AND COSTS:

$17,228.28

To the best of defendant's knowledge and belief, the costs claimed above are
correct and the costs claimed comply with Rule 54 (d)(5).
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Dated this

J.!-~/

day of June, 2011.
SMITH, DRISCOLL & ASSOCIATES, PLLC

~,",,""-N~'\iItJ.t

,Esq.

Attorneys for Defendant
Highway 101 Investments, PLLC

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

Id~f

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this
June, 2011, I caused a true and correct
copy of the foregoing MEMORANDUM OF ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS to be served,
by placing the same in a sealed envelope and depositing in the United States Mail,
postage prepaid, or hand delivery, facsimile transmission or overnight delivery,
addressed to the following:

[~.S.Mail

Hyrum D. Erickson, Esq.
RIGBY, ANDRUS & RIGBY,
Chartered
Attorneys at Law
25 North Second East
Rexburg, Idaho 8340

[ 1 Fax
[

[

] Overnight Delivery
1 Hand Delivery
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Bryan D. Smith, Esq. -ISB #4411
B. J. Driscoll, Esq. - ISB # 7010
SMITH, DRISCOll & ASSOCIATES, PLLC
414 Shoup Ave.
P.O. Box 50731
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405
Telephone: (208) 524-0731
Facsimile: (208) 529-4166
Attorneys for Defendant and Counterclaimant
Highway 101 Investments, LLC
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF MADISON
KENTON D. JOHNSON, a married man
dealing with his sole and separate property
and NEPHI H. ALLEN, a married man dealing
with his sole and separate property, and
REXBURG PLUMBING & HEATING LLC, an
Idaho limited liability company,

Case No. CV-10-115
AFFIDAVIT OF BRYAN D. SMITH IN
SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR AWARD OF
ATIORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS

Plaintiffs,

v.
HIGHWAY 101 INVESTMENTS, LLC,
Defendant,
HIGHWAY 101 INVESTMENTS, LLC,
Counterclaimant,

v.
KENTON D. JOHNSON, a married man
dealing with his sole and separate property
and NEPHI H. ALLEN, a married man dealing
with his sole and separate property, and
REXBURG PLUMBING & HEATING LLC, an
Idaho limited liability company,
Counterdefendants.
-- -- - -iTiON FOR AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES
FFIDAVIT OF BRYAN D SMITH IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR
WARD OF ATIORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS

AGE 476

an D. Smith in Support of Motion for Award of

STATE OF IDAHO
ss.
county of Bonneville
BRYAN D. SMITH, Esq. of the firm Smith, Driscoll & Associates, PLLC, being first
duly sworn on oath, deposes and states as follows:
1.

I am one of the attorneys of record for Defendant and Counterclaimant

Highway 101 Investments, LLC in the above-styled action. I obtained a Juris Doctorate
degree from the McGeorge School of Law, at the University of Pacific, in 1989 and have
been actively practicing law since then.

2.

I am licensed to practice law in the Courts of Idaho, the United States

District Court for the District of Idaho, and in the Courts of California. A substantial
portion of my practice has been devoted to civil litigation.

3.

I submit this Affidavit in Support of defendant's Memorandum of

Attorney's Fees and Costs.

4.

Attached hereto as Exhibit "A" are true and accurate time itemizations

generated by my office for work performed on this case. My time entries are identified
as BDS entries. B. J. Driscoll's time entries are identified as BJD.
5.

My rate of billing on the above-referenced matter was $185.00 per hour.

thru December 31,2011 and $195.00 per hour from January 1, 2011 to the present. I
believe that this hourly rate is reasonable, especially given the amount involved and the
result obtained, the desirability ofthe case, the nature and length of my professional
relationship with my client, awards in similar cases, my experience (particularly in the
.. ~. -

I.FFIDAVIT OF BRYAN D SMITH IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR
,WARD OF ATIORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS

tAGE 477
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ran D. Smith in Support of Motion for Award of

area of law involved in this caseL and the rates charged by other attorneys with
comparable experience in comparable cases in the southeastern Idaho area.
6.

The rate of billing on the above-referenced matter for B. J. Driscoll, is

$150.00 per hour. I believe that this hourly rate is reasonable, especially given the
amount involved and the result obtained, the desirability of the case, awards in similar
cases, his experience (particularly in the area of law involved in this case), and the rates
charged by other associate attorneys with comparable experience in comparable cases
in the southeastern Idaho area.
7.

The attorney's fees as set forth in this affidavit were and are necessarily

and actually incurred in this action.
Further sayeth your affiant naught.
DATED this

l~une'2011.

_~

~

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this

Iotc

day of June, 20

Notary Publi or Ida 0
Residing at Idaho
Is, Idaho
My Commission Expires: 04/11/17
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Ian D. Smith in Support of Motion for Award of

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

11I(j~

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this ~ day of June, 2011, I caused a true and correct
copy ofthe foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF BRYAN D. SMITH IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR
AWARD OF ATIORNEY/S FEES AND COSTS to be served, by placing the same in a sealed
envelope and depositing in the United States Mail, postage prepaid, or hand delivery,
facsimile transmission or overnight delivery, addressed to the following:

Hyrum D. Erickson, Esq.
RIGBY, ANDRUS & RIGBY,
Chartered
Attorneys at Law
25 North Second East
Rexburg, Idaho 8340

[-rtf. S. Mail
[ 1 Fax
[ 1 Overnight Delivery

[ 1 Hand Delivery
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Smh~l, Driscoll & Associates, ."LLC
414 Shoup Avenue
P.O. Box 50731
Idaho Falls, 10 83405
TIN: 82-0518512
(208) 524-0731

Invoice submitted to:
Danny Miller
Highway 101 Investments, LLC
120 Lost Trail Place
Idaho Falls ID 83404
June 10, 2011
In Reference To:

Rexburg Plumbing & Heating LLC, et al. vs. Highway 101
Investments, LLC

Professional Services
HrslRate

Amount

3/12/2010 - BOS

Receipt and review of email, complaint, and pictures from client
received 3/1/2010; telephone conference with Hyrum Erickson;
telephone conference with client; preparation of notice of
appearance; letter to Hyrum Erickson;

1.00
185.00/hr

185.00

3/16/2010 - BJO

Consideration of counterclaim, third-party claim, and affirmative
defense to extinguish right of way;

0.40
150.00/hr

60.00

Meet with client; consideration of further handling; telephone
conference with client;

1.75
185.00/hr

323.75

Receipt and review of email from client received 3/17/2010;
research regarding forfeiture of easement; preparation of memo;
email to client;

2.50
185.00/hr

462.50

BJO

Review warranty deed and easement; consideration of permissible
scope of express easement;

0.30
150.00/hr

45.00

3/30/2010 - BOS

Preparation of answer, affirmative defenses, counterclaim and
demand for jury trial; review memos from Barbara Miller; telephone
conference with Barbara Miller;

3.00
185.00/hr

555.00

3/31/2010 - BOS

Receipt and review of plat from client received 3/29/2010;
telephone conference with client; receipt and review emails from
client; revise answer and counterclaim and add claim for trespass;
emails to client;

1.00
185.00/hr

185.00

4/7/2010 - BOS

Receipt and review of reply to counterclaim received 31712020 from
Hyrum Erickson;

0.15
185.00/hr

27.75

-

BOS

3/18/2010 - BOS

-
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Page

Danny Miller
HrslRate

4/8/2010 - BOS
5/10/2010 - BOS

Letter to client;

Amount

0.25
185.00/hr

46.25

OAO

74.00

Receipt and review of notice of service, plaintiffs first request for
production to defendant, and plaintiffs first set of interrogatories to
defendant received 5/11/2010 from Hyrum Erickson;

185.00/hr

5/11/2010 - BNZ

Review legal documents creating right-of-way and other documents
in file; preparation of interrogatories and requests for production;

0.75
120.00/hr

90.00

5/21/2010 - BOS

Telephone conference with Barbara Miller;

0.20
185.00/hr

37.00

6/7/2010 - BOS

Receipt and review of emails from Barbara Miller received 6/1/2010
and 6/2/2010; telephone conference with client;

0.90
185.00/hr

166.50

6/8/2010 - BOS

Preparation of discovery responses;

2.75
185.00/hr

508.75

6/9/2010 - BOS

Review discovery responses (.30); telephone conferences with
client (.20); preparation of interrogatories and requests for
production to plaintiffs (.75); preparation of requests for admissions
to plaintiff (.75); meet with clients (.50);

2.50
185.00/hr

462.50

6/10/2010 - BOS

Complete discovery; preparation of notice of service;

1.00
185.00/hr

185.00

6/11/2010 - BOS

Letter to client;

0.25
185.00/hr

46.25

6/18/2010 - BOS

Receipt and review of notice of service and plaintiffs response to
defendant's first set of requests for admissions received 6/17/2010
from Hyrum Erickson;

0.25
185.00/hr

46.25

6/21/2010 - BOS

Letter to Hyrum Erickson; letter to client;

0.75
185.00/hr

138.75

7/27/2010 - BOS

Receipt and review of plaintiffs' supplemental response to
defendant's first set of requests for admissions, plainitffs' response
to defendant's first set of requests for production of documents to
plaintiffs, and plaintiffs' answers top defendant's first set of
interrogatories to plaintiffs received 7/12/2010 from Hyrum
Erickson; preparation of demand letter to Leischman Electric, Inc.

1.00
185.00/hr

185.00

OAO

74.00

9/1/2010 - BOS

9/2/2010 - 80S

Receipt and review of letter from Hyrum Erickson received
9/1/2010; receipt and review of plaintiffs supplemental responses
to first set of discovery to plaintiff and notice of service received
9/1/2010 from Hyrum Erickson;
Letter to clients;
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2

185.00/hr

0.25
185.00/hr

46.25

Danny Miller

Page
HrslRate

3

Amount

11/12/2010 - BOS

Meet with clients;

0.50
185.00/hr

92.50

11/18/2010 - BOS

Receipt and review of letter from Greg Moeller received
11/18/2010; telephone conference with Barbara Miller;

0.25
185.00/hr

46.25

11119/2010 - BOS

Receipt and review of motion for summary judgment, affidavit of
counsel in support of plaintiffs motion for summary judgment, and
brief in support of plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment received
11/18/2010 from Hyrum Erickson; receipt and review of letter from
Judge Greg Moeller received 11/18/2010; telephone conference
with Hyrum Erickson's office; telephone conference with client;
letter to client;

1.25
185.00/hr

231.25

12/112010 - BOS

Receipt and review of motion requesting voluntary disqualification
received 12/1/2010; letter to client; letter to client;

0.50
185.00/hr

92.50

12/6/2010 - BOS

Receipt and review of voluntary disqualification received 12/3/2010
from court;

0.15
185.00/hr

27.75

12/7/2010 - BOS

Letter to clients;

0.25
185.00/hr

46.25

12/9/2010 - BOS

Receipt and review of notice of hearing received 12/9/2010;
telephone conference with clients; preparation of motion to continue
hearing on motion for summary judgment, affidavit of Bryan O.
Smith, and brief in support of motion to continue hearing on motion
for summary judgment;

2.00
185.00/hr

370.00

12/13/2010 - BOS

Complete motion for Rule 54(f) continuance, brief in support of
motion, and affidavit of Bryan O. Smith; preparation of notice of
hearing; preparation of depositions for Kenton Johnson, Nephi
Allen, Oean Moon, and Rexburg Plumbing & Heating, LLC;

1.50
185.00/hr

277.50

12/14/2010 - BOS

Letter to client;

0.25
185.00/hr

46.25

12/15/2010 - BOS

Receipt and review of email from Hyrum Erickson received
12/12/2010;

0.15
185.00/hr

27.75

12/16/2010 - BOS

Receipt and review of order of assignment received 12/3/2010;
letter to client;

0.40
185.00/hr

74.00

12/20/2010 - BOS

Letter to Madison County Sheriff;

0.25
185.00/hr

46.25

1/5/2011 - BOS

Receipt and review of brief in opposition to Rule 56(f) motion,
affidavit of Hyrum Erickson, affidavit of Oeann Chadwick received
1/4/2011 from Hyrum Blackburn; letter to client;

0.50
195.00/hr

97.50

117/2011 - BOS

Receipt and review of letter from Hyrum Erickson received
1/7/2011; letter to clients;

0.40
195.00/hr

78.00
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1/11/2011 - BOS

Attendance at hearing on motion for continuance of summary
judgment; telephone conference with client;

0.75
195.00/hr

146.25

1/13/2011 - BOS

Telephone conference with client;

0.25
195.00/hr

48.75

1/15/2011 - BOS

Receipt and review of photos from client received 1/14/2011;

0.15
195.00/hr

29.25

1/19/2011 - BOS

Receipt and review of minute entry on Rule 56(f) motion received
1/19/2011 ;

0.15
195.00/hr

29.25

1/25/2011 - BOS

Meet with clients and prepare for depositions;

3.00
195.00/hr

585.00

1/26/2011 - BOS

Preparation for depositions;

1.50
195.00/hr

292.50

1/28/2011 - BOS

Preparation for and attendance at depositions of Nephi Allen and
Kenton Johnson;

5.00
195.00/hr

975.00

2/8/2011 - BOS

Receipt and review of depositions of Nephi Allen and Kenton
Johnston received 2/8/2011 from John Terril; email to client;

0.30
195.00/hr

58.50

2/9/2011 - BOS

Letter to clients;

0.25
195.00/hr

48.75

3/3/2011 - BOS

Preparation of brief and statement of facts in support of motion for
summary judgment;

3.50
195.00/hr

682.50

3/5/2011 - BOS

Preparation of brief in support of motion for summary judgment;
preparation of separate statement of facts in support of motion for
summary judgment;

6.50
195.00/hr

1,267.50

3/7/2011 -

BOS

Preparation of brief in support of motion for summary judgment,
separate statement of undisputed facts, and motion for summary
judgment;

3.50
195.00/hr

682.50

3/8/2011 - BOS

Preparation of brief in support of defendant's motion for summary
judgment, affidavit of Bryan O. Smith, affidavit of Danny Miller,
notice of hearing, separate statement of undisputed facts, and
motion for summary judgment; meet with clients; letter to clients;

1.50
195.00/hr

292.50

3/30/2011 - BOS

Preparation of brief in opposition to plaintiffs' motion for summary
judgment;

3.00
195.00/hr

585.00

3/31/2011 - BOS

Preparation of brief in opposition to plaintiffs' motion for summary
judgment; preparation of affidavit of Bryan O. Smith with exhibits;
receipt and review of answering brief in opposition to Highway 101's
motion for summary judgment received 3/31/2011; telephone
conference with client; research for reply brief;

4.50
195.00/hr

877.50
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4/1/2011 - BOS

Letter to client; review cases for reply brief; telephone conference
with client;

2.00
195.00/hr

390.00

4/5/2011 - BOS

Meet with client;

0.75
195.00/hr

146.25

4/6/2011 - BOS

Receipt and review of reply brief received 4/2/2011 from client;
preparation of reply brief;

3.75
195.00/hr

731.25

4/7/2011 - BOS

Telephone conference with client; preparation of affidavit of
Barbara Miller; preparation of reply brief;

2.50
195.00/hr

487.50

4/8/2011 - BOS

Letter to client; receipt and review of reply brief in support of
plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment received 4/7/2011 from
Hyrum Erickson;

0.50
195.00/hr

97.50

4/14/2011 - BOS

Preparation for and attendance at hearing on cross motions for
summary judgment;

2.50
195.00/hr

487.50

Receipt and review of memorandum decision on summary
judgment received 5/5/2011; telephone conference with client; letter
to client;

0.75
195.00/hr

146.25

5/23/2011 - BOS

Receipt and review of motion for reconsideration and brief in
support of plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration received 5/23/2011
from Hyrum Erickson; letter to clients;

0.50
195.00/hr

97.50

5/31/2011 - BOS

Receipt and review of notice of hearing;

0.15
195.00/hr

29.25

6/1/2011 - BOS

Letter to client;

0.25
195.00/hr

48.75

6/9/2011 - BOS

Preparation of brief in support of motion for fees and costs, motion
for fees and costs, memorandum in support of fees and costs,
affidavit of Bryan O. Smith and notice of hearing;

2.50
195.00/hr

487.50

6/10/2011 - BOS

Preparation of motion for dismissal, brief in support of motion for
summary judgment, memorandum of fees and costs, notice of
hearing on hearing for fees and costs and motion; preparation of
notice of hearing on motion for dismissal;

0.75
195.00/hr

146.25

6/30/2011 - BOS

Preparation of brief in opposition to motion for reconsideration;

2.50
195.00/hr

487.50

Preparation for and attendance at hearing on motion for
reconsideration;

1.00
195.00/hr

195.00

5/6/2011 - BOS

7/7/2011 - BOS

For professional services rendered
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Additional Charges:
Qty/Price

Amount

1
58.00

58.00

3/12/2010 - 80S

Paid to: Madison County - filing fee - Notice of Appearance.

3/25/2010 - 80S

Photocopies

9
0.15

1.35

4/23/2010 - 80S

Photocopies

41
0.15

6.15

5/25/2010 - 80S

Photocopies

15
0.15

2.25

6/11/2010 - 80S

Paid to: Copies of maps for exhibits;

1
2.86

2.86

6/25/2010 - 80S

Photocopies

340
0.15

51.00

8/25/2010 - 80S

Photocopies

60
0.15

9.00

9/24/2010 - 80S

Photocopies

89
0.15

13.35

11/25/2010 - 80S

Photocopies

233
0.15

34.95

12/24/2010 - 80S

Photocopies

147
0.15

22.05

1
45.00

45.00

94
0.15

14.10

Paid to: T&T Reporting - Deposition of Nephi H. Allen taken 1/28/11

1
679.50

679.50

Paid to: T&T Reporting - deposition of Kenton O. Johnson taken

1
328.50

328.50

1
120.00

120.00

312
0.15

46.80

1
31.13

31.13

1/1112011 - 80S

Paid to: Madison County Sheriff's Office - unfound service fees
Dean Moon.

1/25/2011 - 80S

Photocopies

2/8/2011 - 80S

-

80S

1/28/11

2/16/2011 - 80S

Paid to: Westlaw chargeds - January 1-31. 2011;

2/25/2011 - 80S

Photocopies

3/8/2011 - 80S

Paid to: Zip Print - color copies for exhibits.
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Qty/Price

Amount

1
144.00

144.00

3/14/2011 - 80S

Paid to: Westlaw charges - Feb. 2011.

3/24/2011 - 80S

Photocopies

497
0.15

74.55

3/31/2011 - 80S

Paid to: Zip Print - color copies of exhibits

1
3.15

3.15

4/22/2011 - 80S

Photocopies

427
0.15

64.05

5/11/2011 - 80S

Paid to: Westlaw charges - 04/01/11 - 04/30/11

1
90.00

90.00

5/2512011 - 80S

Photocopies

51
0.15

7.65

Total costs
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$1,849.39

Bryan D. Smith, Esq. - ISB #4411
B. J. Driscoll, Esq. -ISB # 7010
SMITH, DRISCOll & ASSOCIATES, PLLC

414 Shoup Ave.
P.O. Box 50731
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405
Telephone: (208) 524-0731
Facsimile: (208) 529-4166
Attorneys for Defendant and Counterclaimant
Highway 101 Investments, LLC
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF MADISON
KENTON D. JOHNSON, a married man
dealing with his sole and separate property
and NEPHI H. ALLEN, a married man dealing
with his sole and separate property, and
REXBURG PLUMBING & HEATING LLC, an
Idaho limited liability company,

Case No. CV-l0-115

BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR
AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES AND
COSTS

Plaintiffs,

v.
HIGHWAY 101 INVESTMENTS, LLC,
Defendant,

HIGHWAY 101 INVESTMENTS, LLC,
Counterclaimant,

v.
KENTON D. JOHNSON, a married man
dealing with his sole and separate property
and NEPHI H. ALLEN, a married man dealing
with his sole and separate property, and
REXBURG PLUMBING & HEATING LLC, an
Idaho limited liability company,
Counterdefendants.
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I.

INTRODUCTION.
The defendant and counterclaim ant, Highway 101 Investments, LLC ("Highway

101"), files this brief in support of its motion for an award of attorney's fees and costs. For
the reasons set forth more fully below, the Court should award Highway 101 its attorney's
fees and costs pursuant to Idaho Code Sections 12-121 and 12-123.
II.

HIGHWAY lOllS THE PREVAILING PARTY.
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure S4(d)(1)(A) states that "costs shall be allowed as a

matter of right to the prevailing party." Rule S4(d)(1)(B) states that "In determining which
party to an action is a prevailing party and entitled to costs, the trial court shall in its sound
discretion consider the final judgment or result of the action in relation to the relief sought
by the respective parties."
Here, this court ruled on summary judgment that Highway 101 use of its property
did not unreasonably interfere with the plaintiff's right of way easement. Thus, Highway
101 is the prevailing party on the plaintiff's complaint and entitled to an award of costs as
set forth in the accompanying memorandum of costs.
III.

HIGHWAY lOllS ENTITLED TO AN AWARD OF ATIORNEY'S FEES BECAUSE THE
PLAINITFFS BROUGHT THEIR COMPLAINT FRIVOLOUSLY, UNREASONABLY OR
WITHOUT FOUNDATION.
Idaho Code Section 12-121 provides as follows:
In any civil action, the judge may award reasonable attorney's fees to the
prevailing party or parties, provided that this section shall not alter, repeal or
amend any statute which otherwise provides for the award of attorney's fees.
The term "party" or {(parties" is defined to include any person, partnership,
corporation, association, private organization, the state of Idaho or political
subdivision thereof.

BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR AWARD OF ATIORNEY/S
FEES AND COSTS
PAGE 489

'ORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS - Page 2
: of Motion for Award of Attorney's Fees and

Idaho Code Section 12-121 "has been limited by I.R.C.P. 54(e)(1) which provides that in
order to award attorney's fees under this provision the court must find that the action
was pursued or defended frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation." Matter of

Estate of Kunzler, 109 Idaho 350, 354 (Idaho App.1985).
The Idaho Supreme Court has repeatedly held that attorney's fees are awardable
when the plaintiff pursues an action "frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation."

Chavez v. Barrus, 146 Idaho 212 (2008); Watkins v. Peacock, 145 Idaho 704 (2008);
Zollinger v. Carrol, 137 Idaho 397 (2002); and Makin v. Liddle, 108 Idaho 67 (1985). See
also Hansen v. Herrero, 137 Idaho 787 (Ct. App. 2002)(Plaintiff acted frivolously,
unreasonably, and without foundation where he ignored well settled Idaho case law in
pursuing his claim).
Idaho Code Section 12-123 provides in relevant part as follows:
12-123. Sanctions for frivolous conduct in a civil case.--(l) As used in this
section:
(a) "Conduct" means filing a civil action, asserting a claim, defense, or
other position in connection with a civil action, or taking any other action in
connection with a civil action.
(b) "Frivolous conduct" means conduct of a party to a civil action or of his
counsel of record that satisfies either of the following:

***
(ii) It is not supported in fact or warranted under existing law
and cannot be supported by a good faith argument for an extension,
modification, or reversal of existing law.
(2)(a) In accordance with the provisions of this section, at any time prior to the
commencement of the trial in a civil action or within twenty-one (21) days after
the entry of judgment in a civil action, the court may award reasonable
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR AWARD OF ATIORNEY'S
FEES AND COSTS
PAGE 490

TORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS - Page 3
-t of Motion for Award of Attorney's Fees and

attorney's fees to any party to that action adversely affected by frivolous
conduct. (Emphasis added).
The Idaho Supreme Court has awarded attorney's fees under Idaho Code Section
12-121 against a party seeking a determination that a guardian was unfit to act as
guardian. In re Doe, 148 Idaho 432 (2009). The Supreme Court held that the motion
"was in legal effect a motion to remove [the party] as guardian" and that the party filing
the motion was basically contending that the governing statute "should be interpreted
to permit removal if someone else would be a slightly better guardian." Id. In awarding
the party prevailing against the motion attorney's fees under Idaho Code Section 12121, the Supreme Court quoted from the magistrate court as follows:
Heisses' cross-appeal simply asked this Court to disregard the current
statutes regarding appointment and removal of guardians and adopt a scheme
Heisses believed would be more favorable to them. The magistrate court wrote
that "much of Heiss' case asserting Conti's unfitness did have the appearance of
'grasping at straws.' This appeal has even less merit."
In re Doe, supra, 148 Idaho at 441.

Here, the central issue of the plaintiffs' complaint was whether the sign post and
bollards could stay or had to go. Highway 101 asked this Court to apply the
reasonableness test-that is, the issue was whether the sign post and bollards
unreasonably interfered with the plaintiffs' right of way easement. The plaintiffs totally
ignored the reasonableness test and asked this Court to apply the per se rule from
foreign jurisdictions. This court was a little taken aback with this argument stating, "This
Court, however, is not aware of any Idaho case that has applied something other than
the reasonableness test." Accordingly, this court "concludes the law of Idaho gives
servient estate owners the right to use their land, but forbids them from unreasonably
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR AWARD OF ATIORNEY'S
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burdening the privileges ofthe dominant estate owner." See Memorandum Decision
and Order Re: Motions for Summary Judgment, p. 9.
The plaintiffs' approach was much like the approach in In re Doe, where the
Court of Appeals awarded attorney's fees against a party who simply asked the court to
disregard applicable Idaho law in favor of law more favorable to the requesting party.
Thus, on the reasonableness issue, the plaintiffs' argument were not supported in fact
or warranted under existing law as Idaho Code Section 123 requires. Moreover, at no
time did the plaintiffs ever make any good faith argument for an extension, modification
or reversal of existing law as Idaho Code Section 123 requires. Accordingly, the
plaintiffs' meet the definition of having "frivolously pursued their complaint," and this
Court should award attorney's fees against the plaintiffs and in favor of Highway 101.
The only other argument the plaintiffs' made to avoid summary judgment was
closely connected to their per se rule. The plaintiffs argued that the description in the
granting language precisely described the entire location of their right of way easement
identifying all the property they were entitled to use rather than the location of the land
upon which they could exercise their ingress and egress privilege. The court rejected
the plaintiffs' tenuous argument because it was not supported in fact: The granting
language implies a right of way over the property it describes because any other reading
would give the plaintiffs a fee simple interest to the entire property than a mere
easement. Plaintiffs obviously do not have a fee simple interest.
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IV.

CONCLUSION.
For the reasons set forth above, the court should grant Highway 101's motion and

award Highway attorney's fees and costs against plaintiffs as set forth in the Affidavit of
Bryan D. Smith and Memorandum of Attorney's Fees and Costs filed concurrently
herewith.
DATED this

/

~

of June, 2011.

By: ----~~T4--~----~------Bryan D.
Attorneys for Defendant
Highway 101 Investments, LLC

CERTIFIC~Jl~ SERVICE

J!!!.:;;;

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this
of June, 2011, I caused a true and correct
copy of the foregoing BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S
FEES AND COSTS to be served, by placing the same in a sealed envelope and depositing
in the United States Mail, postage prepaid, or hand delivery, facsimile transmission or
overnight delivery, addressed to the following:

Hyrum D. Erickson, Esq.
RIGBY, ANDRUS & RIGBY,
Chartered
Attorneys at Law
25 North Second East
Rexburg, Idaho 83440
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[~U.S. Mail

[ 1 Fax
[ 1 Overnight Delivery
[ 1 Hand Delivery
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Bryan D. Smith, Esq. -ISB #4411
B. J. Driscoll, Esq. -ISB # 7010
SMITH, DRISCOll & ASSOCIATES, PLLC
414 Shoup Ave.
P.O. Box 50731
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405
Telephone: (208) 524-0731
Facsimile: (208) 529-4166
Attorneys for Defendant and Counterclaimant
Highway 101 Investments, LLC
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF MADISON
KENTON D. JOHNSON, a married man
dealing with his sole and separate property
and NEPHI H. ALLEN, a married man dealing
with his sole and separate property, and
REXBURG PLUMBING & HEATING LLC, an
Idaho limited liability company,

Case No. CV-1O-115

MOTION TO DISMISS

Plaintiffs,

v.
HIGHWAY 101 INVESTMENTS, LLC,
Defendant,

HIGHWAY 101 INVESTMENTS, LLC,
Counterclaimant,

v.
KENTON D. JOHNSON, a married man
dealing with his sole and separate property
and NEPHI H. ALLEN, a married man dealing
with his sole and separate property, and
REXBURG PLUMBING & HEATING LLC, an
Idaho limited liability company,
Counterdefendants.
VlOTION TO DISMISS

:>AGE 494

.s.doc

COMES NOW Counterclaimant, Highway 101 Investments, LLC, and moves the
court pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(2) for an order dismissing without
prejudice Counts III, IV and V of the counterclaim.
This motion is made on the grounds and for the reasons that this court has
granted summary judgment against the plaintiffs and in favor of Highway 101 on the
issue of IIreasonable use." This means that the plaintiffs cannot prevail on their causes
of action for injunctive relief and damages. Accordingly, judgment should be entered
against the plaintiffs on their complaint; however, final judgment cannot be entered
against the plaintiffs because there are remaining causes of action arising from the
counterclaim.
In this regard, this court has granted the plaintiffs partial summary judgment on
Highway 101's causes of action for Right of Way Forfeiture (Count I) and Unjust
Enrichment (Count II) leaving Counts III and IV for Trespass and Count V for Equitable
Recoupment/Estoppel.
Highway 101 moves to dismiss Counts III, IV, and V from the counterclaim which
will allow the court to enter a final judgment as to all claims in the complaint and
counterclaim effectively terminating the litigation before the district court except for
post judgment issues.
This motion is based on this Motion, the Notice of Hearing, and on the court's
records and files.

MOTION TO DISMISS
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s.doc

Highway 101 requ~rgument.
DATED this

I (J

day of June, 2011.

Bryan D. S
Attorneys for Defendant
Highway 101 Investments, LLC

CERTIFIC')~F

SERVICE

d~ay

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on thif_ctrn_ of June, 2011, I caused a true and correct
copy of the foregoing MOTION TO DISMISS to be served, by placing the same in a sealed
envelope and depositing in the United States Mait postage prepaid, or hand delivery,
facsimile transmission or overnight delivery, addressed to the following:

Hyrum D. Erickson, Esq.
RIGBY, ANDRUS & RIGBY,
Chartered
Attorneys at Law
25 North Second East
Rexbuf&ldaho 8340

1 Overn ight Delivery
1 Hand Delivery
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Hyrum D. Erickson, ISBN 7688
RIGBY, ANDRUS & RIGBY, Chartered
Attorneys at Law
25 North Second East
Rexburg, Idaho 83440
Telephone: 208-356-3633
Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF MADISON

KENTON D. JOHNSON, a married man
dealing with his sole and separate
property and NEPHI H. ALLEN, a
married man dealing with his sole and
separate property, and REXBURG
PLUMBING & HEATING LLC, an
Idaho limited liability company,
Plaintiffs,

v.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

)
)

HIGHWAY 101 INVESTMENTS, LLC,

)

Case No. CV-IO-115

OBJECTION TO MOTION FOR
AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES AND
COSTS AND OBJECTION TO
MEMORANDUM OF ATTORNEY'S
FEES

)

Defendant.

HIGHWAY 101 INVESTMENTS, LLC,
Counterclaimant,

v.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)

)
)

)
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KENTON D. JOHNSON, a married man
dealing with his sole and separate
property and NEPHI H. ALLEN, a
married man dealing with his sole and
separate property, and REXBURG
PLUMBING & HEATING LLC, an
Idaho limited liability company,
Counterdefendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Plaintiffs above named, through their attorney of record, Hyrum Erickson, of Rigby,
Andrus & Rigby, Chtd., pursuant to I.R.C.P. 54(d)(6) and 54(e), hereby object to Highway 101's
Motion for Award of Attorney's Fees and Costs and object to Highway 101's Memorandum of
Attorney's Fees and Costs.

Even if the Court declines to reconsider its opinion, Highway 101 is not the
prevailing party.

1.

Plaintiffs have filed a motion to reconsider and any determination of prevailing party
status is premature prior to the Court's ruling on that motion. However, even if the Court
determines that its original ruling is correct, Highway 101 is not the prevailing party. Prevailing
party status is not determined on a count by count basis. Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(I)
reads as follows:
the trial court shall in its sound discretion consider the fmal iudgment or result of
the action in relation to the relief sought by the respective parties. The trial court
in its sound discretion may determine that a party to an action prevailed in part
and did not prevail in part, and upon so finding may apportion the costs between
and among the parties in a fair and equitable manner after considering all of the
issues and claims involved in the action and the resultant judgment or judgments
obtained.
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The relief sought by the parties on all claims is as follows:
By Plaintiffs - a)
b)

removal of the sign and bollards
an undefined amount of damages for the damage to Plaintiff's business by
the placement of the sign and bollards

By Highway 101 -

a)
b)
c)

the forfeiture of the entire right-of-way
compensation for Highway 101's expenses in repaving the right-ofway
injunction preventing Plaintiffs Allen, Johnson, and Rexburg
Plumbing and Heating or its clients from crossing a "small strip of
land" owned by Highway 101, that would have effectively cut off
access to the business from the right of way.

In its decision on the parties respective motions for summary judgment the Court granted
Plaintiff's summary judgment as to Highway 101's claims of forfeiture and unjust enrichment
and Defendant's summary judgment as to the placement of the sign and bollards. Highway 101
has subsequently moved to dismiss their claim of trespass. The Court is not required to find that
there is a prevailing party, rather the rule states that the Court "may" determine that a party
prevailed. When both parties are partially successful, the Court may determine that there is no
prevailing party. Trilogy Network Systems, Inc. v. Johnson, 144 Idaho 844, 172 P.3d 1119
(2007). In the action related to the right-of-way, Plaintiff's prevailed on Highway 101's assertion
of forfeiture and Highway 101 prevailed as to the placement of the sign. The Court should find
that there is no prevailing party as to the claims involving the easement.

2.

Plaintiffs are the prevailing party as to the claim for unjust enrichment and
forfeiture and are entitled to attorney's fees and costs as to those counterclaims.
When claims and counterclaims are distinct and discrete, the Idaho Supreme Court has

held that the trial court must analyze the claims separately to determine who is the prevailing
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party. 0 Bar Cattle Co. v. Owyhee Feeders, Inc., 2011 WL 692220, (D.Idaho 2011) (U.S.
District Court for the District ofIdaho summarizing Idaho Supreme Court case law); Rockefeller
v. Grabow, 139 Idaho 538, 82 PJd 450 (Idaho 2003); Bream v. Benscoter, 139 Idaho 364, 79
P .3d 723 (Idaho 2003); Ramco v. H-K Contractors, Inc., 118 Idaho 108, 794 P .2d 13 81 (1990)).
The Plaintiff s claims relate to the placement of the sign within the easement. Only Highway
10 l's claim for forfeiture bears any substantial relation to the Plaintiff s claim. Highway 10 l's
counterclaims of unjust enrichment and trespass bear no relation to the sign, have no points of
law, and relatively few facts in common with Plaintiffs complaint regarding the sign. They are
discrete and distinct claims upon which Plaintiffs have prevailed. Additionally, because the
counterclaim for unjust enrichment is a discrete and distinct claims, Plaintiffs are entitled to
attorney's fees on that claim pursuant to I.C. § 12-121 as it was brought and pursued frivolously,
unreasonably, and without foundation. As such, when the case is concluded and judgment is
entered, Plaintiffs expect to request costs as to Highway 10 l's claim for trespass and costs and
fees as to the claim for unjust enrichment.

3.

Regardless of prevailing party status, Highway 101 is not entitled to attorney's fees
as the Plaintiffs' action was not brought, pursued, or defended frivolously,
unreasonably, or without foundation.
Attorney fees may be awarded to the prevailing party under I.C. § 12-121 "when the

court, in its discretion, is left with the abiding belief that the case was brought, pursued, or
defended frivolously, unreasonably, or without foundation." Michalk v. Michalk, 148 Idaho 224,
235,220 P.3d 580, 591 (2009). Plaintiffs have provided various valid arguments in support of
their position. They have cited extensively to case law that is directly on point from other
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jurisdictions. Additionally, Plaintiffs have cited to various Idaho decisions that support their
position. In fact, the Plaintiffs recent motion to reconsider is based entirely on Idaho case law.
Even if Plaintiffs argument ultimately fails to persuade the Court, it cannot reasonably be said to
fall within the type of cases to which I.C. § 12-121 is intended to apply.

4.

If Highway 101 is found to be a prevailing party, the costs set out in Highway 101's
memorandum of costs are unreasonable.

If Highway 101 is determined to be the prevailing party on any claims, Highway 101 has
failed to show that discretionary costs claimed were "necessary and exceptional costs" as
required by I.R.C.P. 54d)(1 )(D). Additionally, Plaintiffs object to Highway 10 l's costs as
excessive. Highway 101 claims $347.25 in copying fees - 2,315 pages at .15 cents per page. No
explanation of the nature of these copies is provided. In any event, .15 cents per page for copies
is not a reasonable charge. Idaho Falls copy centers charge between 6 to 8 cents a page and will
discount it by a penny a page for large projects. A reasonable amount for copying fees is 7 cents
per page or $162.05.
Highway 101 claimed $354.00 as Westlaw charges for various dates. There is no
indication if this is a percentage of their total Westlaw bill for certain dates or if these are charges
for accessing specific products. There is no evidence that these charges are necessary or
exceptional or how and why these charges relate the present case. As such the request should be
denied.
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Conclusion
A determination of prevailing party status is premature at this stage. However, if it does
rule, the parties have each prevailed as to the other parties claims regarding the easement and no
party should be found to be the prevailing party for those claims. Plaintiffs prevailed on the
distinct and discreet claims of trespass and unjust enrichment.
DATED this 23 rd day of June, 2011.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE BY MAIL, HAND DELIVERY
OR FACSIMILE TRANSMISSION
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document was on this date
served upon the persons named below, at the addresses set out below their name, either by mailing, hand delivery or by telecopying to them a true and correct copy of said document in a
properly addressed envelope in the United States mail, postage prepaid; by hand delivery to
them; or by facsimile transmission.
DATED this 23 rd day of June, 2011.
RIGBY ANDRUS & RIGBY, Chartered
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Bryan D. Smith, Esq.
B. J. Driscoll, Esq.
SMITH, DRISCOLL & ASSOCIATES, PLLC
P. O. Box 50731
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405

[X] Mail

Honorable Dane H. Watkins, Jr.
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I.

PLAINTIFFS' MOTION CONTAINS NO NEW EVIDENCE OR CASE LAW.
Plaintiffs' Motion for Reconsideration contains no new evidence or case law.

Rather, Plaintiffs attempt to have this Court change its decision that "Highway 101 has the
right to use its servient estate (the Subject Property) in a manner that does not
unreasonably interfere with Plaintiffs' right to use the Subject Property as a 'right-ofway.1II Frankly, Plaintiffs' arguments are repetitive and contradictory as Highway 101
explains below.
II.

PLAINTIFFS CONTINUE TO ARGUE THEY CAN PREVENT HIGHWAY 101 FROM USING
ITS PROPERTY EVEN THOUGH HIGHWAY 101's USE DOES NOT UNREASONABLY
INTERFERE WITH PLAINITFFS' PRIVILEGE.
Plaintiffs argue that because this Court found the granting language precisely

describes the location of the easement, Plaintiffs are entitled to use the entire location of
the land, including the portions the sign post and bollards occupy. Essentially, Plaintiffs
argue that they have an express 25 foot wide easement: I/[als a practical matter, the

Court's Decision says nothing about the privilege granted, but addresses only the location
by shrinking the size of Rexburg Plumbing and Heating's right-of-way from 25 feet wide, as
set out in their deed, ta 19 feet. 1/1
Plaintiffs further argue that "the Court erred when it ruled that Plaintiffs' right-ofway was solely for the purpose of ingress and egress to their property. Rather, the
Plaintiffs have the right to pass over the right-of-way regardless of purpose. Their ability
to access their property is not relevant to the analysis of whether their easement rights

1

See Plaintiffs' Brief in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Reconsideration, pp. 3-4.
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have been infringed upon.,,2 However, Plaintiffs fail to distinguish between a privilege
created by an easement and the location ofthe easement.
Here, Plaintiffs do not have a 25 foot wide easement. In fact, the granting
document says nothing about a 25 foot wide easement. This is a fiction Plaintiffs have
created. Instead, the granting document says Plaintiffs have a right-of-way easement and
then identifies the property over which the easement runs. If the granting document said
Plaintiffs have a 25 foot easement, then they would have a good faith argument that the
Court cannot shrink their easement to 19 feet. Since the granting document does not say
they have a 25 foot easement, they do not have a good faith argument that the Court has
shrunk their easement.
This Court got it exactly right when it concluded: "The privilege created by the

Easement is a right-ai-way, or a right to use the Subject Property for ingress and egress.
The legal description contained in the granting language precisely describes the location of
the land upon which Plaintiffs can exercise that privilege. Thus, while the location of the
Easement is precisely defined, the privilege is stated generally as a "right-of-way."
(Emphasis in the original.)
Moreover, Plaintiffs are simply dead wrong that the purpose for their right-af-way
easement is irrelevant. Idaho law requires that the Court determine whether Highway
101's use of its property unreasonably interferes with Plaintiffs' use. This necessarily
requires that the Court consider the purpose for which the Plaintiffs have an easement.

2
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The Court cannot judge whether Highway 101's use of its property unreasonably
interferes with Plaintiffs' use unless the Court considers the purpose of Plaintiffs' use.
For example, if Plaintiffs' use is to haul 25 foot wide farm equipment to its own
property, then obviously Highway 101's use of its property restricting the width of the
easement to 19 feet would unreasonably interfere with Plaintiffs' use of the easement.
However, Plaintiffs' use of the right-of-way is for ingress and egress to Plaintiffs' own
property and nothing else. The evidence is undisputed that Highway 101's use does not
unreasonably interfere with Plaintiffs' purpose.
Obviously, purpose is relevant to determining whether Highway 101's use
unreasonably interferes with the purpose of Plaintiffs' use. If this Court were to adopt
Plaintiffs' argument that the purpose ofthe easement is irrelevant, this Court would
render Idaho's well-established "reasonable use" test a nUllity. Plaintiffs know this.
Rather than ask the Court to not apply well-established Idaho law, Plaintiffs disguise their
effort telling the Court that the purpose of Plaintiffs' right-of-way easement is irrelevant.
Nonsense!
III.

PLAINTIFFS MISAPPLY CASE LAW.
Plaintiffs rely on Boydstun Beach Ass'n v. Allen, 111 Idaho 370 (Ct. App. 1986) for

the proposition that this Court-like the trial court in Boydstun Beach-committed
reversible error because "the Court has found that the location of the right is more than

is necessary-the Plaintiffs do not need the full 25 fees set out in their deeds.,,3
However, the easement at issue in Boydstun Beach granted express "parking privileges

3 SRI'

Plaintiffs' Brief in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Reconsideration, p. 8.
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along the entire 200 by 75 foot strip." Id. at 377. Specifically, the granting document
extended parking privileges "in a southeasterly direction 200 feet from north line of said
drive, and extending 75 feet in width from the meander line." Id. The trial court ignored
this express privilege instead limiting parking to a 25 foot strip where access was provided.
Id.

The trial court also allowed a fence erected through the 75 foot easement. But the
appellate court found that this violated the express prohibition against structures.
Boydstun Beach, supra, 111 Idaho at 378. The trial court also limited a boat dock to only a

25 foot strip. But the appellate court found that this too violated the express easement to
"boating and bathing privileges along [the entire] said 200 ft strip." Id. Importantly, the
appellate court approved the trial court's allowing a gate at the end of the driveway
easement because there was no express prohibition against obstructions on the driveway
easement and limiting access to the easement to those with use rights was "sensible." Id.
In other words, allowing a gate on the access easement was "reasonable" and allowable in
the absence of an express provision to access of the entire driveway easement.
Thus, Boydstun Beach continues to support Highway 101's position. Unlike the
trial court in Boydstun Beach that diminished the express parking, boating, and fenCing
easements contained in the granting document, this Court has not diminished any express
grant of privilege for Plaintiffs. However, like the trial court in Boydstun Beach that
"sensibly" or "reasonably" allowed a gate on the driveway easement in the absence of an
express provision to access the entire driveway easement, this Court has found that

DEFENDANT'S OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION
PAGE 507

IN FOR RECONSIDERATION - Page 5
on for Reconsideration.doc

Highway 101's use of its property is "sensible," i.e., "reasonable" in light of the undisputed
fact that its use does not unreasonably interfere with Plaintiffs' right-of-way easement.
Plaintiffs misplace their reliance on Carson v. Elliot, 111 Idaho 889 (Ct. App. 196).
The court in Carson found that the raised garden unreasonably interfered with the
plaintiff's right-of-way easement to "access" her garage and with the turning of vehicles in
the driveway. Specifically, "cars and a boat occasionally required the extra room in the
circle's center to turn around. These vehicles sometimes struck the raised garden." Id. at
891. Plaintiffs argue that striking the raised garden is like striking the sign post and
bollards. Therefore, this Court should conclude factually like the court in Carson that the
sign post and bollards unreasonably interfere with Plaintiffs' right-of-way easement.
However, in Carson the plaintiff "claimed that the garden interfered with access to
her garage and with the turning of vehicles in the driveway." Carson, supra, 111 Idaho at
890. Here, as the Court has already found, Plaintiffs have admitted that the sign post and
bollards do not interfere with their access to their property. Moreover, in Carson, the
extra room in the circle's center was required to turn around. Drivers did not strike the
raised garden just because they were not paying attention. They had no choice ifthey
wanted to turn their vehicle. However, here, according to Nephi Allen, drivers like himself
have embarrassingly struck the sign post and bollards in plain sight not because they had
to in order to turn their vehicles, but because they were not paying attention.
20
Q. So were you embarrassed when you hit the
21 bollard?
22
A. I tried to get out ofthere pretty quick.
23
Q. But were you embarrassed?
24
A. Yeah. I looked around.
25
Q. So you were embarrassed?
.-
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1
A. Yeah.
2
Q. Why?
A. It's embarrassing.
3
Q. Is that because it's in such plain sight
4
5 you shouldn't hit it?
6
A. Maybe 4

***
25
Q. Shouldn't they be looking and not hit
1 the sign?
2
A. They should. 5
Finally, Plaintiffs argue that the sign post and bollards unreasonably interfere with
their use of their easement even if they do not unreasonably interfere with ingress and
egress to their property because the sign post and bollards prevent Plaintiffs from passing
over that portion of the easement where they are located. This is another way of saying
that the Court should not apply the reasonableness test that Idaho has applied uniformly.
Plaintiffs are asking the court to turn a blind eye to whether Highway 101's use of its
property is reasonable asking the Court instead to apply a bright line test that Idaho does
not follow. Nor do Plaintiffs make any attempt at a good faith argument why this Court
should disregard well-established Idaho law and apply the law of some foreign jurisdiction.
IV.

PLAINTIFFS DO NOT ATTEMPT TO DISTINGUISH THE MOST APPLICABLE CASE LAW.
Conspicuously absent from Plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration is any effort to

distinguish Nampa & Meridian Irrigation District. v. Washington Federal Savings, 135
Idaho 518 (2001). This case simply tanks Plaintiffs' theories.
As the Court probably remembers, in Nampa & Meridian Irrigation District, the
Idaho Supreme Court applied the "reasonableness test" to an express 40 foot easement.
See Nephi Alien, Depo., 60:20-61:6 attached as Exhibit "A" to the Affidavit of Bryan D. Smith dated June 3D,
201l.
5 See Nephi Alien, Depo., 61:25-62:2 attached as Exhibit "A" to the Affidavit of Bryan D. Smith dated June 3D,
2011.
4
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At issue was whether Washington Federal Savings could erect a fence and sidewalk within
an irrigation district's lateral maintenance easement. The irrigation district claimed that
Washington Federal Savings could not install the fence and sidewalk within the easement.
The court concluded that "Because NMID failed to show that the sidewalk and proposed
fence would unreasonably inter/ere with its easement, the district court denied NMID's
injunction, holding that Washington Federal was entitled to construct the sidewalk and
fence." Nampa & Meridian Irrigation District., supra, 135 Idaho at 521. (Emphasis added.)
Importantly, in Nampa & Meridian Irrigation District, the Idaho Supreme Court
applied the reasonableness test even though the easement gave NMID an express 40 foot
easement. This means the Idaho Supreme Court will likely apply the reasonableness test
to any granting document unless the granting document clearly and unequivocally grants
an express right to the entire easement regardless of purpose. Obviously, Plaintiffs'
granting document fails to meet this high standard where it grants a general right-of-way
privilege.
V.

THE COURT SHOULD DECLINE PLAINTIFFS' INVITATION ON THIS MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION TO LITIGATE NOW ANY FUTURE DISPUTES BETWEEN THE
PARTIES.
Plaintiffs ask this Court to change a general easement into a specific easement by

arguing that such specificity is necessary in order to avoid future litigation. The Court
should leave to future attorneys, judges, courts and parties, if any, to resolve additional
disputes.
First, the whole basis for asking the Court to describe the area over which Plaintiffs
are entitled to pass is based on speculation to avoid further disputes: It may never
DEFENDANT'S OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR
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happen. Second, if a future dispute arises, the Court can look at that issue then. See

Boydstun Beach Ass'n, supra, 111 Idaho at 378 ("uses made by the servient and dominant
owners may be adjusted consistent with the normal development of their respective
lands"). Third, Plaintiffs' pleadings do not ask for declaratory relief. In other words,
Plaintiffs have not raised this issue in their pleadings. The Idaho Supreme Court "has
repeatedly held that tissues considered on summary judgment are those raised by the
pleadings.'" Vanvooren v. Austin, 141 Idaho 440, 443 (2005); Beco Const. Co. v. City of

Idaho Falls, 124 Idaho 859, 865 (1993); and Gardner v. Evans, 110 Idaho 925, 939 (1986).
Finally, Plaintiffs cite Bratton v. Scott, 150 Idaho 530 (2011) for the proposition that

"any judgment determining the existence of an easement must also specify the character,
width, length and location of the easement." However, this Court has not determined the
existence of an easement. There has never been any dispute that Plaintiffs have an
easement. Here, the Court has concluded that Highway 101's use of its property does not
unreasonably interfere with Plaintiff's easement. Plaintiff cites no law that would allow
the Court to then order prospectively uses that will or will not unreasonably interfere with
Plaintiffs' use of their easement. Accordingly, the Court should decline Plaintiffs' invitation
on this motion for reconsideration to litigate here any future disputes between the
parties.
VI.

CONCLUSION.
For the reasons set forth herein, the Court should deny Plaintiffs' Motion for

Reconsideration.
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DATED this

~ ~une,

2011.

By: ____~~~--~----_+_=_~~Bryan . mith
Attorneys for Defendant
Highway 101 Investments, LLC
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Chartered
Attorneys at Law
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Rexburg, Idaho 83440
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STATE OF IDAHO
ss.
County of Bonneville
BRYAN D. SMITH, being first duly sworn on oath, deposes and says:
(1)

I am one of the attorneys for the defendant, Highway 101 Investments in

the above-referenced matter.
(2)

I make this affidavit based on my own personal knowledge.

(3)

Attached hereto and marked as Exhibit flAil is a true and correct copy of

the cover page and pages 60-62 ofthe deposition transcript of Plaintiff Nephi Allen, on
his own behalf and as the 30(b)(6) designee for Plaintiff Rexburg Plumbing & Heating,
LLC, taken on January 28, 2011.
Further your affiant sayeth naught.
DATED this '1ot:'t-June, 2011.

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this

..lL-::""-...."

Notary Public f
Residing at Idaho
s, Idaho
My Commission Expires: 04/11/17

)ANT'S OPPOSITION

AFFIDAVIT OF BRYAN D SMITH IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S e 2
OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
PAGE 513

r--

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this
aay of June, 2011, I caused a true and correct
copy of the foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF BRYAN D. SMITH IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S
OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION to be served, by placing
the same in a sealed envelope and depositing in the United States Mail, postage
prepaid, or hand delivery, facsimile transmission or overnight delivery, addressed to the
following:

Hyrum D. Erickson, Esq.
RIGBY, ANDRUS & RIGBY,
Chartered
Attorneys at Law
25 North Second East
Rexburg, Idaho 83440

,\FFIDAVIT OF BRYAN D SMITH IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S
)PPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
)AGE 514

1 Overnight Delivery
] Hand Delivery

:FENDANT'S OPPOSITION
- Page 3

EXHIBIT /lA"
AFFIDAVIT OF BRYAN D SMITH IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S
OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
PAGE 515

.-----------~"~...~)--------- )'---------~

Transcript of the Testimony of Nephi H. Allen
Date: January 28, 2011
Volume: I
Case: JOHNSON, et al. VS. HIGHWAY 101 INVESTMENTS, INC.
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talking about a25·foot strip, correct?
A. Correct.
Q. With respect to the easement isn't it '
true that this sign is not in the center, it's not
located near the center of the easement?
A. That's correct. It would be located in
the northeast - northwesterly section of the
easement.
Q. Okay. So when you say in paragraph
11 - or when the complaint says "The sign is located
near the center the roadway," in tenns the roadway,
you're talking about Bron Leishman's property, you're
talking about the easement and even part of Rexburg
Plumbing's property, correct
A. Correct.
Q. Now, you're treating all three of those
parcels as a roadway?
A. WellQ. Is thattrue?
A. Yes. Yes.
Q. All right. But if we look at the
specifics, if we look at the easement Highway 101
did not put the sign in the middle of the easement
did it?
A. No.
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A. Fair enough,
Q. And when you said everybody uses Bron's
property as part the roadway, that would include your
customer's, too, correct?
A. Certainly,
Q. And your service vehicles?
A. Certainly,
Q. And you?
A. Yes,
Q. And Kent?
A. Yes,
Q. And anybody else who wants to access
your property?
A. Yes,
Q. Yes. How wide is it approximately,
from the center of the pole north to Bron Leishman's
building?
A. I have no idea.
MRS, MILLER: The pictures might help.
CanMR. SMITH: Can I have Exhibit 6?
MR. JOHNSON: His building don't go that far
west.
THE WITNESS: Yeah, it doesn't even go to the
building. Kent is right. There is no building north
Page 59
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Q. Would you agree that they placed the
sign about as near north of the edge of the easement
as they could?
A. I believe it is several feet away from
the edge of the easement.
Q. Okay.
A. On the north side of the easement.
Q. All right
A. So several feet away from Bron's
property.
Q. Well, if you look at Exhibit 5, doesn't
the exhibititselfshow that it's approximately the center of the pole atleas~ is approximately
five feetfrom the edge of the easement; is that
correct
A. There you go.
Q. Now, do you agree with that? Is that
about what it is?
A. Sure.
Q. Leaving approximately 19 or 20 feet to
the south for the easement use, correct?
A. Nineteen point three four.
Q. All right So when the complaint talks
about "The sign being in the center the roadway,"
it's not the center of the easemen~ is it?
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of the pole.
MR. JOHNSON: His customers dbn't have no
problem with it.
THE WITNESS: There you go. His building is
not north of the pole.
Q. (By Mr. Smith) All right Paragraph 12
says "The Plaintiffs are currently being damaged by
the presence of the sign." And as I understand your
testimony, the damage is is that you cannot use the
exact location where the pole and the bollards are
located?
A. Yes. AndQ. Yes.
A. - our customers hit that sign. And when
we have customers hit that sign, I don't think they
want to come back and visit us. Whether it be from
embarrassment, or whether they don't want to hit the
sign again, or what have you. We - we don't believe
that sign is helping our customers either, so.
Q. So were you embarrassed when you hit the
bollard?
A. I tried to get out of there pretty quick.
Q. But were you embarrassed?
A. Yeah. I looked around.
Q. So you were embarrassed?
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1
A. Yeah.
2
Q. Why?
3
A. It's embarrassing.
4
Q. Is that because it's in such plain sight
5 you shouldn't hit it?
6
A. Maybe.
7
Q. Okay. Well, if it's such in plain sight
8 and your customers shouldn't hit it, why is that your
9 problem?
I 10
A. Well, because when you have aguy that
11 pulls in there every day for nine years and then he
12 forgets about having that sign back there that wasn't
13 there, you can see how we're creatures of habit. And
14 that building has been there since 1980. I've had a
15 lot of customers that use that building for different
16 businesses before we were there.
17
They pull in - you know, you can see
18 how creatures of habit would pull in, we back out
19 without looking just because we have been there
20 before, so.
21
Q. So are you saying you want Highway 101
22 to move the sign because people hit it without
23 looking?
24
A. No.
25
Q. Shouldn't they be looking and not hit
Page 61
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A. Sure. Why not?
Q. And you think that's reasonable?
!
MR. ERICKSON: I've got to object. I don'!
think that's consistent with the testimony.
The original question was ''what is the
damage that's been done to the property?"
MR. SMITH: Well, I know. That was a
question about eight minutes ago, but now we're
talking about - he says he's got further damages and
. 10 that's because he says his customers hit this sign
11 because they're not looking.
12
Q. (By Mr. Smith) Isn't that what you
13 said?
14
A. I said they hit it.
15
Q. Yes. And you said16
A. I don't know the reason why they hit it,
17 sir. I really don't.
18
Q. Wouldn't you agree that if you're
19 looking that you shouldn't hit the sign?
20
A. It's possible. You know, there is such a
21 thing as blind spots, is there not?
22
MR. SMITH: Can I see Exhibit 6 again?
23
THE WITNESS: I had two people hit it
24 yesterday.
25
Q. (By Mr. Smith) Take a look at Exhibit
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the sign?
A. They should.
Q. Okay. And so because your customers
don't bother to look, you think Highway 101 should
move its sign?
A. That's not why I want the sign moved.
Q. Okay. So the fact that your customers
hit it really is irrelevant?
A. No, it is relevant.
Q. But you just said the reason they hit it
is because they don't look.
A. That might be one of tile reasons, yes.
Q. And what are the other reasons?
A. I just told you. Because they're
creatures of the habit.
Q. Because they've developed a habit A. They didn't need to look.
Q. Why don't they need to look?
A. Do you look when you back out of the
garage to see if there's a truck there?
Q. I look if I don't want to hit it
So as I understand what you're saying is
is that because your customers aren't looking, and
because they've developed habits to drive where the
sign is, you think Highway 101 should move the sign?
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6.2. Can you show me where the blind spot is around
the pole?
.
A. Maybe if I was in my car I could.
Q. But you can't show on Exhibit 6.2?
A. There's no car there.
Q. So is the blind spot on the car or on
the pole?
A. The blind spot would be in the person's
car, would it not, if you're sitting in the driver's
seat? So now you're saying that because there's
blind spots in people's cars, Highway 101 should move
the sign. Is that what you're saying?
A. I don't believe I'm saying that.
Q. All right Can you identify one
customer who has not engaged in a purchase or has not
done business with Rexburg Plumbing because the sign
and the bollards are located where they are?
A. I cannot.
Q. So nobody ever came to you and said,
"Hey, you've got that sign out there, and I think
it's a nuisance," or "It's a problem," or "I can't
drive over that spot," or for any reason, ''We're not
going to do business with you."
Can't find anybody?
A. I've had lots of people say everything
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Attorneys for Defendant and Counterclaimant
Highway 101 Investments, LLC
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF MADISON
KENTON D. JOHNSON, a married man
dealing with his sole and separate property
and NEPHI H. ALLEN, a married man dealing
with his sole and separate property, and
REXBURG PLUMBING & HEATING LLC, an
Idaho limited liability company,

Case No. CV-10-115
ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS' MOTION
FOR RECONSIDERATION AND GRANTING
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS

Plaintiffs,

v.
HIGHWAY 101 INVESTMENTS, LLC,
Defendant,

HIGHWAY 101 INVESTMENTS, LLC,

CounterciaimtJnt,

v.
KENTON D. JOHNSON, a married man
dealing with his sole and separate property
and NEPHI H. ALLEN, a married man dealing
with his sole and separate property, and
REXBURG PLUMBING & HEATING LLC, an
Idaho limited liability company,
Counterdefendants.

m GRANTING DEFENDANT'S
ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION AND GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION
TO DISMISS
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Motion for Reconsideration and Granting Motion to

THIS MATTER having come on regularly for hearing on plaintiff's Motion for
Reconsideration and Defendant's Motion to Dismiss before the Honorable Dane H.
Watkins, Jr., District Judge on July 7,2011, with plaintiffs appearing by and through
Hyrum D. Erickson, Esq., of the firm Rigby, Andrus & Rigby, Chartered, and defendant
appearing by and through Bryan D. Smith, Esq., of the firm Smith, Driscoll & Associates,
PLLC; and the Court having reviewed its files, considered oral arguments from counsel,
and otherwise being fully advised on the premises orders as follows:
1.

Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED.

2.

Defendant's Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED.

MADE AND ENTERED this~ day of July, 2011.

APPROVED:

i/6Y#Z
t;e-z/
Hyr~

D. Erickson, Esq.
Rigby, Andrus & Rigby, Chartered
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR CONSIDERATION AND GRANTING DEFENDANT'S

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION AND GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION
TO DISMISS
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; Motion for Reconsideration and Granting Motion to

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

If~day

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this
of July, 2011, I caused a true and correct
copy of the foregoing ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
AND GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS AND MOTION FOR AWARD OF
ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS to be served, by placing the same in a sealed envelope
and depositing in the United States Mail, postage prepaid, or hand delivery, facsimile
transmission or overnight delivery, addressed to the following:
Bryan D. Smith, Esq.
SMITH, DRISCOLL
& ASSOCIATES, PLLC
P.O. Box 50731
Idaho Falls, 1083405-0731

[ vf"U. S. Mail

[ ] Fax
[ ] Overnight Delivery
[ ] Hand Delivery

['-tLI. S. Mail

Hyrum D. Erickson, Esq.
RIGBY, ANDRUS & RIGBY,
Chartered
Attorneys at Law

[
[

] Fax
] Overnight Delivery

[

] Hand Delivery

25 North Second East
Rexburg, Idaho 8340

·
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ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION AND GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION
TO DISMISS
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GRANTING DEFENDANT'S

lotion for Reconsideration and Granting Motion to

Bryan D. Smith, Esq. -ISB #4411
B. J. Driscoll, Esq. -ISB # 7010
SMITH, DRISCOLL & ASSOCIATES,

PllC

414 Shoup Ave.
P.O. Box 50731
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405
Telephone: (208) 524-0731
Facsimile: (208) 529-4166
Attorneys for Defendant and Counterclaimant
Highway 101 Investments, LLC

FILED IN CHAMBERS
at Idaho Falls

Time ---....::;;>.~'*"'*"
Deputy Clerk ---+1--1'--

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF MADISON
KENTON D. JOHNSON, a married man
dealing with his sole and separate property
and NEPHI H. ALLEN, a married man dealing
with his sole and separate property, and
REXBURG PLUMBING & HEATING LLC, an
Idaho limited liability company,
Plaintiffs,

v.
HIGHWAY 101 INVESTMENTS, LLC,
Defendant,

HIGHWAY 101 INVESTMENTS, LLC,
Counterclaimant,

v.
KENTON D. JOHNSON, a married man
dealing with his sole and separate property
and NEPHI H. ALLEN, a married man dealing
with his sole and separate property, and
REXBURG PLUMBING & HEATING LLC, an
Idaho limited liability company,
Counterdefendants.
JUDGMENT
PAGE 522
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JUDGMENT

1 14:23 FAX 12085294166

Smith Driscoll & Assoc's

THIS COURT having entered its Memorandum Decision and Order Re: Motion for
Summary Judgment dated May 5, 2011; and having subsequently granted defendant's
Motion to Dismiss Counts III, IV, and V from the counterclaim;
WHEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that judgment
be entered in favor of the defendant, Highway 101 Investments, LLC, and against the
plaintiffs, Kenton D. Johnson, Nephi H. Allen, and Rexburg Plumbing & Heating, LLC, on
plaintiffs' complaint; and that judgment be entered in favor of the plaintiffs, Kenton D.
Johnson, Nephi H. Allen, and Rexburg Plumbing & Heating, LLC, on defendant's
counterclaim, with no party recovering any damages nor any relief as sought for in the
complaint or counterclaim.
MADE AND ENTERED this

~ day of July, 2011.

Han. Dane H. Watkin ,
District Judge

APPROVED:

Hyrum . Erickson, Esq.
Rigby, Andrus & Rigby, Chartered
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

JUDGMENT
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this~day of July, 2011, I caused a true and correct
copy of the foregoing JUDGMENT to be served, by placing the same in a sealed
envelope and depositing in the United States Mail, postage prepaid, or hand delivery,
facsimile transmission or overnight delivery, addressed to the following:
!

Bryan D. Smith, Esq.
SMITH, DRISCOLL
& ASSOCIATES, PLLC
P.O. Box 50731
Idaho Falls, 1083405-0731

Hyrum D. Erickson, Esq.
RIGBY, ANDRUS & RIGBY,
Chartered
Attorneys at Law
25 North Second East
Rexburg, Idaho 83440

-0 U. S. Mail
[
[
[

] Fax
] Overnight Delivery
] Hand Delivery

-r] u. S. Mail
[ ] Fax
[ ] Overnight Delivery
[ ] Hand Delivery

Clerk of the Court

JUDGMENT
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Hyrum D. Erickson, ISBN 7688
RIGBY, ANDRUS & RIGBY, Chartered
Attorneys at Law
25 North Second East
Rexburg, Idaho 83440
Telephone: 208-356-3633

MADISON COUNTY

Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF MADISON

KENTON D. JOHNSON, a married man
dealing with his sole and separate
property and NEPHI H. ALLEN, a
married man dealing with his sole and
separate property, and REXBURG
PLUMBING & HEATING LLC, an
Idaho limited liability company,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV-1O-115

)

Plaintiffs,

v.

)
)

MOTION FOR AWARD OF
ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS

)

HIGHWAY 101 INVESTMENTS, LLC,
Defendant.

HIGHWAY 101 INVESTMENTS, LLC,
Counterclaimant,
~

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

)
)

)
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KENTON D. JOHNSON, a married man
dealing with his sole and separate
property and NEPHI H. ALLEN, a
married man dealing with his sole and
separate property, and REXBURG
PLUMBING & HEATING LLC, an
Idaho limited liability company,
Counterdefendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Plaintiffs above named, through their attorney of record, Hyrum Erickson, of Rigby,
Andrus & Rigby, Chtd., pursuant to LR.C.P. 54(d), move the Court for an award of costs and
attorney's fees as follows:
1.

Plaintiffs are prevailing parties as to Highway 101 's various counterclaims.
Highway 101 brought the following causes of action against the Plaintiff: 1) Right of

Way Forfeiture - seeking to declare the right of way non-existent; 2) Unjust Enrichmentseeking to force Plaintiffs to pay an undefined amount of money as result of Highway 101's
improvements to the right-of-way; 3) Trespass - seeking undefined damages and an injunction
preventing Plaintiffs from traversing the alleged "small strip of property". Highway 101 was
unsuccessful on all of its counterclaims. The Court granted summary judgment as to the claims
of unjust enrichment and forfeiture and Highway 101 moved the court to dismiss the claim for
trespass. The Idaho Supreme Court has made clear that defeating a claim is as important to a
prevailing party analysis as winning a money judgment.
Avoiding liability is a significant benefit to a defendant. In baseball, it is said that
a walk is as good as a hit. The latter, of course, is more exciting. In litigation,
avoiding liability is as good for a defendant as winning a money judgment is for a
plaintiff.
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Eighteen Mile Ranch, LLC v. Nord Excavating & Paving, Inc., 141 Idaho 716, 719, 117 PJd

130, 133 (Idaho, 2005). Plaintiffs prevailed as to all claims brought by the Highway 101.
2.

Plaintiffs are the prevailing party pursuant to I.R.C.P. 54(d)(1).

Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(1) reads as follows:
In determining which party to an action is a prevailing party an entitled to costs,
the trial court shall in its sound discretion consider the final iudgment or result of
the action in relation to the relief sought by the respective parties. The trial court
in its sound discretion may determine that a party to an action prevailed in part
and did not prevail in part, and upon so finding may apportion the costs between
and among the parties in a fair and equitable manner after considering all of the
issues and claims involved in the action and the resultant judgment or judgments
obtained.
Although the majority of the parties' effort and argument in this matter have been related to the
Plaintiffs' cause of action of seeking the removal of the sign, the amount of time or attention paid
to a particular matter is not the basis on which a prevailing party decision is made. Rather, the
Court must determine the prevailing party "in relation to the relief sought by the respective
parties." Id The relief sought by the Plaintiffs was precise and limited - the removal of the sign
and a unspecified amount of damages related to its placement. The relief sought by Highway 101
was broad and sweeping - the forfeiture of the entire easement. If Highway 101 had prevailed as
to its claim, it would have essentially destroyed Plaintiffs' business. While Plaintiffs greatly
desire the removal of the sign, its importance is dwarfed by the possibility that the entire
easement could have been forfeited. Although Plaintiffs' sought damages related to the
placement of the sign, those damages were slight in relation to the damages sought by Highway
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101 in its unjust enrichment claim or the consequences that would have resulted had Highway
101 been successful in preventing Plaintiffs from accessing their property based on the "small
strip ofland" alleged in its trespassing claim. Pursuant to LR.C.P. 54(d)(I), based on the "final
judgment in relation to the relief sought by the parties," Plaintiffs are the prevailing party.

3.

Plaintiffs are the prevailing party as to the claim for unjust enrichment and
forfeiture and are entitled to attorney's fees and costs as to those counterclaims.
When claims and counterclaims are distinct and discrete, the Idaho Supreme Court has

held that the trial court must analyze the claims separately to determine who is the prevailing
party. 0 Bar Cattle Co. v. Owyhee Feeders, Inc., 2011 WL 692220, (D.Idaho 2011) (U.S.
District Court for the District ofIdaho summarizing Idaho Supreme Court case law); Rockefeller

v. Grabow, 139 Idaho 538, 82 P.3d 450 (Idaho 2003); Bream v. Benscoter, 139 Idaho 364, 79
P.3d 723 (Idaho 2003); Ramco v. H-K Contractors, Inc., 118 Idaho 108,794 P.2d 1381 (1990)).
Highway 101 's claims for unjust enrichment and forfeiture are distinct and discrete and, as they
were brought unreasonably and without foundation, Plaintiffs are entitled to reasonable
attorney's fees pursuant to I.C. § 12-121.
The cause of action for forfeiture was brought without foundation. In support of the
cause of action Highway 101 provided no evidence that supported its claim for forfeiture. The
totality of its argument regarding forfeiture was a citation to a Wisconsin case that, although it
does contain the language quoted by Highway 101, does not have anything to do with forfeiture
of an easement. Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, 10-11 (citing Grygiel
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v. Monches Fish & Game Club, Inc., 787 N.W.2d 6 (Wis. 2010). The Court in the Wisconsin
case cited did not grant forfeiture and the parties were not even seeking forfeiture of an easement.
There was no evidence presented that the Plaintiffs behavior regarding the easement was
inconsistent with prior uses and no legal argument made in support of the cause of action.
The cause of action for unjust enrichment was brought without foundation. Unjust
enrichment is a well established cause of action in Idaho. The standard for unjust enrichment is
clearly set out in Idaho case law. Highway 101 failed to provide either evidence or argument in
support of its cause of action. It cited to no case law, in or out ofIdaho, in support of its
contention that Plaintiffs should be required to pay a portion of the improvements. Opposition to

Plaint!ff's Motion/or Summary Judgment, 12. Idaho case law is clear that one may not force a
benefit upon another and then require payment based on unjust enrichment. Curtis v. Becker,
130 Idaho 378, 941 P.2d 350 (Ct.App. 1997)(explaining "officious intermeddler" rule);

Chinchurreta v. Evergreen Management, Inc., 117 Idaho 591, 593, 790 P.2d 372,374
(Ct.App.l989) (adopting Restatement (First) of Restitution § 2 (1937); Teton Peaks Inv. Co.,

LLC v. Ohme, 146 Idaho 394,398, 195 P.3d 1207, 1211 (Idaho,2008). Given Highway 101 IS
failure to provide any factual support or legal argument in support of its claim for unjust
enrichment, the Court should find that it was brought unreasonably and without foundation and
award costs and fees.
Although these causes of action were without foundation, because they carried with them
such serious consequences to the Plaintiffs, Plaintiffs were required to spend the time and
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resources to respond thoroughly and completely. Plaintiffs are entitled to attorney's fees incurred
in the defense of these causes of action.

Conclusion
Plaintiffs are the prevailing party in the matter as a whole and should be awarded costs.
In addition, because the counterclaims of forfeiture and unjust enrichment were distinct, discrete,
and brought without a basis in law or fact, Plaintiffs are entitled to costs and fees pursuant to I.e.
12-121 as to those counts.
DATED this 8th day of August, 2011.

Hyru

MOTION FOR AW A RO

()~ A 'T"W~T""U""''' TO~

MOTION FOR AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS
PAGE 530

FEES AND COSTS - Page 6

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE BY MAIL, HAND DELIVERY
OR FACSIMILE TRANSMISSION
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document was on this date
served upon the persons named below, at the addresses set out below their name, either by mailing, hand delivery or by telecopying to them a true and correct copy of said document in a
properly addressed envelope in the United States mail, postage prepaid; by hand delivery to
them; or by facsimile transmission.
DATED this 8 th day of August, 2011.
RIGBY ANDRUS & RIGBY, Chartered

Bryan D. Smith, Esq.
B. 1. Driscoll, Esq.
SMITH, DRISCOLL & ASSOCIATES, PLLC
P. O. Box 50731
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405

[X] Mail

Honorable Dane H. Watkins, Jr.
Courtesy Copy
Bonneville County Courthouse
605 North Capital
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83402

[X] Mail
[ ] Hand Delivery
[ ] Facsimile
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] Hand Delivery
] Facsimile
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Hyrum D. Erickson, ISBN 7688
RIGBY, ANDRUS & RIGBY, Chartered
Attorneys at Law
25 North Second East
Rexburg, Idaho 83440
Telephone: 208-356-3633

MADISON ~~=:~

Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF MADISON

KENTON D. JOHNSON, a married man
dealing with his sole and separate
property and NEPHI H. ALLEN, a
married man dealing with his sole and
separate property, and REXBURG
PLUMBING & HEATING LLC, an
Idaho limited liability company,
Plaintiffs,

v.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV-10-115

MEMORANDUM OF COSTS AND
ATTORNEY FEES

)
)

HIGHWAY 101 INVESTMENTS, LLC,
Defendant.

HIGHWAY 101 INVESTMENTS, LLC,
Counterclaimant,
~

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

)
)
)
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KENTON D. JOHNSON, a married man
dealing with his sole and separate
property and NEPHI H. ALLEN, a
married man dealing with his sole and
separate property, and REXBURG
PLUMBING & HEATING LLC, an
Idaho limited liability company,
Counterdefendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

COME NOW the Plaintiffs/Counterdefendants, and through their attorney of record,
Hyrum Erickson, of Rigby, Andrus & Rigby, Chartered, hereby submit the following
Memorandum of Costs and Attorney Fees pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure, Rule 54(d)
and 54(e), and Idaho Code § 12-120. This is based upon the "Affidavit of Hyrum Erickson in
Support of Memorandum of Costs" filed simultaneously herewith.

Non Discretionary Costs (I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l)(C)
Filing fee
Service of Process
Deposition Costs to T&T Reporting

Total Costs
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MEMORANDUM OF COSTS AND ATIORNEY FEES
PAGE 533

$88.00
$40.00
$494.40

$622.40

Attorney Fees
(See attached Affidavit of Hyrum Erickson)
Total Attorney Fees

$1,000.00

Total Attorney Fees and Costs

$1,622.40

DATED this 8th day of August, 2011.

MEMORANDUM OF rO~T~ ANfl
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE BY MAIL, HAND DELIVERY
OR FACSIMILE TRANSMISSION
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document was on this date
served upon the persons named below, at the addresses set out below their name, either by mailing, hand delivery or by telecopying to them a true and correct copy of said document in a
properly addressed envelope in the United States mail, postage prepaid; by hand delivery to
them; or by facsimile transmission.
DATED this 8 th day of August, 2011.
RIGBY ANDRUS & RIGBY, Chartered

Bryan D. Smith, Esq.
B. J. Driscoll, Esq.
SMITH, DRISCOLL & ASSOCIATES, PLLC
P. O. Box 50731
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405

[X] Mail
[ ] Hand Delivery
[ ] Facsimile

Honorable Dane H. Watkins, Jr.
Courtesy Copy
Bonneville County Courthouse
605 North Capital
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83402

[X] Mail
[ ] Hand Delivery
[ ] Facsimile
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Hyrum D. Erickson, ISBN 7688
RIGBY, ANDRUS & RIGBY, Chartered
Attorneys at Law
25 North Second East
Rexburg, Idaho 83440
Telephone: 208-356-3633
Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF MADISON

KENTON D. JOHNSON, a married man
dealing with his sole and separate
property and NEPHI H. ALLEN, a
married man dealing with his sole and
separate property, and REXBURG
PLUMBING & HEATING LLC, an
Idaho limited liability company,
Plaintiffs,
v.
HIGHWAY 101 INVESTMENTS, LLC,
Defendant.

HIGHWAY 101 INVESTMENTS, LLC,
Counterclaimant,
v.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV-1O-115

AFFIDAVIT OF HYRUM ERICKSON IN
SUPPORT OF MEMORANDUM OF
COSTS AND ATTORNEY FEES
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KENTON D. JOHNSON, a married man
dealing with his sole and separate
property and NEPHI H. ALLEN, a
married man dealing with his sole and
separate property, and REXBURG
PLUMBING & HEATING LLC, an
Idaho limited liability company,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Counterdefendants.

)
)

STATE OF IDAHO
County of Madison.

)
ss.
)

Hyrum Erickson, being first dully sworn, deposes and says:
1. I am an adult, competent to testifY to the matters contained herein.
2. I am the attorney of record for Plaintiffs/Counterdefendants in the above entitled
action.
4. Attached as exhibit A and incorporated herein by reference is a true and correct
itemization of the costs and attorney's fees incurred by my clients concerning this action.
5. To the best of my knowledge and belief the items described herein are correct and the
costs are in compliance with LR.C.P. 54.
5. During the course of this matter, I billed my time at the rate of$125 per hour. Other
attorney's in the law firm billed their time at a slightly higher rate.
6. I spent approximately 8 hours responding to Highway 101 's claims for unjust
enrichment and forfeiture. This amounts to $1,000 out of the total attorney's fees of$13,700.79.
This includes researching the claims, drafting applicable portions in the memorandum supporting
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Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment, reviewing Highway 101's response to the motion for
summary judgment, researching and drafting a reply to Highway 101's response, and researching
and drafting the motion for costs and fees ..
7. All costs and attorney fees requested in this matter were reasonably incurred.
8. These fees are reasonable given the time and labor required. The rates charged are
quite low for attorneys in southeastern Idaho. The time was reasonable.
DATED this 8 th day of August, 2011.

SUBSCRlBED AND SWORN To before me this 8th day of August, 2011.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE BY MAIL, HAND DELIVERY
OR FACSIMILE TRANSMISSION
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document was on this date
served upon the persons named below, at the addresses set out below their name, either by mailing, hand delivery or by telecopying to them a true and correct copy of said document in a
properly addressed envelope in the United States mail, postage prepaid; by hand delivery to
them; or by facsimile transmission.
DATED this 8 th day of August, 2011.

RIGBY ANDRUS & RIGBY, Chartered

Bryan D. Smith, Esq.
B. 1. Driscoll, Esq.
SMITH, DRISCOLL & ASSOCIA TES, PLLC
P. O. Box 50731
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405

[X] Mail
[ ] Hand Delivery
[ ] Facsimile

Honorable Dane H. Watkins, Jr.
Courtesy Copy
Bonneville County Courthouse
605 North Capital
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83402

[X] Mail
[ ] Hand Delivery
[ ] Facsimile
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)

RIGBY, ANDRUS & RIGBY, CHARTERED
25 North 2nd East - P.O. Box 250
Rexburg, 10 83440-0250

Invoice submitted to:
REXBURG PLUMBING AND HEATING
KENTON JOHNSON
NEPHI ALLEN
PO BOX 759
REXBURG, 1083440

August 08, 2011
In Reference To: REXBURG PLUMBING AND HEATING v. Highway 101
Investments
E 19695
Opened: 9/23/09

Professional Services
HrslRate

Amount

9/22/2009 Telephone conference w/client; research; Letter to opposing counsel;
Consultation with Jerry Rigby

1.78
125.00/hr

9/24/2009 Attempt to contact opposing counsel

0.05
NO CHARGE
125.00/hr

222.50

11/20/2009 Draft complaint

1.20
125.00/hr

11/23/2009 Consultation with Jerry Rigby

0.17
NO CHARGE
125.00/hr

11/25/2009 Draft complaint

1.13
125.00/hr

12/14/2009 File Review; Attempt to contact client

0.15
NO CHARGE
125.00lhr

12/15/2009 Telephone conference w/client; Consultation with Jerry Rigby; edit complaint;
letter (email) client

0.57
125.00lhr

71 .25

2/15/2010 File Review; Letter to Client

0.20
125.00/hr

25.00

2/19/2010 Telephone conference w/client ; edit complaint

0.23
125.00lhr

28.75

0.27
125.00/hr

33.75

3/3/2010 Receipt and review return of service; calendar dates for default; Letter to Client
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I

150.00

141.25

REXBURG PLUMBING AND HEATING

Page

Hrs/Rate

2

Amount

3/12/2010 Tel. call w/opposing counsel re: filing an answer, requested he file a notice of
appearance

0.05
NO CHARGE
125.00/hr

3/15/2010 Receipt and review Letter from opposing counsel and notice of appearance;
Letter to Client

0.33
125.00/hr

3/31/2010 Receipt and review letter (email) from client; letter (email) client;

0.05
NO CHARGE
125.00/hr

41.25

4/1/2010 Receipt and review Answer and Counterclaim; letter (email) client

0.18
125.00/hr

22.50

4/2/2010 Receipt and review of Answer and Counteclaim; prepare reply

1.23
125.00/hr

153.75

4/5/2010 Telephone conference w/client; draft reply; draft interrogatories; letter (email)
client

2.18
125.00/hr

272.50

4/6/2010 Consultation with client re: situation and drafting settlement agreement

0.75
125.00/hr

93.75

4/16/2010 Receipt and review voicemail from client; research self help and right to move
sign; Consultation with Rich Andrus; letter (email) client

2.30
125.00/hr

287.50

4/19/2010 Draft settlement agreement; letter (email) client

0.73
125.00/hr

91.25

4/22/2010 Telephone conference w/client

0.28
125.00/hr

35.00

4/16/2010 Consultation

NO CHARGE
0.20
140.00/hr

4/27/2010 letter (email) Jerry Rigby re: consultation on complaint and answer views on
case

0.28
125.00/hr

5/3/2010 Consultation with Jerry Rigby

35.00

0.33
NO CHARGE
125.00/hr

6/14/2010 Receipt and review answers to interrogatories and requests for
production/admissions; Letter to Client; review discovery request

0.85
125.00lhr

106.25

6/16/2010 Draft response to requests for adm issions; Telephone call with client

0.45
125.00lhr

56.25

6/23/2010 Receipt and review letter from opposing counsel; research re: response to
requests for admissions; draft letter to opposing counsel (not sent); letter
(email) Jerry Rigby

1.15
125.00/hr

143.75

6/30/2010 Telephone conference w/client; prepare responses

1.02
125.00/hr

127.50
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Page

Hrs/Rate

3

Amount

7/1/2010 Draft responses to discovery

0.25
125.00/hr

31.25

7/2/2010 Consultation with client and completing responses to discovery (reduced 30
minutes for non-case conversation); drafting/editing responses

2.23
125.00/hr

278.75

7/6/2010 Draft responses to discovery; review Defendant's documents produced in
discovery

3.52
125.00/hr

440.00

7/7/2010 Review Defendant's documents; Attempt to contact client; Attempt to contact
client; Telephone call with client

0.38
125.00/hr

47.50

7/8/2010 Receipt and review voicemail from client

0.05
NO CHARGE
125.00/hr

7/9/2010 Prep. response to discovery; Telephone call with client; signing and mailing

1.63
125.00/hr

203.75

6/29/2010 Receipt and review and reply to discovery questions issue.

0.20
175.00/hr

35.00

6/24/2010 Review email and letter from Hyrum re: requests for admissions; email Hyrum;
Consultation re: discovery

1.00
NO CHARGE
175.00/hr

8/3/2010 Draft motion for summary judgment

0.75
125.00/hr

93.75

8/9/2010 Draft brief in support of motion for summary judgment

0.78
125.00/hr

97.50

8/10/2010 Draft memorandum in support of motion for summary judgment

3.08
125.00/hr

385.00

8/11/2010 Draft affidavits; transfer photos

1.08
125.00/hr

135.00

8/16/2010 Consultation with Bron Leishman; Consultation with Jerry Rigby

1.60
125.00/hr

200.00

8/30/2010 Draft supplemental response to request for production of documents

0.35
125.00/hr

43.75

2.52
125.00/hr

315.00

10/18/2010 Attempt to contact client

0.05
125.00/hr

6.25

10/19/2010 Telephone call with client;Review and edit brief; email clients

0.17
125.00/hr

21.25

9/7/2010 Draft brief
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Page

Hrs/Rate

4

Amount

11/12/2010 Draft affidavit and motion for summary judgment

1.85
125.00/hr

231.25

11/15/2010 Drafting and editing affidavit and brief

1.50
125.00/hr

187.50

11/16/2010 Draft and edit documents; letter (email) client

0.52
125.00/hr

65.00

11/17/2010 Draft motion for summary judgment affidavit and attachments; file motion

0.67
125.00/hr

83.75

11/19/2010 Receipt and review message from opposing counsel re: he would like to
postpone summary judgment hearing until he can schedule depositions

0.13
125.00/hr

16.25

11/29/2010 Receipt and review notice of prior association; file review re: dates the firm
started on the matter and dates Judge Moeller left the firm; prepare motion for
voluntary recusal

0.43
125.00/hr

53.75

11/30/2010 Draft order and motion

0.20
125.00/hr

25.00

12/3/2010 Consultation with Jerry Rigby

0.05
NO CHARGE
125.00/hr

11/15/2010 Receipt and review docs and make comments.

0.20
185.00/hr

37.00

12/10/2010 Telephone call with client; email opposing counsel; letter (email) client

0.67
125.00/hr

83.75

12/20/2010 Receipt and review filings from opposing counsel; schedule

0.22
125.00/hr

27.50

12/22/2010 Receipt and review filings and motion; Letter to Client; calendar

0.73
125.00/hr

91.25

12/31/2010 Draft brief and affidavits in oppostion to rule 56(f) motion

4.37
125.00/hr

546.25

1/1/2011 Draft brief re: opposition to motion to postpone summary judgment

1.00
125.00/hr

125.00

1/3/2011 Consultation with Jerry Rigby re: brief in opposition to 56(f) motion

0.27
125.00/hr

33.75

1/4/2011 Draft affidavit and file; research re: subpeonas and depositions; Telephone
conference with Dean Moon

2.03
125.00/hr

253.75
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Page

REXBURG PLUMBING AND HEATING

Hrs/Rate
1/5/2011 Attempt to contact Dean Moon; Consultation with Jerry Rigby; Attempt to
contact Dean Moon;Telephone conference with Dean Moon; draft Letter to
opposing counsel; letter (email) Jerry Rigby

0.48
125.00/hr

5

Amount
60.00

1/10/2011 Preparing for hearing

0.10
NO CHARGE
125.00/hr

1/11/2011 Travel; court appearance re: motion to postpone summary judgment hearing;
Travel; Letter to Client

2.10
125.00/hr

262.50

1/27/2011 File Review; Telephone call with client; Consultation with client re: depositions
tommorow

1.23
125.00/hr

153.75

1/28/2011 Travel; attend depositions; Travel (from 8:00 to 3:30 minus an hour lunch)

6.50
125.00/hr

812.50

1/5/2011 Consultation with Hyrum Erickson

0.20
185.00lhr

37.00

1/3/2011 Consultation; Reviewing brief

0.20
185.00/hr

37.00

3/2/2011 Reviewing depositions

0.28
125.00/hr

35.00

3/11/2011 Receipt and review motion for summary judgment and supporting docs;
Consultation with client; Research;

1.33
125.00/hr

166.25

3/14/2011 Letter to client; calendar deadlines

0.33
125.00/hr

41.25

3/25/2011 Preparing response to motion for summary judgment

NO CHARGE
0.10
125.00/hr

3/28/2011 Draft brief

3.40
125.00/hr

425.00

3/29/2011 Re: briefing

2.08
125.00/hr

260.00

3/30/2011 Draft brief

5.23
125.00/hr

653.75

3/31/2011 Draft and file brief; email client

3.42
125.00/hr

427.50

4/1/2011 Receipt and review brief in opposition to summary judgment

0.10
NO CHARGE
125.00/hr

4/6/2011 Draft brief

2.90
125.00/hr
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362.50

REXBURG PLUMBING AND HEATING

Page

Hrs/Rate

6

Amount

4/7/2011 Drafting and filing reply brief

4.77
125.00/hr

596.25

4/11/2011 Telephone conference w/client

0.23
125.00/hr

28.75

4/12/2011 Attempt to contact court personnel

0.05
NO CHARGE
125.00/hr

4/14/2011 Prepare for hearing

2.58
125.00/hr

322.50

4/512011 Preparing brief

0.20
125.00/hr

25.00

4/8/2011 Receipt and review briefing by Highway 101

0.70
125.00/hr

87.50

4/14/2011 Appearance at court hearing oral argument on summary judgment; and Travel

2.00
125.00/hr

250.00

3/31/2011 Edit and revise docs.

0.30
185.00/hr

55.50

4/25/2011 Reviewing Supreme Court's latest easement cases

0.37
NO CHARGE
125.00/hr

5/6/2011 Receipt and review Memorandum Decision and Order and Receipt and review
e-mail from

1.05
125.00/hr

131.25

5/9/2011 Research regarding Court's Memorandum

1.00
125.00/hr

125.00

5/11/2011 Reviewing and Consultation

0.40
140.00/hr

56.00

5/20/2011 Reviewing

0.30
140.00/hr

42.00

5/10/2011 Consultation with Jerry Rigby; Research regarding definition of "right of way"

1.26
125.00/hr

157.50

5/16/2011 Attempt to contact client; research

1.33
125.00/hr

166.25

5/17/2011 Telephone conference w/client; Research

1.27
125.00/hr

158.75

5/18/2011 Draft motion to reconsider

1.36
125.00lhr

170.00
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5/19/2011 Draft and Research motion to reconsider

Page

7

Hrs/Rate

Amount

0.45

56.25

125.00/hr
5/20/2011 Draft motion to reconsider; Consultation with Rich Andrus and Consultation with
Rob Wood

6/13/2011 Receipt and review motion for attorneys fees and costs and supporting
documents; Preparing motion to dismiss

6/14/2011 Telephone conference with various copy centers

2.46

307.50

125.00/hr
0.42

52.50

125.00/hr
0.17

21.25

125.00/hr
6/20/2011 Research and calendar deadline to object to costs and fees

0.13

16.25

125.00/hr
6/21/2011 Draft brief re: costs and fees
6/22/2011 Research and draft objection to attorneys fees and costs; Reviewing Supreme
courts latest easement cases

7/412011 Receipt and review opposition to motion to reconsider

1.67
125.00/hr

208.75

1.50

187.50

125.00/hr
0.17

21.25

125.00/hr
7/5/2011 Telephone conference w/client
7/6/2011 Prepare for hearing

0.10
NO CHARGE
125.00lhr
0.75

93.75

125.00/hr
7/7/2011 Prepare for hearing; Travel; Appearance at court hearing on motion to
reconsider
Re: time at hearing spent on attorneys fees and motion to dismiss

5.00

NO CHARGE

125.00/hr
0.25

31.25

125.00/hr
7/12/2011 Receipt and review proposed order and juegment

0.17

NO CHARGE

125.00/hr
7/13/2011 Receipt and review email re: draft of judgment

0.05

6.25

125.00/hr
7/18/2011 Receipt and review revised proposed judgment

7/20/2011 Receipt and review proposed order and judgment; review, sign & return to
opposing counsel
7/27/2011 Receipt and review signed order and judgment; draft letter to client re: appeal

0.05
125.00/hr

6.25

0.15

18.75

125.00/hr
1.83

125.00/hr
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228.75
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Page

Hrs/Rate

8

Amount

8/3/2011 Draft and research motion re: costs and fees and associated memorandum and
affidavit

3.18
125.00/hr

397.50

8/8/2011 Draft motion, affidavit, and memorandum re: costs and fees

1.10
125.00/hr

137.50

For professional services rendered

121.34

$14,230.75

Additional Charges:
2/19/2010 Filing fee - Madison County Clerk of the Court - Complaint

88.00

2/28/2010 Service 'of Process - Bonneville County Sheriff's Office - Summons & Complaint - Paper ID:
201001073 - Case No: CV10115

40.00

1/28/2011 Deposition costs - T & T Reporting - Invoice #9575A

494.40

Total additional charges
For professional services rendered
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$622.40
121.34

$14,853.15

Bryan D. Smith, Esq. - ISB #4411
B. J. Driscoll, Esq. -IS8 # 7010
SMITH, DRISCOLL & ASSOCIATES,

PLLC

414 Shoup Ave.
P.O. Box 50731
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405
Telephone: (208) 524-0731
Facsimile: (208) 529-4166
Attorneys for Defendant and Counterclaimant
Highway 101 Investments, LLC
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF MADISON
KENTON D. JOHNSON, a married man
dealing with his sole and separate property
and NEPHI H. ALLEN, a married man dealing
with his sole and separate property, and
REXBURG PLUMBING & HEATING LLC, an
Idaho limited liability company,

Case No. CV-l0-U5

MOTION TO DISALLOW COSTS

Plaintiffs,

v.
HIGHWAY 101 INVESTMENTS, LLC,
Defendant,

HIGHWAY 101 INVESTMENTS, LLC,
Counterclaimant,

v.
KENTON D. JOHNSON, a married man
dealing with his sole and separate property
and NEPHI H. ALLEN, a married man dealing
with his sole and separate property, and
REXBURG PLUMBING & HEATING LLC, an
Idaho limited liability company,
Counterdefendants.
1/I0TION TO DISALLOW COSTS
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COMES NOW, Plaintiff, Highway 101, and moves this Court pursuant to Idaho
Rules of Civil Procedure S4(d)(6) for an order disallowing the attorney's fees and costs
plaintiff seeks in its Motion for Award of Attorney's Fees and Costs and Memorandum of
Costs and Attorney Fees.
This motion is made on the grounds and for the reasons that Plaintiffs are not
the all overall prevailing parties and therefore not entitled to recover any costs. This
motion is made further on the grounds and for the reasons that Plaintiffs are not
entitled to recover any attorney's fees even assuming they were the overall prevailing
party because Plaintiffs cannot establish any right to entitlement of attorney's fees.
This motion is based on this Motion, the Brief in Support of Defendant's Motion
to Disallow Costs, the Not~aring, and on the Court's records and files herein.
DATED this

--I..U-

day of August, 2011.

Bryan D. mith
Attorneys for Defendant
Highway 101 Investments, LLC
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CERTIFICAWRVICE

Jf

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this
day of August, 2011, I caused a true and
correct copy of the foregoing MOTION TO DISALLOW COSTS to be served, by placing
the same in a sealed envelope and depositing in the United States Mail, postage
prepaid, or hand delivery, facsimile transmission or overnight delivery, addressed to the
following:

Hyrum D. Erickson, Esq.
RIGBY, ANDRUS & RIGBY,
Chartered
Attorneys at Law
25 North Second East
Rexburg, Idaho 83440

[-1~Mail

[-1 Fax

[ ] Overnight Delivery
[ ] Hand Delivery
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Bryan D. Smith, Esq. - ISB #4411
B. J. Drisco", Esq. -ISB # 7010
SMITH, DRISCOll & ASSOCIATES, PLLC

414 Shoup Ave.
P.O. Box 50731
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405
Telephone: (208) 524-0731
Facsimile: (208) 529-4166
Attorneys for Defendant and Counterclaimant
Highway 101 Investments, LLC
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF MADISON
KENTON D. JOHNSON, a married man
dealing with his sole and separate property
and NEPHI H. ALLEN, a married man dealing
with his sole and separate property, and
REXBURG PLUMBING & HEATING LLC, an
Idaho limited liability company,

Case No. CV-l0-115

BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO
DISALLOW COSTS

Plaintiffs,

v.
HIGHWAY 101 INVESTMENTS, LLC,
Defendant,

HIGHWAY 101 INVESTMENTS, LLC,
Counterclaimant,

v.
KENTON D. JOHNSON, a married man
dealing with his sole and separate property
and NEPHI H. ALLEN, a married man dealing
with his sole and separate property, and
REXBURG PLUMBING & HEATING LLC, an
Idaho limited liability company,
Counterdefendants.
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISALLOW COSTS
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I.

INTRODUCTION.
Plaintiff sued Highway 101 for injunctive relief and damages arising from

Highway 101's placement of a signpost and bollards on Highway 101's property but
within an ingress and egress easement in favor of Plaintiff. Highway 101 filed an answer
and counterclaim. Both Plaintiff and Highway 101 have filed motions for costs and
attorney's fees, and both claim to be prevailing parties. Highway 101 files this brief
opposing Plaintiff's Motion for Attorney's Fees and Costs.
II.

ALTHOUGH PLAINTIFFS PREVAILED ON SOME CLAIMS, PLAINTIFFS ARE NOT THE
"OVERALL PREVAILING PARTY" BECAUSE HIGHWAY 101 PREVAILED IN "THE
ACTION."
"A prevailing party in an action is entitled to certain costs as a matter of right and

may, in some cases, also be awarded discretionary costs and attorney fees." Shore v.
Peterson, 146 Idaho 903,914 (2009). Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(1)(B) provides:

In determining which party to an action is a prevailing party and entitled
to costs, the trial court shall in its sound discretion consider the final judgment or
result of the action in relation to the relief sought by the respective parties. The
trial court in its sound discretion may determine that a party to an action
prevailed in part and did not prevail in part, and upon so finding may apportion
the costs between and among the parties in a fair and equitable manner after
conSidering all ofthe issues and claims involved in the action and the resultant
judgment or judgments obtained.
"In determining which party prevailed where there are claims and counterclaims
between opposing parties, the court determines who prevailed {in the action'; that is,
the prevailing party question is examined and determined from an overall view, not a
claim-by-claim analYSis." Shore, supra, 146 Idaho at 914. In determining who prevailed
"in the action," the court is to look at whether there is a "primary issue in the case" and
determine who won that primary issue. Id. at 915. The court should not focus on claims
IRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISALLOW COSTS
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that are dismissed as lIunnecessary" to the primary issue in the case especially where
the court never makes any findings of fact or conclusions of law. Id. A court can also
give less or more weight to claims depending on whether the party IIvigorously pursued"
the claims. Jorgensen v. Coppedge, 148 Idaho 536, 539 (2010).
Here, this Court should determine, if it can, whether there was a IIprimary issue"
in the action and then decide who won that primary issue. Obviously, whether Highway

101 had to remove the signpost and bollards was the IIprimary issue" in the action. The
Plaintiffs essentially concede as much in their brief when they state lithe majority of the
parties' effort and argument in this matter have been related to the plaintiffs' cause of
action of seeking the removal of the sign." See Plaintiffs' Motion for Award of
Attorney's Fees and Costs, p. 3. Thus, the lIoverall prevailing party" in the action is
Highway 101 because it won the primary issue in the case.
Plaintiffs mistakenly claim they are the prevailing party by looking at who
prevailed on a claim-by-claim basis. However, the Court determines the prevailing party
question from an "overall view/, not by a claim-by-claim analysis. Shore, supra, 146
Idaho at 914. Moreover, of the five claims Highway 101 asserted, Highway 101
voluntarily dismissed three of them. Under Shore, the Court has discretion to give very
little weight to these claims especially since the Court entered no findings of fact or
conclusions of law regarding these claims.
As for the remaining forfeiture and unjust enrichment claims, Highway 101
asserted the forfeiture claim as an affirmative defense in its answer and only raised
forfeiture in the counterclaim to get an affirmative declaration/judgment if forfeiture
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became an issue. However, forfeiture really did not become an issue because discovery
revealed that Highway 101 did not unreasonably interfere with Plaintiffs' easement.
Similarly, Highway 101 raised set off as an affirmative damage defense in its
answer and only raised "unjust enrichment" in the counterclaim to leave open the
possibility of obtaining an affirmative judgment depending on the evidence on Plaintiffs'
claim for damages. However, once Highway 101 determined that Plaintiffs did not have
any damages, Highway 101 did not "vigorously purse" the unjust enrichment claim
either.
In fact, the Court can tell from the briefing that Highway 101 did not "vigorously
pursue" either the claim for unjust enrichment or forfeiture. Under Jorgensen, supra,
138 Idaho at 539, this Court can give less weight to these claims in determining who
prevailed in the action because Highway 101 did not "vigorously pursue" these claims.
As further proof that Highway 101 did not "vigorously pursue" these claims and
that the placement of the signpost and bollards was the "primary issue," the Court
should consider that Plaintiffs seek attorney's fees for eight hours of work defending
against the unjust enrichment and forfeiture claims whereas Plaintiffs' counsel spent
over 121 hours on "the action." Thus, Plaintiffs' counsel spent 93% of his time on the
placement of the signpost and bollards issue. Highway 101 submits that any issue
occupying 93% of counsel's time necessarily makes that issue the "primary issue" in the
action. Importantly, Highway 101 prevailed on this "primary issue" thus making
Highway 101 the floverall prevailing party."
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III.

PLAINTIFFS CANNOT RECOVER ATTORNEY'S FEES FOR DEFENDING AGAINST THE
FORFEITURE OR UNJUST ENRICHMENT CAUSES OF ACTION.
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 12-121 allows for an award of attorney's fees "to

the prevailing party or parties./I Here, Highway 101 has set forth above that it is the
overall prevailing party. Plaintiffs cannot recover attorney's fees under 12-121 when
they are not the prevailing parties.
Plaintiffs claim that Highway 101's claim for forfeiture was frivolous. However,
no Idaho case has ever addressed whether overburdening an easement can result in
forfeiture ofthe easement although other courts have addressed the issue.
"[EJxtinguishing an easement is appropriate when the additional burden imposed on the
servient estate is so violative of the terms of the express easement that 'continued use
of the easement is precluded as a matter of law."' Grygiel v. Monches Fish & Game

Club, Inc., 787 N.W.2d 6 (Wis. 2010). Even this Court cited to A.L.R. 5th 313 Section 2(a)
(not Idaho law) for the propOSition that forfeiture of an easement is available in certain
limited circumstances. See Memorandum Decision and Order Re: Motions for
Summary Judgment, p. 13.
Plaintiffs' easement was expressly granted only to plaintiffs Nephi Allen and
Kenton Johnson. But Allen and Johnson have allowed Rexburg Plumbing & Heating,
LLC's customers and suppliers to use the easement as well. The Court never addressed
this legal issue of whether Allen and Johnson's allowing customers and suppliers of
Rexburg Plumbing & Heating, LLC (who does not have an easement but is a separate
entity) to use the easement amounts to conduct overburdening the easement such that
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISALLOW COSTS
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Highway 101 could seek forfeiture as a remedy. At this point, the issue is moot because
Highway 101 has prevailed on the placement of the sign and bollards issue. But
Highway 101's argument that an issue of fact existed to defeat summary judgment is
not frivolous especially where Idaho has never addressed the forfeiture issue.
Plaintiffs also claim that Highway 101's claim for unjust enrichment was
frivolous. However, "The owner of an easement has the right and duty to maintain,
repair, and protect the easement." Gibbens v. Seisshaupt, 98 Idaho 633, 640 (1977).
"The owner ofthe servient estate has no duty to maintain the easement." Id. Having
the Court declare whether paving the easement was "maintenance" requiring
contribution from Plaintiffs is not frivolous especially where no case in Idaho has ever
addressed this issue.
Again, once Highway 101 discovered that Plaintiffs had no damages, Highway
101 did not "vigorously pursue" its unjust enrichment claim. Similarly, once Highway
101 discovered that the signpost and bollards did not unreasonably interfere with
Plaintiffs' use of the easement, Highway 101 did not "vigorously pursue" its forfeiture
claim. However, neither claim was frivolous especially where no Idaho law exists on
point on the issues.
The Court can contrast the fact that no Idaho law exists on point for these issues
with Plaintiffs' position on the easement issue. Plaintiffs cited law from other
jurisdictions that Highway 101's placement ofthe signpost and bollards was
unreasonable per se because it prevented Plaintiffs from using the exact location where
the signpost and bollards were located. However, Idaho has never followed this
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approach. The law in Idaho is very clear that Highway 101 can make whatever use of its
ll

property as it wants that does not "unreasonably interfere with Plaintiffs' easement
privilege i.e., ingress and egress rights. Plaintiffs' failure to provide any good faith
argument for reversing this Idaho law makes Plaintiffs' argument on the issue frivolous.
In fact, Plaintiffs' ignoring relevant, on point, applicable Idaho law (and arguing against it
when Highway 101 pointed it out) makes Plaintiffs' conduct fundamentally frivolous.
IV.

CONCLUSION.
For all the reasons set forth above, the Court should deny Plaintiffs' request for

attorney's fees and costs.~
DATED this

K

day of August, 2011.

Bryan D.
Attorneys for Defendant
Highway 101 Investments, LLC
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CERTIFICAp""::RVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this J!!day of August, 2011, I caused a true and
correct copy of the foregoing BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISALLOW COSTS to
be served, by placing the same in a sealed envelope and depositing in the United States
Mail, postage prepaid, or hand delivery, facsimile transmission or overnight delivery,
addressed to the following:

Hyrum D. Erickson, Esq.
RIGBY, ANDRUS & RIGBY,
Chartered
Attorneys at Law
25 North Second East
Rexburg, Idaho 83440
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] Overnight Delivery
] Hand Delivery
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF MADISON
)
KENTON D. JOHNSON, a married man
dealing with his sole and separate property )
and NEPHI H. ALLEN, a married man
)
dealing with his sole and separate property, )
and REXBURG PLUMBING & HEATING,)
LLC, an Idaho limited liability company,
)
)

Plaintiffs,
vs.

)
)
)
)

HIGHWAY 101 INVESTMENTS, LLC,
Defendant.

)
)
)

Case No. CV-2010-11~
MINUTE ENTRY ON
MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

)

August 29,2011, at 8:30 A.M., Plaintiff's Motion to Disallow Attorney Fees and
Defendant's Motion for Attorney Fees came on for hearing before the Honorable Dane H.
Watkins, Jr., District Judge, sitting in open court at Idaho Falls, Idaho.
Ms. Karen Konvalinka, Court Reporter, and Ms. Lettie Messick, Deputy Court Clerk,
were present.
Mr. Hyrum Erickson appeared on behalf ofthe plaintiff. Mr. Bryan Smith appeared on
behalf of the defendant.
Mr. Smith presented argument supporting defendant's motion for attorney fees.
Mr. Erickson argued in opposition to defendant's motion for attorney fees.
The Court took this matter under advisement.
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Court was thus adjourned.

~JR
/'

c: Hyrum Erickson
Bryan Smith
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District Judge

Hyrum D. Erickson, ISBN 7688
RIGBY, ANDRUS & RIGBY, Chartered
Attorneys at Law
25 North Second East
Rexburg, Idaho 83440
Telephone: 208-356-3633
Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF MADISON

KENTON D. JOHNSON, a married man
dealing with his sole and separate
property and NEPHI H. ALLEN, a
married man dealing with his sole and
separate property, and REXBURG
PLUMBING & HEATING LLC, an
Idaho limited liability company,
Plaintiffs/Counterdefendantsl
Appellants,

v.
HIGHWAY 101 INVESTMENTS, LLC,
Defendant/Counterclaimanti
Respondent.

TO:

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV-1O-115

NOTICE OF APPEAL

FEE CATEGORY: L.4.
FEE: $101.00

THE ABOVE NAMED RESPONDENT, HIGHWAY 101 INVESTMENTS, LLC, AND
THE PARTY'S ATTORNEY, BRYAN D. SMITH, ESQ.,SMITH, DRISCOLL &
ASSOCIATES, PLLC, P. O. BOX 50731,IDAHO FALLS, IDAHO 83405 AND THE
CLERK OF THE ABOVE ENTITLED COURT

NOTICE OF APPEAL - Page 1
NOTICE OF APPEAL
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NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT:
1.

The above named appellants, KENTON D. JOHNSON, a married man dealing with his
sole and separate property and NEPHI H. ALLEN, a married man dealing with his sole
and separate property, and REXBURG PLUMBING & HEATING LLC, an Idaho limited
liability company, appeal against the above named respondent to the Idaho Supreme
Court from the Judgment, entered in the above entitled action on July 25,2011.

2.

That the party has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the judgment and/or
orders described in paragraph 1 above are appealable orders under and pursuant to Rule
11(a)(1), LA.R.

3.

Preliminary Statement ofIssues on Appeal:
(A preliminary statement of the issues on appeal which the appellant then intends to
assert in the appeal; provided any such list of issues on appeal shall not prevent the
appellant from asserting other issues on appeal.)
A. Did the Court err in ruling that the owner of a servient estate may place a
permanent obstruction within an express right-of-way?
B. Did the Court err in using extrinsic evidence to determine the "reasonableness"
of an encroachment upon a unambiguous express right-of-way?

4.

Has an order been entered sealing all or any portion of the record? No.

5.

(a) A reporters transcript is requested.
(b) The appellant requests the preparation of the following portions of the reporter's
transcript in both hard copy and electronic format:
January 11, 2011 - hearing on Highway 101 IS Rule 56(f) motion.
April 14, 2011 - hearing on motions for summary judgment
July 7, 2011 - hearing on motion to reconsider

6.

The appellant requests the following documents to be included in the clerk's record in
addition to those automatically included under Rule 28, LA.R.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

\JOTICE OF APPEAL
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Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment filed 11117/2011
Brief in support of Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment filed 11117/2011
Affidavit of Counsel in support of Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment filed
11117/2011
Plaintiffs' motion requesting voluntary disqualification filed 11130/2011
Brief in Opposition to Rule 56(f) motion filed 115/2011
Affidavit of Hyrum Erickson in opposition to Rule 56(f) motion filed 115/2011
Affidavit of DeAnn Chadwick filed 115/2011

8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
7.

Brief in Support of Defendant's motion for summary judgement filed 3/9/2011
Answering brief in opposition to Highway lOl's motion for summary judgment
filed 3/3112011
Affidavit of Counsel in opposition to Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment
filed 3/3112011
Reply brief in support of Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment filed 4/7/2011
Motion for reconsideration filed 5/20/2011
Brief in support of Plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration 5/20/2011

I certify:

(a) That a copy of this notice of appeal has been served on each reporter of whom a
transcript has been requested as named below at the address set our below:
Karen Konvalinka
Bonneville County Courthouse
605 North Capital
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83402
(b)(1) That the Reporter has been paid the estimated fee for preparation of the reporter's
transcript, by payment to the Clerk of the District Court therefore. (A check payable to the
Reporter has been delivered to the Clerk of the District Court concurrently with the filing of this
Notice of Appeal).
(c)(1) The estimated fee for preparation of the clerk's or agency's record has been paid.
(d)(1) The appellate filing fee has been paid.
(e) Service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant to Rule 20,
LA.R.

Dated this 1st day of September, 2011.

H m Erickson
Attorney for Appellant
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE BY MAIL, HAND DELIVERY
OR FACSIMILE TRANSMISSION
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document was on this date
served upon the persons named below, at the addresses set out below their name, either by mailing, hand delivery or by telecopying to them a true and correct copy of said document in a
properly addressed envelope in the United States mail, postage prepaid; by hand delivery to
them; or by facsimile transmission.
DATED this 1st day of September, 2011.
RIGBY ANDRUS & RIGBY, Chartered

Bryan D. Smith, Esq.
SMITH, DRISCOLL & ASSOCIATES, PLLC
P. O. Box 50731
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405

[X] Mail
[ ] Hand Delivery
[ ] Facsimile

Clerk of the Court
Attention: Gwen
Madison County Courthouse
Rexburg, Idaho 83440

[ ] Mail
[X] Hand Delivery
[ ] Facsimile

Karen Konvalinka
Court Reporter
Bonneville County Courthouse
605 North Capital
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83402

[X] Mail
[ ] Hand Delivery
[ ] Facsimile
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)
property and NEPHI H ALLEN, a
)
married man dealing with his sole and )
separate property, and REXBURG
)
PLUMBING & HEATING LLC, an
)
Idaho limited liability company
)
)
Plaintiffs/Counterdefendantsl )
Appellants
)

SUPREME COURT NO.
CASE NO. CV-201 0-115
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)

vs

)
)

CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF
APPEAL

HIGHWAY 10IlNVESTMENTS, LLC)
DefendantiCounterclaimanti
)
Respondent
)

APPEAL FROM: tIt Judicial District Madison County
HONORABLE Dane H. Watkins, Jr. PRESIDING
CASE NO. FROM COURT: CV-2010-115
ORDER OF JUDGMENT APPEALED FROM: Judgment, dated July 25, 2011
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: Hyrum DErickson, 25 North Second East, Rexburg, ID
83440
ATTORNEY FOR THE RESPONDENT: Bryan D Smith, PO Box 50731, Idaho Falls, ID
83405
APPEALED BY: Kenton D Johnson, Nephi HAllen and Rexburg Plumbing & Heating LLC
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF MADISON.

KENTON D. JOHNSON, a married man
dealing with his sole and separate property
and NEPHI H. ALLEN, a married man
dealing with his sole and separate property,
and REXBURG PLUMBING & HEATING,
LLC, an Idaho limited liability company,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
HIGHWAY 101 INVESTMENTS, LLC,
Defendant.

I.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV-201O-11S
MEMORANDUM DECISION RE:
MOTIONS FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES
AND COSTS

FILED IN CHAMBERS
at Idaho Falls
Bonnevill
Honor Ie J
Date ~I.f-L~~~~~
Time - _.........~.......-¥""".Deputy Clerk _~~~,,;;;..

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs Ncphi Allen and Kenton Johnson are the managing partners of Rexburg
Plumbing and Heating LLC. On October 23,2000, Plaintiffs acquired real property in Rexburg
together with a "right-of-way" easement (hereafter, "Easement") over a strip ofland (hereafter,
"Subject Property") abutting their property.
On February 20, 2007, Highway 101 Investments, LLC (hereafter, "Highway 101")
acquired real property in Rexburg and a right-of-way easement over the Subject Property. On
July 29, 2009, Highway 101 acquired fee simple title to the Subject Property.
In 2008, Highway 101 obtained a permit from the City of Rexburg to have a sign erected
on the northwest comer of the Subject Property. Young Electric Sign Company (hereafter
"YESCO") began installing the sign on August 6, 2008, and finished on August 26, 2008.
On February 19,2010, Plaintiffs filed this action seeking removal of the sign. On April
1,2010, Highway 101 filed an answer and counterclaim. On November 17,2010, Plaintiffs filed
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a motion for summary judgment asking this Court to rule in their favor on the following
affirmative defenses and counterclaims raised by Highway 101: latches, estoppel, equitable
estoppel/recoupment, unclean hands, merger, forfeiture, right-of-way forfeiture, no unreasonable
restriction, set off, unjust enrichment, and trespass.
On March 9,2011, Highway 101 filed a motion for summary judgment asking this court
to conclude the sign does not unreasonably interfere with Plaintiffs' use of the Easement and that
the doctrines of latches and equitable estoppel bar Plaintiffs' claims.
On May 5, 2011, this Court entered a memorandum decision that (1) granted Highway
101 's motion for summary judgment on the issue of reasonable use, (2) granted Plaintiffs
motion for summary judgment on the issues of forfeiture and unjust enrichment, and (3) denied
the parties' motions in all other respects. Highway 101 subsequently moved to dismiss its
trespass counterclaim.
On June 13,2011, Highway 101 filed a motion for attorney's fees and costs, a supporting
brief, a memorandum of attorney's fees and costs, and a supporting affidavit of counsel. On
June 23, 2011, Plaintiffs filed an objection to Highway 101 's request for attorney's fees and
costs.
On August 8, 2011, Plaintiffs filed a motion for attorney's fees and costs, a memorandum
of attorney's fees and costs, and a supporting affidavit of counsel. On August 18,2011,
Highway 101 filed a brief and a motion to disallow Plaintiff s request for attorney's fees and
costs.
On September 1, 2011, this Court heard oral argument regarding attorney's fees and
costs.
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II.

STANDARD OF ADJUDICATION

An award of attorney fees must be supported by statutory or other authority. See Webb v.

Webb, 143 Idaho 521, 526,148 P.3d 1267,1272 (2006). The amount of attorney fees and costs
awarded is generally discretionary. Lettunich v. Lettunich, 141 Idaho 425,435, 111 P.3d 110,
120 (2005).
III.

DISCUSSION

Highway 101 asserts it is the prevailing party and that Plaintiffs' action was frivolous or
without foundation. Plaintiffs contend they are the prevailing party and that Highway 101' s
counterclaim was frivolous or without foundation.

A. Prevailing Party
Rule 54(d)(1)(B) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
In detennining which party to an action is a prevailing party and entitled to costs,
the trial court shall in its sound discretion consider the final judgment or result of
the action in relation to the relief sought by the respective parties. The trial court
in its sound discretion may detennine that a party to an action prevailed in part
and did not prevail in part, and upon so finding may apportion the costs between
and among the parties in a fair and equitable manner after considering all of the
issues and claims involved in the action and the resultant judgment or judgments
obtained. I
The Idaho Court of Appeals identified three areas of inquiry that a court should consider
when deciding whether a party "prevailed."
(a) the final judgment or result obtained in the action in relation to the relief
sought by the respective parties; (b) whether there were multiple claims or issues
between the parties; and (c) the extent to which each of the parties prevailed on
each of the issues or claims. If the court detennines that a party prevailed only in
part, it may apportion the costs and attorney fees among the parties in a fair and
equitable manner after considering all of the issues and claims involved in the
action and the resultant judgment or judgments obtained.

I Rule 54(d)(1)(B) only speaks of costs. However, Rule 54(e)(1), which pertains to attorney's
fees, incorporates the Rule 54(d)(1 )(B) definition of prevailing party.
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Chadderdon v. King, 104 Idaho 406, 411, 659 P.2d 160, 165 (Ct. App. 1983) (emphasis added).

In determining which party prevailed in an action where there are claims and
counterclaims between opposing parties, the court determines who prevailed "in
the action." That is, the prevailing party question is examined and determined
from an overall view, not a claim-by-claim analysis.
Eighteen Mile Ranch, LLC v. Nord Excavating & Paving, Inc., 141 Idaho 716, 719, 117 P.3d

130, 133 (2005).
In Jorgensen v. Coppedge, 148 Idaho 536,539,224 PJd 1125,1128 (2010), the Idaho
Supreme Court affirmed the district court's conclusion that neither party prevailed. In that case,
Coppedges prevailed on a breach of contract claim and Jorgensen successfully defended against
Coopedges' fraud, breach of contract, unfair competition, and intentional interference with
business advantage counterclaims. Id. As the court considered that result in relation to the relief
sought by the parties, the court noted that Jorgensen's claim was more than double that of
Coopedges' counterclaims. Id. Nevertheless, Coopedges' counterclaims "potentially subjected
Jorgensen to nearly a half million dollars of liability," and Coppedges "vigorously pursued"
those claims "through the expense of time and effort." Id. Coppedges "made the decision to
seek affirmative relief in the form of counterclaims rather than simply asserting defenses to
Jorgensen's claim." Because Jorgensen prevailed on those counterclaims, the Idaho Supreme
Court concluded, "Rule 54(d)(1 )(B) expressly requires the district court to consider the multiple
claims between the parties. Therefore, we find that the district court did not abuse its discretion
in making its determination under Rule 54(d)(1)(B) [that there was no overall prevailing party]."
Id

In Shore v. Peterson, 146 Idaho 903, 915, 204 P.3d 1114, 1126, (2009), Peterson
prevailed on his affirmative defense of accord and satisfaction, but lost on his claim of
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converslOn. The Idaho Supreme Court held, "the district court abused its discretion by
determining that Peterson was not the prevailing party." The court explained,
This determination was an abuse of discretion for two reasons. First, the primary
issue in this case was the claim to collect on the promissory note. In the district
court's decision, it made no findings on the substance or merits of the conversion
claim because it determined that the claim was unnecessary as a result of
Peterson's successful defense of the collection claim. However, in its decision
denying costs and attorney fees, the court did an about-face and found that the
conversion claim was not in the alternative and that Peterson lost on that claim .
. . . Second, the court made no mention of the fact that the Shores' claim for
conversion was dismissed after the presentation of their case-in-chief at trial.
Thus, the district court's decisions are inconsistent, and the district court erred by
failing to identify Peterson as the prevailing party.

Id.
In this case Plaintiffs sought (1) removal of the sign and bollards and (2) damages for
harm caused to Plaintiffs' business as a result of Highway 101 's placement of the sign and
bollards. This Court granted Highway 101 's motion for summary judgment on both of those
issues.
Highway WI's counterclaims sought (1) forfeiture of Plaintiffs' easement, (2)
compensation via an unjust enrichment claim for paving done by Highway 101 on the Subject
Property, and (3) an injunction preventing Plaintiffs from crossing a strip of land owned by
Highway 101. This Court granted Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment on the forfeiture
and unjust enrichment claims, and Highway 101 voluntarily dismissed its third claim.
Similar to the Jorgensen case, this case involved multiple claims and counterclaims.
Similar to the outcome in Jorgensen, the parties in this case each prevailed in some substantive
regard. The major distinction between this case and Jorgensen is that Highway 101 did not
"vigorously pursue" its counterclaims. This Court did make substantive conclusions on the
merits of Highway 101's forfeiture and unjust enrichment claims, but the parties seem to agree,
and their affidavits of cost support the conclusion that more than ninety percent of the work by
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each party in this case was spent on the sign and bollards issue. This Court is convinced that
issue was the "primary issue" in this case, and there is no dispute Highway 101 prevailed on that
issue. This Court concludes Highway 101 was the overall prevailing party in the action.
B. Costs

As the prevailing party, Highway 101 is entitled to certain costs as a matter of right.
LR.C.P.54(d)(1)(C). Plaintiffs do not object to the costs as a matter of right claimed by
Highway 101 in its affidavit of costs? This Court therefore concludes Highway 101 should be
awarded costs as a matter of right in the amount 0[$1,145.28.

C. Attorney's Fees
Both parties assert they are entitled to attorney's fees pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-121.
In the discussion above, this Court concluded Highway 101 was the overall prevailing party in
the action. 3
Fees under I.C. § 12-121 are not awarded to a prevailing party as a matter
of right but, rather, are subject to the district court' discretion. Coward v. Hadley,
150 Idaho 282, 290, 246 P.3d 391, 399 (2010). A district court should only award
fees "when it is left with the abiding belief that the action was pursued, defended,
or brought frivolously, unreasonably, or without foundation." C & G, Inc. v. Rule,
135 Idaho 763, 769, 25 P.3d 76, 82 (2001) (internal quotation marks omitted).
However, "when a party pursues an action which contains fairly debatable issues,
the action is not considered to be frivolous and without foundation." Id A claim
is not necessarily frivolous simply because the district court concludes it fails as a
matter of law. Gulf Chem. Employees Fed Credit Union v. Williams, 107 Idaho
890, 894,693 P.2d 1092, 1096 (Ct. App. 1984). Furthermore, "[a] misperception
of the law, or of one's interest under the law is not, by itself, unreasonable.
Rather, the question is whether the position adopted was not only incorrect, but so
plainly fallacious that it could be deemed frivolous, unreasonable, or without
foundation." Snipes v. Schalo, 130 Idaho 890, 893, 950 P.2d 262, 265
(Ct.App.1997) (internal citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).

2

3

Plaintiffs objected to certain costs in their brief but withdrew those objections at the hearing on September 1, 2011.
Because Plaintiffs are not the prevailing party, they are not entitled to attorney's fees and this Court need not
.
. Corp., 2011 WL 3904754 (Idaho Sep. 7, 2011).
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Garner v. Pavey, 2011 WL 3332258 at 5 (Idaho Aug. 4, 2011).
In this case, Highway 101 asserts Plaintiffs' claim was unreasonable because Plaintiffs
asked this court to apply a rule of law that had previously not been applied in Idaho. This Court
rejected Plaintiffs' argument and as a result their claim failed as a matter oflaw. This Court,
however is not left with the abiding belief that Plaintiffs brought or pursued their claim
frivolously, unreasonably, or without foundation. Plaintiffs cited and argued multiple Idaho
cases in support of the position they took regarding the effect ofthe granting language of their
Easement. Thus, even if Plaintiffs misperceived the law in Idaho, or their interest under the law,
this Court cannot conclude their argument was so plainly fallacious as to be deemed frivolous,
unreasonable, or without foundation. Highway 101, therefore, is not entitled to an award of
attorney's fees.

IV.

CONCLUSION

Plaintiffs' request for attorney's fees and costs is denied.
Highway 101's request for costs is granted in the amount of$I,145.28. Highway 101's
request for attorney's fees is denied.
IT IS SO ORDERED

DATED this

-h-

day of September 2011.

~~
Distric~udge
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I hereby certify that on this
day of September 2011, I did send a true and
correct copy of the foregoing document upon the parties listed below by mailing, with the correct
postage thereon; by causing the same to be placed in the respective courthouse mailbox; or by
causing the same to be hand-delivered.
Hyrum D. Erickson
RIGBY, ANDRUS & RIGBY, CHARTERED

25 North Second East
Rexburg, ID 83440

Brian D. Smith
SMITH, DRISCOLL & ASSOCIATES, PLLC
414 Shoup Ave.
P.O. Box 50731
Idaho Falls, ID 83405

Marilyn R. Rasmussen
Clerk ofthe District Court
Madison County, Idaho

MEMORANDUM DECISION RE: MOTIONS FOR ATIORNEY'S
FEES AND COSTS
PAGE 573

\. TTORNEY'S FEES & COSTS - 8

Bryan D. Smith, Esq. -ISB #4411
B. J. Driscoll, Esq. -ISB # 7010
SMITH, DRISCOLL & ASSOCIATES, PLLC

414 Shoup Ave.
P.O. Box 50731
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405
Telephone: (208) 524-0731
Facsimile: (208) 529-4166
Attorneys for Defendant and Counterclaimant
Highway 101 Investments, LLC

FILED IN CHAMq;:'iS
at Idaho Fa.!1e
Bonnevill Ctn..'...........f'
Hono I J dge?"1"~~'4-441

Date -..,...............+.,~t....tl.-L,

nme ____~~~~~
Deputy Clerk _ _ _

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, iN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF MADISON
KENTON D. JOHNSON, a married man
dealing with his sole and separate property
and NEPHI H. ALLEN, a married man dealing
with his sole and separate property, and
REXBURG PLUMBING & HEATING LLC, an
Idaho limited liability company,
Plaintiffs,

v.
HIGHWAY 101 INVESTMENTS, LLC,
Defendant,

HIGHWAY 101 INVESTMENTS, LLC,
Counterclaimant,

v.
KENTON D. JOHNSON, a married man
dealing with his sole and separate property
and NEPHI H. ALLEN, a married man dealing
with his sole and separate property, and
REXBURG PLUMBING & HEATING LLC, an
Idaho limited liability company,
Counterdefendants.
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AMENDED JUDGMENT

THIS COURT having entered its Memorandum Decision Re: Motions for
Attorney}s Fees and Costs dated September 12} 2011;
WHEREFORE} IT IS HEREBY ORDERED} ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Amended
Judgment be entered in favor of the defendant} Highway 101 Investments} LLC} and
against the plaintiffs} Kenton D. Johnson} Nephi H. Allen} and Rexburg Plumbing &
Heating} LLC in the amount of $1}145.28 for Highway 101}s request for costs.
MADE AND ENTERED

thi~=,--_ day of~er} 2011.

~inS'Jr.
District Judge

APPROVED:

Hyrum . Erickson} Esq.
Rigby} , ndrus & Rigby} Chartered
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
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s!~\~er,

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this
day of
2011, I caused a true and
correct copy of the foregoing AMENDED JUDGMENT to be served, by placing the same
in a sealed envelope and depositing in the United States Mail, postage prepaid, or hand
delivery, facsimile transmission or overnight delivery, addressed to the following:
Bryan D. Smith, Esq.
SMITH, DRISCOLL
& ASSOCIATES, PLLC
P.O. Box 50731
Idaho Falls, ID 83405-0731

I
Hyrum D. Erickson, Esq.
RIGBY, ANDRUS & RIGBY,
Chartered
Attorneys at Law
25 North Second East
Rexburg, Idaho 83440

[ +45. Mail
[ ] Fax
[ ] Overnight Delivery
[ ] Hand Delivery

--

~U.S.Mail
[ ] Fax
[ ] Overnight Delivery
[ ] Hand Delivery

Clerk of the Court
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Hyrum D. Erickson, ISBN 7688
RIGBY, ANDRUS & RIGBY, Chartered
Attorneys at Law
25 North Second East
Rexburg, Idaho 83440
Telephone: 208-356-3633
Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF MADISON

KENTON D. JOHNSON, a married man
dealing with his sole and separate
property and NEPHI H. ALLEN, a
married man dealing with his sole and
separate property, and REXBURG
PLUMBING & HEATING LLC, an
Idaho limited liability company,
Plaintiffs,

v.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV-I0-115

)

HIGHWAY 101 INVESTMENTS, LLC,
Defendant.

HIGHWAY 101 INVESTMENTS, LLC,
Counterc1aimant,
v.

)
)
)
)
)

)
)
)
)
)
)

)
)

)
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KENTON D. JOHNSON, a married man
dealing with his sole and separate
property and NEPHI H. ALLEN, a
married man dealing with his sole and
separate property, and REXBURG
PLUMBING & HEATING LLC, an
Idaho limited liability company,
Counterdefendants.

On the

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

'l9~y S1f~Oll'
of

Defendant obtained a judgment against

Plaintiffs in the above court and cause, in the sum of$I,145.28.
The Judgment has been settled and paid, and the undersigned attorney of record for the
Defendants do hereby autry3Eze and direct that the judgment be released and satisfied of record.

DATEDthis2J't'"~dayof S;~201

STA TE OF IDAHO
County of Bonneville
On this

)
ss.
)

J,.t}1Ii day of~~~!!ILJ!I...&<!t..L_"

2011, before me, the undersigned, a Notary

Public in and for said State, perso ally appeared Bryan D. Smith, known to me to be the person
whose name is subscribed to the within instrument and acknowledged to me that he executed the
same.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my h
day and year in this certificate first above written.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR MADISON COUNTY
KENTON D JOHNSON, a married man
)
Dealing with his sole and separate property )
)
And NEPHI HALLEN, a married man
And REXBURG PLUMBING & HEATING )
LLC. an Idaho limited liability company
)
)

Plaintiffs/ CounterdefendantslAppellants

)
)

VS

)

SUPREME COURT NO. 39160-2011
CASE NO. CV-2010-U5
CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS

)

HIGHWAY 101 INVESTMENTS, LLC

)
)

Defendantl Counterc1aimant/Respondent

)
)

I, Gwen Cureton, Deputy Clerk of the District Court of the Seventh Judicial
District of the State of Idaho, in and for Madison County, do hereby certify that the following is
a list of the exhibits, offered or admitted and which have been lodged with the Supreme Court or
retained as indicated:
NO.

DESCRIPTION
None

SENT lRETAINED

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affIxed the seal of
the said Court this
day of
, 2012.

KIM H MUIR
CLERK OF THE DISTRICT COURT

By-=_____________________
Deputy Clerk
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)
)

Defendant/Counterciaimant/Respondent

)
)

I, Kim H Muir, Clerk of the District Court of the 7th Judicial District of the
State of Idaho, in and for the County of Madison, do hereby certify that the foregoing
Clerk's Record in the above entitled cause was compiled and bound under my direction
and contains true and correct copies of all pleadings, documents and papers designated to
be included under Rule 28, IAR, the Notice of Appeal, any Notice of Cross Appeal, and
any additional documents requested to be included.
I further certify that all documents, x-rays, charts and pictures offered or admitted
as exhibits in the above entitled cause, if any, will be duly lodged with the Clerk of the
Supreme Court with any Reporter's Transcript and the Clerk's Record (except for
exhibits, which are retained in the possession of the undersigned), as required by Rule 31
of the Appellate Rules.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of
said Court this
day of
fC~ 2012.

KIMHMUIR
CLERK OF THE DISTRICT COURT

Deputy Clerk
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)
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)

I, Gwen Cureton, Deputy Clerk of the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District of
the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Madison, do hereby certify that I have
personally served or mailed, by United States Mail, postage prepaid, one copy of the
Clerk's Record and any Reporter's Transcript to each of the parties or their Attorney of
Record as follows:
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT
Hyrum DErickson
RIGBY, ANDRUS & RIGBY
25 North Second East
Rexburg, ID 83440
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Bryan D Smith
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